There's a lot of talk going on around here recently about issues of truth, right, and wrong. And I think a lot of the conversations get muddy because of a confusion of concepts.
The concepts of "fact" and "opinion" are taught as opposites in schools (at least they were in my day). At some point we were given a list of sentences and told to categorize them as facts or opinions, with no possibility allowed for "neither fact nor opinion."
Most dictionary definitions of "fact" I've seen include an element of truthfulness in the definition. See this for an example.
Most definitions of opinion speak of belief or conclusion, which necessitates that there is a one who believes or one who forms a conclusion. See this.
Facts and opinions are not opposites, but rather concepts that can refer to each other.
For example, "Dagonee believes homosexual couples should be able to receive the civil benefits of marriage" is a fact which contains truth about my opinion. "Dagonee believes homosexual couples should not be able to receive the civil benefits of marriage" is neither a fact nor an opinion, though it refers to an opinion.
Here's where it gets more complicated. Both statements above are what I will refer to as "factual statements." They can both be evaluated for truthfulness by someone with the appropriate knowledge. If true, then the statement will be properly categorized as a fact.
Let's look at another type of statement. Suppose Einstein said, "There is a cosmological constant in general relative whose effect is to reflect mathematically the static nature of the universe." He later said, "The introduction of the cosomological constant was a mistake." Were he alive today, he might say, "There is a cosmological constant that affects whether the universe expands, contracts, or stays constant." (Note: I'm using quotes mainly to partition the statements; I am not asserting Einstein ever said these.)
All of these statements are opinions - they reflect Einstein's belief about the cosmological constant. But they are also factual statements, or at least potentially so. It's possible that one day we will know the value of the cosmological constant and will be able to evaluate the truthfulness of these statements.
A lot of disputed things represent disputes about factual statements. For example, "There is a God with characteristics X, Y, and Z," "There is a God with characteristics W, X, and Y," and "There is no God." These are factual statements about which many, many people have opinions.
Similarly, "The Universe is 10,000 years old" and "The Universe is 15 billion years old" are both factual statements about which many people hold opinions. Here, though, many people do not consider one side or the other to be an opinion, based on the amount of positive knowledge or proof each side possesses. However, this really shifts the opinion definition to individual pieces of evidence and interpretations of the evidence. It becomes possible to rate the strength of an opinion, referring not to how strongly it's held, but to how strongly it is rooted in positive evidence. But this rating of strength will likely be subject to the same types of dispute.
I'm not sure what all this means, but the key issue is the concept of opinions about factual statements and the fact that many things called "opinions" are really factual statements.
Dagonee
Posted by twinky (Member # 693) on :
quote:Both statements above are what I will refer to as "factual statements." They can both be evaluated for truthfulness by someone with the appropriate knowledge.
I think calling them "factual statements" is likely to make people think they contain elements of truth.
Posted by saxon75 (Member # 4589) on :
Is the difference between stating a factual statement and holding the opinion that said factual statement is fact an important distinction to make?
Posted by twinky (Member # 693) on :
I had to parse that sentence twice to understand it, saxon.
Posted by saxon75 (Member # 4589) on :
Yeah it felt pretty awkward writing it, but I couldn't think of a better way of phrasing it that accurately conveyed my question.
Posted by TMedina (Member # 6649) on :
Um...three times for me.
-Trevor
Edit: It is important if only because too many terms have associated elements that are not necessarily integral to the statement. Factual does not indicate, for example, truthful but many people would argue otherwise.
quote: Is the difference between "stating a factual statement" and "holding the opinion that said factual statement is fact" an important distinction to make?
I think that's how its supposed to read.
[ April 13, 2005, 02:52 PM: Message edited by: TMedina ]
Posted by zgator (Member # 3833) on :
quote: Similarly, "The Universe is 10,000 years old" and "The Universe is 15 billion years old" are both factual statements about which many people hold opinions.
I wouldn't have considered either of those to be factual statements.
"The Bible says that the Universe is 10,000 years old" is a factual statement.
"Scientific measurements show the Universe to be 15 billion years old" is a factual statement.
Of course, that's just my opinion. Posted by Storm Saxon (Member # 3101) on :
quote: For example, "Dagonee believes homosexual couples should be able to receive the civil benefits of marriage" is a fact which contains truth about my opinion. "Dagonee believes homosexual couples should not be able to receive the civil benefits of marriage" is neither a fact nor an opinion, though it refers to an opinion.
I don't get why the second statement is not an opinion on Dagonee's opinion.
I also don't get how both of these statements can be factual statements when you've just said statement number two is 'neither a fact nor an opinion'.
Posted by saxon75 (Member # 4589) on :
Maybe like so:
According to the definitions you are using, Dag, if person A says "The Universe is 10,000 years old," the statement itself is not accurately described as his opinion. Rather, person A's opinion is that the statement "The Universe is 10,000 years old" is a true statement, that the factual statement is, indeed, fact. But is this an important or even useful distinction to make?
Posted by sndrake (Member # 4941) on :
quote:April 13, 2005 TO: Steve Drake FROM: Ron Seigel, First Vice President, Michigan Citizens With Disabilities Caucus
That is today's fax.
I found it when I did my daily fax-checking.
Posted by scottneb (Member # 676) on :
Thanks sndrake, that clears some things up.
Posted by TMedina (Member # 6649) on :
I think the distinction is a "truthful" or accurate fact versus a false or incorrect fact.
The book is open.
This is a factual statement.
Whether or not the book is actually open determines whether or not my statement is accurate.
The book is good.
This is a subjective viewpoint, stated as fact. It could and perhaps should be rephrased as, "I think the book is good."
And when the argument breaks down into semantics, using the same rulebook is always a good idea.
-Trevor
Posted by Storm Saxon (Member # 3101) on :
All the definitions that I've looked at in the various online dictionaries in the last couple of minutes describe 'fact' as something that 'exists' or whose truthfulness can be verified. Thus, I don't understand how you can have incorrect or false factual statements.
Posted by saxon75 (Member # 4589) on :
If my understanding is correct, then a "factual statement" would be a proposition stated as fact. Or possibly a statement regarding fact. Either way the "factual" refers to the subject of the statement, not the accuracy of the statement.
Posted by Storm Saxon (Member # 3101) on :
quote: If my understanding is correct, then a "factual statement" would be a proposition stated as fact. Or possibly a statement regarding fact. Either way the "factual" refers to the subject of the statement, not the accuracy of the statement.
Ah. Like 2 + 2 = 5 or something? The facts in the problem are correct but the conclusion is wrong?
Posted by no. 6 (Member # 7753) on :
*loves Big Brother*
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
quote:I think calling them "factual statements" is likely to make people think they contain elements of truth.
I'm open to alternatives. But the point is the statement is one that is either true or false. "Sideways" was a good movie is pretty much just an opinion, although factual statements could be used to support or denigrate that opinion. Suppose you have a bag. "There are 6 pennies in this bag" is a factual statement about the bag. "The bag is pretty" is an opinion about the bag.
quote:Is the difference between stating a factual statement and holding the opinion that said factual statement is fact an important distinction to make?
Yes, if only because there are factual statements not currently subject to proof that people hold opinions about. It therefore becomes necessary to categorize such statements when deciding how to respond.
quote:I wouldn't have considered either of those to be factual statements.
"The Bible says that the Universe is 10,000 years old" is a factual statement.
"Scientific measurements show the Universe to be 15 billion years old" is a factual statement.
Of course, that's just my opinion.
Actually, both of those are facts, at least according to my definition, assuming they are each qualified slightly:
"According to some interpretations, the Bible says that the Universe is 10,000 years old."
"Scientific measurements combined with the assumption of a constant speed of light show the Universe to be 15 billion years old."
The particular intepretation of the Bible or the evidence supporting the assumption of the constancy of lightspeed are both subject to additional statements about the supporting evidence, of course.
This illustrates why the distinction is important. We can pop over to Answers in Genesis and then to a variety of science sites and prove that each of these revised statements is true. Each of these statements form the basis for many poeple holding their opinion on the age of the Universe.
But the statement "The age of the Universe is X <units>" for some value X in some units would be a fact if the correct value of X and the correct unit were entered. Each of the versions of your revised statements in my original posts could be that factual statement.
And that's why the distinction is necessary. Some term is needed to refer to statements that could be facts. "Candidate facts," maybe? It's ugly, but it might work.
quote:I don't get why the second statement is not an opinion on Dagonee's opinion.
It might be an opinion, if expressed by someone else. Suppose two people have read all my posts except those about civil gay marriage. It would be reasonable to guess that I oppose it, based on my statements about my religious beliefs. If someone had seen some of my first amendment posts, though, it would be reasonable to guess that I support it. In either case, the statement made by such a person would be an opinion, even if they guessed correctly. This is because it is a belief not based on positive evidence. However, either statement could be true. Therefore they are factual statements or candidate facts, depending on which term we go with.
Technically, of course, it's possible I'm lying about what I believe. Depending on how deep one wants to get into epistemology, all statements are at best opinions. But frankly, the "we can't know what we know" discussions bore me.
quote:According to the definitions you are using, Dag, if person A says "The Universe is 10,000 years old," the statement itself is not accurately described as his opinion. Rather, person A's opinion is that the statement "The Universe is 10,000 years old" is a true statement, that the factual statement is, indeed, fact. But is this an important or even useful distinction to make?
Yes, I think it is. Because failing to do so can make it difficult to even parse which statements are worth having certain types of discussion about. When I argue that the first two Star Wars prequels were pretty good, I'm not arguing about something that might be "true." But in the course of doing so, I will provide reasons, some of which will be facts, to "support" my opinion. When I argue that evolution is likely, my intent is to provide evidence to support the truth of that statement.
The distinction also makes it easier, maybe even possible, to have discussions like the recent one about whether the Universe could be 10,000 years old and God not be a liar.
quote:All the definitions that I've looked at in the various online dictionaries in the last couple of minutes describe 'fact' as something that 'exists' or whose truthfulness can be verified. Thus, I don't understand how you can have incorrect or false factual statements.
That's the whole reason for my post, Storm. Because there is a different between a fact and something that might be a fact, yet they also contain many characteristics in common.
Using set theory, Call U the universal set of statements. Call C the universal set of factual statements or candidate facts. Call F the universal set of facts. F is a subset of C, which is a subset of U.
In data modeling terms, I'd have a entity called factual statements and an attribute called truth. Factual statements with truth = 1 would be facts.
quote:Either way the "factual" refers to the subject of the statement, not the accuracy of the statement.
Exactly.
Dagonee
Posted by Glenn Arnold (Member # 3192) on :
Saxon75 beat me to it. My math teachers would refer to these as "statements" but not factual ones, unless they could be proven.
A statement that is "stated as fact" can be true or false, but it is only a factual statement if it can be proven true. As such, the term "factual statement" is inherently loaded language.
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
But not all statements qualify. That's why I want to have a term for discussing these.
Posted by Storm Saxon (Member # 3101) on :
That's pretty much the way I understand factual statement, Glenn.
Posted by Glenn Arnold (Member # 3192) on :
As I recall, when I learned fact vs. opinion (in elementary school?) we had the option of fact and opinion. As in, "I believe the earth is round."
A statement that is inherently *just an opinion* is one that people could have different views on. Like whether Sideways is a good movie. You can't conclude that everyone will agree.
Posted by TMedina (Member # 6649) on :
If I understand Dag's intent, that is correct.
I state "2 + 2 = 5." I have not phrased this in the form of opinion, but rather as a stated fact.
As much as I may have wished this was the case when balancing my checkbook, it is incorrect and therefore not a fact as defined by Webster and others. Or, for purposes of inventory, an incorrect fact (a fact that is not correct, truthful or accurate is not a fact). In fact.
If I said "I believe 2 + 2 = 5," this would be my opinion until or unless it can be so verified as to enter the realm of fact.
I think we're discussing two issues:
Presentation - how do I present or represent the statement in my argument
The nature of the statement - fitting the literal definition and standards as a fact or fails the test and must be classified as an opinion.
Truth, as applied to the opinion - is that the actual opinion ascribed to the holder? Do I really, for example, believe pizza to be the bane of all existence?
-Trevor
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
The other interesting sidenote is that people will disagree on which statements can be included in the factual statement or candidate fact category. For example, those who believe in universal absolute morality will believe that statements such as "It is immoral to eat animal flesh" are factual statements or candidate facts. Those who do not believe in universal absolute morality will not consider those statements to be factual statements or candidate facts.
This, I think, may be the most important element of the distinction I'm trying to draw. I care little about the actual name, and much more about the underlying concept. I think this distinction gets pretty quickly lost in many discussions.
Dagonee
Posted by Storm Saxon (Member # 3101) on :
quote: However, either statement could be true. Therefore they are factual statements or candidate facts, depending on which term we go with.
If something could be true, but we don't know, or don't agree that it is, then it's just a 'statement' to me.
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
quote:fitting the literal definition and standards as a fact or fails the test and must be classified as an opinion.
But there's a qualitative difference between the opinion "the earth is round" and the opinion "Sideways is a good movie." So much so that I think different words are needed in situations when the distinction is important.
Dagonee
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
quote:If something could be true, but we don't know, or don't agree that it is, then it's just a 'statement' to me.
But there are statements that can't be true, at least in this sense. That's the distinction I want to make.
Dagonee
Posted by Glenn Arnold (Member # 3192) on :
(Rereading Dag's original post to try to get back to his original intent)
Posted by Storm Saxon (Member # 3101) on :
Man, I wish I wasn't heading out the door.
Posted by TMedina (Member # 6649) on :
Wouldn't this be subject to the argument?
You present x statement as fact and I challenge the grounds on which you present this statement as fact.
Hence the infamous, "if we accept this to be true and we consider the argument in this light, it follows that this statement must be true and therefore a fact."
Position A: It is a fact that killing is always wrong. Position B: To evaluate an action as "wrong" is a judgement based on subjective viewpoints. Ergo, the fact is invalid.
-Trevor
Posted by Glenn Arnold (Member # 3192) on :
The term we use is the "truth value" of the statement.
For example, a statement alone can have either a true or false value. It's possible to construct a statement that cannot be true, in that it is an inherent contradiction: "I am lying" is a terse version of this kind of thing. More common is: I exist AND I don't exist. The AND makes the statement impossible, since both sub-statements can't be true at the same time.
The opposite of an inherently false statement is a tautology: "God exists or God does not exist." This statement is true, regardless of the truth value of the substatements.
I think maybe the issue of opinion needs clarifying, though, because I don't see fact as being the opposite of opinion.
Posted by saxon75 (Member # 4589) on :
quote:Yes, I think it is. Because failing to do so can make it difficult to even parse which statements are worth having certain types of discussion about. When I argue that the first two Star Wars prequels were pretty good, I'm not arguing about something that might be "true." But in the course of doing so, I will provide reasons, some of which will be facts, to "support" my opinion. When I argue that evolution is likely, my intent is to provide evidence to support the truth of that statement.
I don't understand what you are saying here at all.
I think the root of my lack of understanding is that I don't get why "The Star Wars prequels are good movies" is not a factual statement. It's certainly stated as fact.
And I don't understand why the two statements "The Star Wars prequels are good movies" and "Evolution is likely" are different in terms of "truth." Both are stated equally firmly (using "is" and "are") and both are equally subjective ("good" and "likely").
Posted by JonnyNotSoBravo (Member # 5715) on :
quote:A lot of disputed things represent disputes about factual statements. For example, "There is a God with characteristics X, Y, and Z," "There is a God with characteristics W, X, and Y," and "There is no God." These are factual statements about which many, many people have opinions.
These cannot all be factual statements if a factual statement by definition contains truth. "There is a God" cannot be true at the same time as "There is no God". So you can say the first two or the last one of these statements may be true, and therefore may be factual. Also, it's possible none of them could be true; there could be a God that doesn't have characteristics W, X, Y or Z.
Like saxon75, I do not get what the point of making these distinctions is. It is definitely semantic - I'm just not sure it's useful. Posted by twinky (Member # 693) on :
quote:It is definitely semantic - I'm just not sure it's useful.
This is Dagonee we're talking about, remember. Posted by no. 6 (Member # 7753) on :
Isn't arguing mostly semantic anyway?
Posted by TMedina (Member # 6649) on :
If only because a person intent on winning an argument is just as likely to misrepresent a fact in order to document a "win" rather than participate in a meeting of the minds intent on meaningful discussion.
That said, "God exists" is no more a factual statement than "God doesn't exist" because neither statement, although presented as fact, can be verified as truthful or accurate.
Which leads us to the subjective nature of proof and human perception.
-Trevor
Posted by saxon75 (Member # 4589) on :
To make it more concrete:
Person A--let's call him Alan--says, "The Star Wars prequels are good movies." This is a factual statement. It is Alan's opinion that the statement is true. What difference should separating the factual statement from the opinion make in my conversation with Alan about the worth of the Star Wars prequels?
Person B--let's call him Barry--says, "Evolution is likely." This is also a factual statement. It is Barry's opinion that the statment is true. What difference should separating the factual statement from the opinion make in my conversation with Barry about evolution?
Posted by twinky (Member # 693) on :
#6:
I wouldn't say so.
"Jake Lloyd should play Ender" versus "Haley Joel Osment should play Ender" versus "They'll both be too old by the time the movie gets made" is hardly a semantic discussion, rather it is vital to the future of Hatrack -- nay, the world!
[ April 13, 2005, 03:56 PM: Message edited by: twinky ]
Posted by saxon75 (Member # 4589) on :
Trevor, you're using a different definition of "factual statement" than Dag is. That's not what his point is.
Posted by Irami Osei-Frimpong (Member # 2229) on :
Fact is ground in the idea of what is made or done by God. That we even think that we can engage with facts is a result of having the divine power of thought and the world being sprung from the thought of God, and I think that's a suspect road that gives its way to science and bad law.
I think we true opinions of the world, as distinct from facts. And the only thing we have facts concerning are those things that we make. We can have facts concerning tools, and the extent to with we make everything a tool or a making of man, we introduce new facts. But the big things, the things that we don't make or manipulate, we opinion is all we have, but that's quite a lot.
[ April 13, 2005, 03:59 PM: Message edited by: Irami Osei-Frimpong ]
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
"That we even think that we can engage with facts is a result of having the divine power of thought and the world being sprung from the thought of God, and I think that's a suspect road that gives its way to science and bad law."
Man, you went to Berkeley. You can do better than that.
People invoke "Truth is God" only when they don't want to have to start justifying themselves.
Posted by Irami Osei-Frimpong (Member # 2229) on :
I'm not saying that I believe it, I'm saying that that's what a fact is. Fact from the latin facere, to make or to do, and the noun form was concieved with the sense of a making or doing of God, that's why it can't be otherwise.
I'm also saying that God being the guarantor and origin of facts poses huge problems.
[ April 13, 2005, 04:04 PM: Message edited by: Irami Osei-Frimpong ]
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
Glenn, what that categorization schema fails to account for is statements that are not true or false not because they are self-contradictory but because of their nature.
quote:I think the root of my lack of understanding is that I don't get why "The Star Wars prequels are good movies" is not a factual statement. It's certainly stated as fact.
And I don't understand why the two statements "The Star Wars prequels are good movies" and "Evolution is likely" are different in terms of "truth." Both are stated equally firmly (using "is" and "are") and both are equally subjective ("good" and "likely").
Saxon, the form of the statement is incidental. Likely may be subjective, but only in the sense that one person might define a specific range of probabilities as likely than another person would, whereas a movies "goodness" is inherently undefinable. Change "is likely" to "has a large body of scientific evidence in its support."
quote:These cannot all be factual statements if a factual statement by definition contains truth. "There is a God" cannot be true at the same time as "There is no God". So you can say the first two or the last one of these statements may be true, and therefore may be factual. Also, it's possible none of them could be true; there could be a God that doesn't have characteristics W, X, Y or Z.
Again, I'm distinguishing between "factual statements" and "facts." And I've expressed a willingness to alter the term "factual statement." According to my usage, as defined above, these are all "factual statements" in a way that "that flower is pretty" is not.
Let's try to define the types of statements as sets:
S: The set of all statements. All members of any set below is a member of S.
C: The set of all statements that, if true, would be facts.
U: The set of all statements that cannot be true or false (not dependent on are ability to prove). U is the complement set of C (Any member of S must be in either C or U).
O: The set of all opinions. A member of O may be in either C or U.
OU: The set of all opinions that cannot be true or false. All members of OU are members of U.
OC: The set of all opinions that could be true or false.
F: The set of all facts. All smembers of F are members of C.
OofC: The set of all opinions about one or more statements in C. All members of OC are members of O and members of OC.
CofO: The set of all statements in C about one or more statements in O. All members of CofO are members of C.
FofO: the set of all facts about opinions. All members of FofOare members of F.
Posted by Glenn Arnold (Member # 3192) on :
quote: I'm not sure what all this means, but the key issue is the concept of opinions about factual statements and the fact that many things called "opinions" are really factual statements.
I'd argue that many (most) of the things we call facts are actually opinions.
As far as any argument about whether a movie is good or not goes, these statements depend on personal opinion. A person can state the reasons for their opinion as criteria, but another person would have to agree on those criteria, and also whether the movie meets those criteria. That's where the term "subjective" comes in.
We've used the term "subjective," but so far, we haven't used "objective." I think (my opinion) that those terms are clearer than "fact" vs. "opinion," because they haven't devolved into colloqial expressions.
Could we say a fact is an objective truth, while an opinion is a subjective truth?
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
By the way, the above list is a quick go at it. I expect there are errors.
I'm trying to end up with only four undefined terms: statement, fact, opinion, and truth (with false defined as not true, and truth not depending on our ability to verify, but on the nature of the statement. My intent is that "There is a God" is a member of C.
Posted by Glenn Arnold (Member # 3192) on :
quote: Glenn, what that categorization schema fails to account for is statements that are not true or false not because they are self-contradictory but because of their nature.
I assume that by "their nature" you mean the same as what I'm calling the "truth value" of the statement.
"The world is flat" has a truth value of "false."
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
quote:Could we say a fact is an objective truth, while an opinion is a subjective truth?
If you are referencing those terms from the perspective of the statement, not the maker of the statement.
It comes back to whether "There is a God" is, if true, an objective truth? Whereas many statements about God might very well be subjective. And I know that's horribly unclear, so I'm going to go pick up a package and try again.
Dagonee
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
quote:I assume that by "their nature" you mean the same as what I'm calling the "truth value" of the statement.
"The world is flat" has a truth value of "false."
No, what I meant was closer to subjective/objective. But I'm not happy with those terms because there's a difference between subjective/objective truth and subjective/objective knowledge that I don't think is fully appreciated by many people.
Dagonee
Posted by Glenn Arnold (Member # 3192) on :
quote: It comes back to whether "There is a God" is, if true, an objective truth?
If it's true, then it's an objective truth. The problem is that we don't know whether it's true or not.
This is where we get into the difference between "knowledge" and "belief."
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
Yes, and I'm pretty comfortable with that distinction (knowledge/belief). Maybe the problem is perspective. I'm trying to look at not what someone knows, believes, or thinks about it, but rather what is. Which I think is why I zeroed in on the "factual statement/candidate fact" concept.
[ April 13, 2005, 05:07 PM: Message edited by: Dagonee ]
Posted by Avin (Member # 7751) on :
quote:Let's try to define the types of statements as sets:
S: The set of all statements. All members of any set below is a member of S. C: The set of all statements that, if true, would be facts. U: The set of all statements that cannot be true or false (not dependent on are ability to prove). U is the complement set of C (Any member of S must be in either C or U). O: The set of all opinions. A member of O may be in either C or U. OU: The set of all opinions that cannot be true or false. All members of OU are members of U. OC: The set of all opinions that could be true or false. F: The set of all facts. All smembers of F are members of C. OofC: The set of all opinions about one or more statements in C. All members of OC are members of O and members of OC. CofO: The set of all statements in C about one or more statements in O. All members of CofO are members of C. FofO: the set of all facts about opinions. All members of FofOare members of F.
I like this analysis, but I think we can do better. For one thing, let's do away with "statements" and instead talk about "propositions" as in logical propositions. A "statement" as understood as any human language based utterance is poorly defined, and leads to this false dichotomy of allowing the possibility of something that is neither true nor false.
In order to talk about logical propositions, there must be some theory-of-everything this is based on, i.e. the conceptual atoms and a semantic interpretation for every logical statement.
Let us posit that there exists a objectively real theory G (consisting of atoms and interpretation) that is capable of interpreting certain propositions. As a Christian, I believe that G is capable of assigning an interpretation (true or false) to ANY proposition. However I will also allow for the fact that this is an issue of faith, and so this may NOT exist. Even if not, I think most people, atheists included, would say that there is some objective reality, but it may not be capable of interpreting every proposition. In even the most extreme case though, subjectivity cannot be subjective if we want to have logical consistency (e.g. if "nothing is objectively true", then is the proposition "nothing is objectively true" objectively true?), so G must exist even if it is only capable of interpreting a few things.
So we know that there exists at least one proposition P which is interpreted in G as either true or false. If a proposition is true under G, then it is a Fact. Any propositions that are not interpreted under G are inherently subjective. If G interprets every proposition, then each proposition is either a fact or its inverse is a fact.
Now, consider any individual person A. A, working in the same logical system, holds certain axioms A to be true. These axioms contain the fundamental truths that are part of this person's worldview, as well as this person's mental interpretation of different words and concepts. Now, for any proposition P, we know from Godel's Incompleteness theorems that if A is consistent, either A proves P, A proves ~P, or A cannot prove or disprove P. The way we interpret this is that if A proves P, then A holds P as an opinion. If A neither proves nor disproves P, then A does not have an opinion of whether P is true or not. (An interesting side note of this explanation for opinions is that we know from Godel's theorems that A cannot prove or disprove the consistency of A, so under the above interpretation, if a person has a consistent worldview, they would never know for certain whether they were completely consistent or not!)
Now, if A holds an opinion that is false under G, then we would say A has an incorrect opinion. However, there is no way to prove that A's opinion is incorrect unless we were to know parts of G. Of course, A may hold opinions of what G's interpretations are, but cannot inherently use it.
Furthermore if G does not exist, then any two people may have different axioms and come to different conclusions, and neither would be able to say one is correct or not. However, what is possible regardless of whether G exists or not is to point out inconsistencies: such as if A completely understands B (i.e. A knows B), A can attempt to prove a contradiction starting from B in an attempt to show B that B is inconsistent.
So the relation between Fact and Opinion is inherently tied to the scope of what is objectively true or not. If G is "complete", then there are a lot of Facts out there. In fact, no person could even have as many opinions as the number of facts that would exist without being inconsistent (in other words, it is impossible for any one person to believe everything that is objectively true at the same time while still being consistent). If G is "incomplete", this still may be the case, but it may also be the case that it is possible to believe everything that is objectively true. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, anything that a person thinks is by definition an opinion, even if they seem to KNOW it to be true. However, their opinions can either be true, false, or neither depending on how they match up to G.
[ April 13, 2005, 05:17 PM: Message edited by: Avin ]
Posted by saxon75 (Member # 4589) on :
quote:Saxon, the form of the statement is incidental. Likely may be subjective, but only in the sense that one person might define a specific range of probabilities as likely than another person would, whereas a movies "goodness" is inherently undefinable. Change "is likely" to "has a large body of scientific evidence in its support."
Alright, so my understanding of a factual statement was faulty. I still don't see the practical application of the separation of opinion from factual statement.
Alan says, "Evolution is likely." That is a factual statement (as defined above). It is therefore his opinion that the statement is true. How should this separation of opinion from factual statement affect my conversation with him?
Posted by saxon75 (Member # 4589) on :
Actually, if we replace "is likely" with "has a large body of scientific evidence in its support," then it's hardly even worth discussing, as it's not even disputable. I mean, one may dispute that the scientific evidence has any value or may dispute its interpretation, but I think most people would be hard pressed to argue that it doesn't exist.
What if we change it to Alan saying "All life evolved from single-celled organisms"? That seems to qualify as a factual statement. And Alan's opinion, then, is that the statement is true. How should that affect my discussion with him?
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
quote:Alan says, "Evolution is likely." That is a factual statement (as defined above). It is therefore his opinion that the statement is true. How should this separation of opinion from factual statement affect my conversation with him?
Because it's not useful seeking to determine the truth of a non-factual statement* - it's a meaningless endeavor. So one must first determine if the subject of disagreement is a factual statement or not.
My point isn't distinguishing the opinion that a factual statement is true from the factual statement, although I think there's value in doing so. Rather, it's in distinguishing factual statements from opinions in general. The opinion about a factual statement was an interesting example of the broader concept that many times when people think they are discussing opinions they are actually disputing the truth value of factual statements.
Dagonee *Factual statement is used here in the same way I used it in the first post.
[ April 13, 2005, 05:55 PM: Message edited by: Dagonee ]
Posted by saxon75 (Member # 4589) on :
Ah, OK. Got it now.
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
Victimized by my love of self-referencing concepts.
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
Oh, and Avin, I'm still pondering your post. It's an interesting way of looking at things.
I haven't run into you before. Are you new or are you an alt for another member?
Posted by Avin (Member # 7751) on :
I'm relatively new (registered here about a week ago). But I would think you would have read some of my posts on the Speed of Light/10000 years thread (starting on page 2).
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
Welcome aboard. Posted by Avin (Member # 7751) on :
Thanks.
In the process of explaining my last post to my wife, I was able to simplify things a bit; since I think more logically/mathematically I realize I tend to be more abstract than I have to be sometimes. My point is that objective truthhood/falsity of statements or propositions determines its status as a "fact" and this is based on a comprehensive (perhaps arbitrary, if you wish) assignment of truth values to propositions. Humans cannot think this way. We think logically. (Well, illogically sometimes!) The point is that formalized logic was developed to reflect the way humans reason. We start with certain assumptions, and we make conclusions by reasoning on those assumptions. The things we think are true are all results of that process. Therefore, they do not correspond (and, based on theories in logic, cannot ever correspond completely and consistently) to a comprehensive assignment of truth values to sentences. So we can state our "opinions," which are the results of this system, and our opinions may even contain thoughts about what this object truth is, but we cannot ever equate the results of our reasoning with that objective truth. Our opinions will then be facts depending on whether they correspond to objective truth, but if anyone tries to evaluate any given opinion, their opinion of whether it is true or not will also be an opinion.
The other thing is that I think any written or spoken sentence that seems not to correspond to something capable of having objective truth value ("The movie is good"), in reality, to whoever wrote or spoke such a sentence, carries behind it much more semantic meaning, which consists of perhaps one or more internal propositions (such as what "good" means in this case, what makes a movie "good", things about this movie that are relevent to evaluating it as "good", etc). That's why I chose to look behind the statement and evaluate the propositions behind it.
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
OK, if we change my schema as follows:
C: The set of all statements that can be assigned a truth value under G. F: The set of all statements that are assigned the truth value "true" under G. All members of F are members of C.
U maintains the same definition as the complement of C, but of course it's base definition is altered by the change to C. The undefined terms are now statement, opinion, and G (which contains the definition of true).
Under this new system, whether or not objective truth exists or not depends on whether or not C is an empty set and whether or not U is an empty set. If C is empty, then there is no objective truth. If U is empty, then there is no subjective truth. If both are non-empty, then both subjective and objective truth exists.
The categorization of a statement into C or U will then be a necessary first step in seeking to determine its truth.
I'm still digesting "statement" and "proposition." I think moving from the former to the latter removes part of the subject I'm interested in here, so I need to think on it more.
Glenn, does this help integrate the thoughts you expressed on the last page and the idea I'm trying to get at here?
Dagonee
[ April 13, 2005, 07:56 PM: Message edited by: Dagonee ]
Posted by Glenn Arnold (Member # 3192) on :
quote: Let us posit that there exists a objectively real theory G (consisting of atoms and interpretation) that is capable of interpreting certain propositions.
This is my take on this:
Depending on your definition of "interpret," you could say that "reality" interprets atoms as being "true." Any atom not interpreted by reality is, by default, "False." (or non-existent. Reminds me of Spock "anything that is real exists")
From this can we make the jump to: "G exists, and G is complete"? Or am I assuming too much about reality?
Posted by Glenn Arnold (Member # 3192) on :
Ok, I remember now: "Nothing that is unreal exists."
I don't think it's logically the same, but use the other one, because it works better in my previous post.
Posted by Glenn Arnold (Member # 3192) on :
Dag,
I'm trying to sort out your sets. I can work with a few at a time, but it takes time to absorb them all.
quote: My intent is that "There is a God" is a member of C.
Yes, we agree on that.
quote: Let us posit that there exists a objectively real theory G (consisting of atoms and interpretation) that is capable of interpreting certain propositions. As a Christian, I believe that G is capable of assigning an interpretation (true or false) to ANY proposition.
Based on what I said above, G (as reality) does interpret every proposition. G (as God) introduces something that is assumed prior to the assumption of reality. (Oh, geez, this is going to open a whole other can of worms).
Ok, first: If we define reality as God, then God exists. But if we assume God is reality (The assumption of God must be prior to the assumption of reality), then (I think) God is a superset of reality, and thus isn't necessarily interpreted by it. (or can only be partially interpreted by it)
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
When I use the G concept, I'm strictly using it as an evaluator of statements. This means it can parse a statement and assign truth values where possible. The crux, I guess, is whether or not "Sideways is a good movie" is something that can be assigned a truth value by G. And here it's important to maintain the distinction between "Sideways is a good movie" and "Sideways is a good movie to me."
So my use of G above does not require God (although, of course, my personal concept of the real G is based on my belief in God).
Whether or not all statements can be assigned a truth value by G is an important question about the nature of the universe, I think. All my musings in the first post were based on an apparantly deep, underlying assumption that not all statements can be assigned a truth value by G.
Dagonee
Posted by Glenn Arnold (Member # 3192) on :
quote: The crux, I guess, is whether or not "Sideways is a good movie" is something that can be assigned a truth value by G. And here it's important to maintain the distinction between "Sideways is a good movie" and "Sideways is a good movie to me."
So an opinion in this case is true if it fulfills a personal rubric. Does that work?
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
I think so. But that can't depend on whether the person thinks it's a personal rubric. If G can evaluate the truth of any statement, "statement X can be evaluated by G" has to be a statement that can be evaluated by G.
I think.
Dagonee
Posted by Glenn Arnold (Member # 3192) on :
It's possible for a three year old to evaluate whether they like a movie or not, but a three year old isn't even going to consider whether they have a personal rubric. And I think that most of the time adults don't bother to consider whether they have a personal rubric either.
"I know what I like" isn't exactly metacognitive. It's usually just a cop out. (often a perfectly justified cop out, but a cop out nonetheless)
In other words I don't think you even have to be aware of the process of evaluating according to a rubric in order to have an opinion.
You might break it down into formal opinion, where you know you are comparing it to a personal rubric, and informal opinion, where you don't know or don't care.
Posted by Avin (Member # 7751) on :
If G exists and is complete, it would have to necessarily contain comprehensive information about everyone who has ever existed, including their complete personal rubrics at any point in time during their lives and how they would take anything to mean, whether those people knew it themselves or not.
So just because a person does not know that they have certain views does not preclude G from having an interpretation on things that relate to them.
Furthermore, just because a person isn't aware that they have a reasoning system that results in a proposition, does not mean that the system does not exist.
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
quote:If G exists and is complete, it would have to necessarily contain comprehensive information about everyone who has ever existed, including their complete personal rubrics at any point in time during their lives and how they would take anything to mean, whether those people knew it themselves or not.
Yes, and this would allow someone to judge a CofO statement (a factual statement about an opinion). But this leaves out one level of analysis.
If "Sideways is a good movie" (a member of U) is a personal rubric, then G cannot evaluate the truth of that statement. But, it can evaluate the truth of the statement, "Dagonee believes that Sideways is a good movie." (a member of CofU)
Dagonee
Posted by Avin (Member # 7751) on :
The problem is, you cannot seperate the statement "Sideways is a good movie" from the context - i.e., who said that statement, to what audience, was it part of a discussion, what was said before, what does the word "good" mean in that context, etc. That is why I choose to deal with propositions instead, because the implicit propositions that correspond to that statement ALONG WITH the context of that statement can together be interpreted under G as true or false. At least, that is my take - again, because I believe that G is complete. If you did not believe G is complete then it may very well be that that is subjective and G does not interpret any of the propositions related to that statement.
Note that this blurs the line between you stating (statement X:) "Sideways is a good movie" and me stating (statement Y:) "Dagonee thinks Sideways is a good movie" in an imaginary conversation. Both of these statements correspond to both propositions and contexts that can be interpreted in G and can be true or false, so they both are potentially "facts". Both of these statements can be opinions as well, because according to a third person observer of our conversation T's axioms, which includes what T thinks the word "good" means in the current discussion, T may agree or disagree with either statement. T may think (as a result of T) that X is either true or false, and T may think Y is true or false (for instance, he could believe you were lying when you said that). Later in our conversation, T may realize we are using the word "good" (or maybe the word "movie") in a different sence than he had thought, and therefore now change his opinion on one or potentially both statements. However this would not contradict with the fact that he previously would have vocally said something that he now seems to be saying the opposite of; what changed was his internal representation of the sentence (the context) and so we only see the vocal portion of that change. He has not changed his axioms, but he is asserting a different thing than before. The point is that his two assertions are still logically equivalent because his context with his statement amounted to the same idea both times, but we only see the statement portion of that.
Still, there IS a difference between statement X and statement Y, in that in a certain sense they are related but statement Y has more context to it than statement X. The context of statement X involves your personal definition of "good" and "movie", what makes a "good movie", knowledge of the movie Sideways with relation to how it can be good, and innumerable assumptions about language and reality - all of which you held at the time you stated this (since it was your statement). I think that given a complete understanding of this context, there is an objective truth or falsity to the statement+context (which is best described by the propositions that underly the statement+context). Therefore, if someone had internal axioms that were consistent and completely aligned with G, then they would always come to the same conclusion about the statement that G would. Furthermore, any two people with the same axioms, if they had the same context about the statement, would also come to the same conclusion about the statement, because they would both be evaluating the same set of propositions that underly the statement+context from the same axioms.
Now with Y, Y contains a context about X that is specific to what Dagonee thought the context of X was at the time that he made statement X, and also context about what a person is, who Dagonee is, what does it mean for a person to think something, etc. which is specific to ME at the time I made statement Y. So in other words, Y has a more specific, but larger, context than X.
The reason statement X seems more subjective and opinion oriented than statement Y is that statement X is completely based on your personal assumptions about words and topics that are not semi-universally held. But if you incorporate your context with the statement, then you get to what you really meant. However, the truth value of statement Y is in most people's reasoning more based upon assumptions that are more universally held (those assumptions which relate to you actually having said that and believing that the movie is good). Yet that is at its deepest level, equally subjective until you include the contexts described above, at which point it then can be evaluated by G or any person's own axioms.
The lesson, I think, is that when people make statements, the more explicit they are about the contexts, the more "factual" they seem.
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