Many times I've seen expressed the basic idea of "Even if free will doesn't exist, it's important that we act as though it does."
For those of you that agree with this statement, could you please explain to me what it means?
To me, it doesn't make any sense to talk about someone without free will deciding how to act, nor does it make sense to talk about how somebody should act if they aren't able to choose how to act.
I'm guessing that there's something I'm missing, quite possibly a definition that isn't shared.
I'm not wanting to get into a debate about whether or not we actually have free will -- I'm just trying to understand a viewpoint that I currently don't.
Posted by pooka (Member # 5003) on :
If we don't have free will, a lot of us would be in despair. It would mean that any abuse we've suffered or bad things we've done were appointed by God and there's nothing we can do about them.
Being able to do something about problems is essential to the way a lot of people operate psychologically -- even if the only choice we have is how to feel about something.
Posted by mr_porteiro_head (Member # 4644) on :
Yeah, that doesn't answer my question. If you don't have free will, how can you possibly choose how to feel about it? If you can choose, what does it mean to say that you don't have free will?
Posted by Achilles (Member # 7741) on :
I'm with Porter on this one. I don't understand it either, Dude.
Please enlighten us?
Posted by mr_porteiro_head (Member # 4644) on :
I'm hoping that Tom will chime in, since I know for a fact that he's expressed such an idea before.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:For those of you that agree with this statement, could you please explain to me what it means?
It means that people need to believe that their lives are personally meaningful and that their decisions have consequences in order for them to be aware of themselves as conscious entities; self-awareness is predicated upon the possibility of conscious thought, and conscious thought is by its very nature aware of the possibility of alternative action. It also means that society has to behave as if a given individual's actions are the result of that individual's decisions to maintain order, if not "justice."
For this reason, even if it turns out that everything you do has been predetermined by your environment, your genetics, or God, society still has to behave as if "you" chose to do those things. Moreover, your awareness of your self as a conscious entity is dependent upon the fiction that you are a conscious entity.
We construct our image of the will out of our image of the self -- and, importantly, vice versa. Whether we truly have free will or not, whether everything we do IS predetermined or not, it is essential to our image of ourselves to behave otherwise.
Posted by adfectio (Member # 11070) on :
I think it's one of those circular logic things. Or it just isn't logical at all. I think you understand all the arguments, you just can't make it fit in your head.
If we don't have free will how can we freely decide to act like we do? We can't. But maybe we're made to think that we do choose it.
Posted by Javert (Member # 3076) on :
The way I've heard it explained is that, when it comes down to it, we don't have free will. We act based on our genes, which we have no control over, and the sum of our experiences.
So, if we were able to look at all those factors and understand them, it would appear as though there is no free will. People just do what the genes and experiences say they're going to do.
But since we can't possibly have all of that information, and even if we did it would be incredibly hard to view it objectively, we don't know what we're 'supposed to do'.
And thus, we act as though we have free will.
Hopefully that made some sense.
Posted by MattP (Member # 10495) on :
quote:If we don't have free will, a lot of us would be in despair.
I think what you're trying to say would be more accurately stated as "If we didn't believe we had free will, a lot of us would be in despair." That's really a separate issue from whether we actually have free will or not.
I think it's likely that we live in an entirely deterministic universe, but that there are so many variables at play so as to make it impossible to distinguish from true free will.
I also think it's impossible to act as if you don't have free will unless you actually do have free will. Posted by Lisa (Member # 8384) on :
From my point of view, it means that we have absolutely no way to know whether or not we have free will. It sure feels like we do, no? I mean, I'm choosing to type this.
If we don't have free will, it's not something we can ever really know. It's just theoretical. It may be true and it may not be. That being the case, acting as though we don't have free will (which is stupid, because doing so is itself a choice) is morally lazy and an excuse for doing whatever we want.
Since we can't know for sure one way or the other, it's incumbant upon us to take responsibility for our choices and our actions.
Posted by The Pixiest (Member # 1863) on :
You can "choose" all you like. However, whatever you choose will be due to Causation. Something CAUSED you to choose that. Your biology combined with your environment will dictate whatever you do.
Just because we don't have the ability to measure every little variable... The bit of cosmic radiation that bounced a neuron a nanometer to the left and inspired your greatest creative thought... The hormone that your body released that made you eat the ENTIRE pizza... The traumatic childhood experience that has instilled a livelong terror of Shrimp... doesn't mean we have free will.
We are a biological machine reacting to the world around us.
However, removing the pretense of free will changes the environment in an unpleasant way. Can you suddenly beg mercy for your sins/crimes/rudeness because you had no free will? After all, how can you be guilty of something when you had no choice?
So we act as if we have free will. People are held accountable for their actions. And a (comparatively) polite environment is maintained.
Posted by mr_porteiro_head (Member # 4644) on :
*frustrated*
None of this addresses the crux of why I can't wrap my head around this idea.
quote:Whether we truly have free will or not, whether everything we do IS predetermined or not, it is essential to our image of ourselves to behave otherwise.
I don't understand how it makes any sense to talk of something without free will "behaving", any more than it makes sense to talk of a stone misbehaving.
Of course, a stone isn't self aware, which is where I think the disconnect might be. What does it mean for someone to be self-aware but not to have free will?
Posted by pooka (Member # 5003) on :
quote:"If we didn't believe we had free will, a lot of us would be in despair."
Yeah, whatever. I thought Porter had clarified that we were discussing the belief in Free Will and not Free Will.
I have this calvinist friend and his interpretation of predestination makes sense, it's just not anything I would describe as predestination.
I'm still somewhat of a taoist, I think which means we do have free will in some things but not in others. But even in the non free will things, we have a choice about how we will feel about those things, and if we see them truthfully, we are less likely to be depressed. We gain more and more free will. Whoa. I don't think you can ever gain all or infinite free will, though. Even God's intentions are subject to our free will.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:I don't understand how it makes any sense to talk of something without free will "behaving", any more than it makes sense to talk of a stone misbehaving.
Why not? You can ask how water "behaves" on a slope, or how gas "behaves" in a closed system. Behavior does not necessarily imply choice.
quote:What does it mean for someone to be self-aware but not to have free will?
Remember how I spent a while trying to answer this one for myself, and then settled on "contexts" to cover it? The idea is that someone's self-awareness operates on the internal context; you -- that is, the bundle of things that make up your sense of self -- are aware of yourself by virtue of being your sense of self. You can make decisions that appear to be generated purely from within your consciousness, but your consciousness is merely another product of your internal context -- and your internal context is, first and foremost, a product of other contexts. This produces a closed system within which your "free will" can occur; you may be able to "freely" choose between a variety of options, but since all inputs into and methods of the closed system are controlled by other contexts, it should be theoretically possible for an external observer to perfectly predict your choice provided he or she knows all the variables (which is a pretty big "provided," mind you, and not one I think we'll achieve in a dozen lifetimes.)
I'm verging on making a programming analogy, here. Don't make me. Posted by pooka (Member # 5003) on :
Your mother is a programming analogy.
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
quote:Why not? You can ask how water "behaves" on a slope, or how gas "behaves" in a closed system. Behavior does not necessarily imply choice.
But you wouldn't say it was important for water to flow down a slope, even though it might be important to know that water on a slope will flow down.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
It is argued that free will is a post hoc rationalization. That is to say it is a narrative that explains what already happened in a way that mistakenly seems like we are active agents.
[ March 31, 2008, 02:19 PM: Message edited by: orlox ]
Posted by mr_porteiro_head (Member # 4644) on :
quote:Originally posted by TomDavidson:
quote:I don't understand how it makes any sense to talk of something without free will "behaving", any more than it makes sense to talk of a stone misbehaving.
Why not? You can ask how water "behaves" on a slope, or how gas "behaves" in a closed system. Behavior does not necessarily imply choice.
Good point.
quote:Originally posted by Dagonee: [QB]
quote:Why not? You can ask how water "behaves" on a slope, or how gas "behaves" in a closed system. Behavior does not necessarily imply choice.
But you wouldn't say it was important for water to flow down a slope, even though it might be important to know that water on a slope will flow down.
Also a good point.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
My take on it is that the concept of free will goes hand in hand with the concept of rewards and punishments for behavior. And that concept is integral to civilization, which in turn is integral to the success/survival of our species on the current (or any large) scale.
You can take free will out of that, by the way, and it all still works, it's just that we seem to be mired in patterns of speech and thought that make free will a useful concept. Acting as if free will exists may have the same meaning/result as "acting out genetic imperatives that result in the encouragement of beneficial behavior and the discouragement/prevention of harmful behavior."
For me, personally, choice is a useful concept whether my choices are deterministic or by some nebulous definition "free." In fact, I haven't encountered a useful definition of free will that is qualitatively distinguishable from "deterministic but currently not well understood."
Why is free will important? What is different about reality, for you, if you don't have free will? More importantly, what would be different about humanity if free will didn't exist?
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:But you wouldn't say it was important for water to flow down a slope, even though it might be important to know that water on a slope will flow down.
It may be important to the water to flow down a slope. I don't think the water is capable of perceiving this value, since I don't think it's got anything capable of coming up with an awareness of "purpose," but I could be wrong.
It's important for us -- insofar as we consider ourselves self-aware, free-willed entities -- to behave as if we are self-aware, free-willed entities. If we could remove the "free-willed" fiction without also removing the "self-aware" fiction, that might be okay -- but I suspect it's impossible. More pointedly, I suspect it's academic; we're not going to stop acting like we're free-willed just because it's theoretically possible that we aren't.
I suppose a useful question is this: if someone gives you a potent drug without your knowledge, and after falling victim to it you "choose" to rape and kill someone, are you to blame? If not, who is?
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
For some systems lacking free will, a person's behavior is determined in lage part by their environment. In these systems, having the concept of free will and its attendent ideas (such as justifiable punishment and personal responsibility) are important because, even though they would be false, they would lead to better outcomes than if the true state were believed.
What people believe are part of the deterministic inputs and believing that they had no free will would lead to more negative consequences than believing that they do.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
MrSquicky, I doubt that the belief in free will is important to the system. What's important is the subjective perception of benefit or harm, and anticipation of consequences. I think these can exist without belief in free will.
The perception of choice & self awareness may be more interdependent.
Posted by pooka (Member # 5003) on :
In what systems do people believe they lack free will, and what can be learned from them?
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
scifi, I'm not sure you got my point. I was showing why some people believe that (in their system) the illusion of free will is important to maintain.
Also, what I think you're proposing (simplistic behaviorism) doesn't work when we're talking about real world people. It doesn't work for high order animals, as the learned helplessness experiments with dogs demonstrate. To date, any system that has done away with mental states has utterly failed to describe or predict human behavior outside of trivial cases.
Posted by Dagonee (Member # 5818) on :
Squicky and Tom are nibbling away at the problem area, but I'm still not sure I understand how "important" is used here. Tom's qualified "important" by defining the subject (whom it is important to - the self-aware system). Squicky's qualified "important" as to the object (what it is important for - better outcomes).
Both clarifications help me to understand what is meant by the statement at issue here, but I still don't understand how an outcome is determined to be better to a self-aware system that has no free will.
Despite this, you've both narrowed the area of confusion by quite a bit, so please continue nibbling at it. Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky: scifi, I'm not sure you got my point. I was showing why some people believe that (in their system) the illusion of free will is important to maintain.
Also, what I think you're proposing (simplistic behaviorism) doesn't work when we're talking about real world people. It doesn't work for high order animals, as the learned helplessness experiments with dogs demonstrate. To date, any system that has done away with mental states has utterly failed to describe or predict human behavior outside of trivial cases.
I did miss your point. Your post makes sense as a rationalization for believing that believing in free will is important.
I'll respond on your second paragraph then I'm leaving the discussion for a while: I don't think I was proposing what you think I was proposing. I was arguing that I think you can take the belief in free will away, and people will largely behave the same way. They will still perceive making choices, and will make similar choices for similar reasons. This is because society won't change how we react to people's choices simply because individuals don't believe in free will.
Getting back to the statement at the beginning of the thread:
"Even if free will doesn't exist, it's important that we act as though it does."
I'd actually say "even if free will doesn't exist, it's inevitable that we act as though it does."
Posted by Xavier (Member # 405) on :
Everything I've ever done, or ever will do, was determined by my genes and by my environment. I recognize this, and don't lose any sleep at night. This conclusion is almost inescapable once you determine that having a "soul" is improbable.
However, by admitting that this is the case of all humans, we would have a very difficult time punishing individuals for committing crimes in our society.
So we pretend that individuals have free will, at the same time acknowledging that they probably don't. It's a contradiction that's a frequent source of drama on Law and Order .
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
scifi, Ahhh...I get what you were saying. The reason why is would potentially exist is that this belief itself affects how people behave.
Consider the stress that surrounds the idea that people get punished for things that they ultimately were not responsible for. If you take away the belief in free will, no one is responsible for anything. We'd have to move completely away from earning and deserving what happens to you. That'd be an enormous societal change.
You'd have no grounds to ever be angry or proud or touched by something that another person did. It's all just people following their programming. These emotional states 1) rely on congitive justifications and 2) have real measurable effects on the state of one's body and one's actions. There be a big effect if they were either known to be unjustifiable (which would cause cognitive conflict, which also has very real effects) or if people stopped feeling them.
Posted by Mucus (Member # 9735) on :
quote:Originally posted by TomDavidson: More pointedly, I suspect it's academic; we're not going to stop acting like we're free-willed just because it's theoretically possible that we aren't.
Simple question (I think): I'm not entirely getting this discussion as well, though it sounds interesting. This might clear up my confusion.
How would you suspect that people would behave if they behaved like they did not have free-will and knew it as well? i.e. If we assume that we're not free willed and we start acting that way, what would the difference be? How would we behave differently from we do now?
Posted by Nighthawk (Member # 4176) on :
I had free will... once. Then I got married.
Posted by MightyCow (Member # 9253) on :
I would look at it this way:
Obviously you have free will, it's self-evident. You feel like you have free will. You choose to do what you do. You make choices, and it's obvious that you could have taken any number of those different possible choices.
So don't act like you don't have free will just because someone tried to make you think you don't. Act as though you do have free will, because you do.
Even if you didn't have free will, you'd still be acting as though you have free will (since you are), so it wouldn't matter.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
Exactly. If we have no free will, there is no REAL difference between acting as if we do or acting as if we don't, obviously.
I think the essentially political position that we should act AS IF we do is a tacit admission that the idea (that we have no free will) is nonsense.
It is comparable to the proposition that we are a 'brain in a vat' or the solipsist masturbation that only I exist and 'others' are only artificial inputs to solicit a desired response. Or that the world was just created two seconds ago complete with your mistaken belief that you have been alive all these years.
There is no way to positively disprove those assertions but they are so ridiculous that you are wise to act as if reality is as it appears to be.
Posted by Saephon (Member # 9623) on :
At first, I was also having trouble to wrap my head around the expression, but now I think I get it.
Even if free will doesn't exist, it's important that we act as though it does....
The rest of the statement, in my opinion, goes: ....because regardless of whether we actually are choosing to act that way, we will think we are. It's not about truth. It's about convincing yourself that your preferred outcome is the reality. Yes, if you could step back and know the truth and see that there is no free will, all this talk of "pretending that there is" would be laughable and impossible because we can't choose anything. But as far as I know, most people do not claim to have done that and discovered this undeniable truth. So we have a choice. Suppose that there isn't free will, and despair (or just do whatever you want I guess).....or you can suppose there is free will, either because you think so, or because you believe you're choosing to. If you somehow come up with the answer that you're genuinely undecided on the matter, my bet is that 9 times out of 10 that person will continue to act as if he has free will anyway. So it kind of doesn't matter.
Do not underestimate one's concept of self and his beliefs. It is provably possible that some things reality cannot touch inside a person.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:If we have no free will, there is no REAL difference between acting as if we do or acting as if we don't, obviously.
That's not actually true though. The belief that we do or do not can and likely will have an effect on how people behave. Not having free will doesn't mean that you stop believing in things or that the things you believe stop influencing your actions. It just means that you aren't free to choose what to believe or how to act
As I've pointed out, believing in free will lets you justify feeling ways about people or treating people certain ways because "they deserve it". If you believe that there is no free will, you can't justify things like that, so you are either left with cognitive conflict or stopping this behavior.
Posted by pooka (Member # 5003) on :
But you can still justify punishing people, because if their deterministic program has brought them to the point of harming others, their program should be culled from society. They do not continue to harm others. Their program has run to its terminus, where the consequence of their act was to bring about punishment.
I've always thought the "deterrent" argument for capital punishment was not very ethical anyway.
quote:I think the essentially political position that we should act AS IF we do is a tacit admission that the idea (that we have no free will) is nonsense.
Huh? Anyway, I don't think this is a principally political discussion. I believe it's philosophical. Are you saying that because something is adopted as "political" it automatically becomes a sham?
A question for the materialists, what of the quantum mechanics level? It seems human behavior is both too consistent and too uncertain to have a foundation in quantum events.
Posted by Shigosei (Member # 3831) on :
"Even if free will doesn't exist, it's important that we act as though it does."
I'm not taking sides on the question of free will or not, but I suppose you could say that we feel compelled to explain why we continue to act as if we have free will.
Posted by twinky (Member # 693) on :
This discussion reminds me of an amusing quote that summarizes the "no free will" position for me: "Consciousness is just the brain's way of estimating what it thinks it did."
quote:But you can still justify punishing people, because if their deterministic program has brought them to the point of harming others, their program should be culled from society.
Of course you could, but that would be a new type of justification and would not allow anger. It also invalidates most people's idea of justice, so that woud have to be thrown out too.
The way most people in western society are built right now, punishing someone for something that wasn't their fault but was instead was completely due to outside factors would cause a great deal of psychological trauma. It might be possible to drastically rebuild society and social conceptions so that they would no longer have a problem it, but that would be a massive undertaking.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
twinky, Consciousness and its contents have a definite, often objectively observable role in behavior and body state. By current understanding, it can not just be an epiphenomenom.
quote:The brain does appear to be capable of stimulating itself, however.
I don't know how you would determine spontaneous brain arousal from the influence of an outside non-deterministic entity.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:How would you suspect that people would behave if they behaved like they did not have free-will and knew it as well?
It depends. Are we talking about localized free will, the ability to make an illusory or artificial "choice" within your internal context, or true free will, the ability to make a choice independent of the manipulation of other contexts? I think Xavier is a good example of someone who's perfectly aware that he has only localized free will, and it doesn't affect him much.
I think someone who doesn't even believe in localized free will is someone who has rejected the belief that his self-image is important even to himself. As such, I think such a person is at best insane, and at worst actually non-sentient.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
MrSquicky, I think if people's cognition drastically changes, their behavior likely will too. That seems to be your current argument.
However, I don't believe that a belief in free will actually has that much to do with our normal thought processes. I think anger and gratitude and awe and various other states of mind can certainly coexist with a theoretical notion that people's behavior is deterministic. They do in my mind, after all! And I haven't changed my behavior in any significant way since I decided that I don't have free will.
Honestly, I don't see a gap between how we would react to people's actions if we thought they were deterministic vs. how we would react if felt they were freely willed. Either way I think responses are largely either arbitrary or based on some value system that actually exists outside the question of free will. (It doesn't matter if I think Timmy freely chose to steal that car, I'm still going to put him in prison. My reasons for putting him in prison are still valid.)
And, like Tom (I think; it's hard to know if I understand his concept of contexts) I think every normal person continues to perceive making choices, regardless of what they believe regarding the ultimate mechanism of those choices.
Posted by twinky (Member # 693) on :
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky: twinky, Consciousness and its contents have a definite, often objectively observable role in behavior and body state. By current understanding, it can not just be an epiphenomenom.
OM NOM NOM NOM! I eat cookies, therefore I have free will?
(Sorry, amusing typo. )
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky:
quote:The brain does appear to be capable of stimulating itself, however.
I don't know how you would determine spontaneous brain arousal from the influence of an outside non-deterministic entity.
Maybe I just didn't get enough sleep last night, but I can't seem to parse this sentence. Do you meane "separate" by "determine?"
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
scifi, As I've been pointing out, people feel a need to justify what people get. This goes so far as to be a congitive error, that has been called the just world hypothesis, which involves believing that people who have good or bad things happen to them deserve these things and manufacturing things that constitute deserving them if they don't exist.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
I guess I don't know why you think that believing in deterministic behavior invalidates or prevents that.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:Maybe I just didn't get enough sleep last night, but I can't seem to parse this sentence. Do you meane "separate" by "determine?"
Yeah, that's what I meant. The word I meant to write was distinguish.
Posted by mr_porteiro_head (Member # 4644) on :
Tom, would you elaborate on what you mean by "localized free will", and how it applies to Xavier?
Posted by Mucus (Member # 9735) on :
TomDavidson:
I'm not sure, I never thought about breaking it down like that. As for the first scenario, based on just my interpretation of what Xavier said, I think I agree with the idea that my thoughts, actions, etc. are all deterministic to a major extent.
The problem is I'm trying to imagine (in both your cases) what would happen if someone behaved as though they did not have free will and I'm not coming up with a lot unless someone tries to "game the system" and break it. (i.e. trying to make all decisions hooked up to a truly random number generator)
I mean, when I think about making a decision, really roughly I would weigh the pros and cons, then try to choose something appropriate. At no juncture do I really think "hey since I have free will, I should do this" or alternatively "I don't want to do this, but since I have no free will I have to." Whether I have free will or not doesn't seem to affect my decisions.
So I'm just not seeing that it makes a difference to how people behave either way (although maybe I'm generalising too much, maybe some people do make decisions based on whether they think they have free will?)... hence a great deal of confusion with this conversation.
Edit to add: Perhaps an example. If we look at predestination paradoxes in science fiction, let's pick an example where the "cycle" holds. (e.g. The Twilight Zone: No Time Like the Past" where the main character tries to go back in time to change stuff and in every case either cannot change anything or actually causes what he is trying to prevent)
Under that kind of situation, a person is aware that no matter what they do they cannot change "what is supposed to happen" but can still "try" from their perspective. So I guess under your breakdown, they would have localised free will but not true free will. Is this correct?
A person that does not have localised free will would be one step futher, knowing that they cannot change "what is supposed to happen," they do not "try"? They try to figure out for every decision what they should do and then do it? Is that an example?
[ March 31, 2008, 05:30 PM: Message edited by: Mucus ]
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
I suspect - but don't know for sure - that "localized free will" as Tom used it is something similar to "perception of making choices." (Obviously these choices would only be cognitive, as any number of things can limit the expression of our choices in what actually happens.)
In your time traveler example, both scenarios involve perception of choice. Lack of perception of choice combined with self-awareness is something I don't think we can experience, except perhaps in a dream state.
Posted by Launchywiggin (Member # 9116) on :
I like Tom's posts. His interpretation makes the most sense to me.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
quote:Originally posted by pooka: Huh? Anyway, I don't think this is a principally political discussion. I believe it's philosophical. Are you saying that because something is adopted as "political" it automatically becomes a sham?
A question for the materialists, what of the quantum mechanics level? It seems human behavior is both too consistent and too uncertain to have a foundation in quantum events. [/QB]
I am not saying it is a sham. I am saying that it is extra, and does not follow, from argumentation that we do not have free will.
Quantum mechanics is the elephant in the room. If it doesn't seem that macro events have a quantum foundation that is entirely our problem. Reality does have a quantum foundation. How do we get from there to here and how much of it matters are open questions.
And it speaks to the other elephant which is two different conceptions of determinism. Absolute determinism and probabilistic determinism. Of course, we haven't really even defined free will either. Posted by twinky (Member # 693) on :
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky:
quote:Maybe I just didn't get enough sleep last night, but I can't seem to parse this sentence. Do you meane "separate" by "determine?"
Yeah, that's what I meant. The word I meant to write was distinguish.
Okay. I imagine that would be impossible if you were to attribute divine powers to the entity, for example. But since I don't believe in the divine, I don't have to worry about that particular problem. Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky: The belief that we do or do not can and likely will have an effect on how people behave. Not having free will doesn't mean that you stop believing in things or that the things you believe stop influencing your actions. It just means that you aren't free to choose what to believe or how to act
If I am not free to choose what to believe or how to act how is it sensible that I should choose to act as if I believe in free will?
edit: chose/preferred a better word
[ March 31, 2008, 09:38 PM: Message edited by: orlox ]
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
Tom - My real problem is with 'true free will'. Can you explain again what you mean by that?
Posted by C3PO the Dragon Slayer (Member # 10416) on :
Let's see if I get this worldview of a not-free-will-world.
People are robots. If you put the same person, who has the same experiences, personality, mood, and knowledge, in the same situation, he would behave the exact same way each time.
Of course, this cannot be proven because you can't take the same person with the same experiences over and over again - once you do it the first time he has different experiences!
Just putting pieces together (beware the programming analogies!) I want to bring my experience programming robots and games into this. As an amateur game programmer, I know the importance of suspense of disbelief, and I also know that this can be done in part by making lifelike Non-Playable-Characters. Doing so is very tricky. I have never been able to duplicate a thinking human being, but I have been able to simulate it by making randomly generated responses in my simpler games. However, this doesn't do much to help suspense of disbelief. A more practical approach is to have a fixed response to a set of variables that define its awareness. If the NPC has enough variables to watch, and enough programmed responses, it can react pretty realistically, so long as you don't program it to respond to you so well that you can't beat it. However, this makes it predictable, so it's easy to take advantage of.
My greatest successes in programming AI is by combining the two methods. Not have one response for each scenario, but several which it chooses randomly. This is probably a step away from the world as a non-free-will-believer perceives it, as well as a world where humanity has free will. All I know is that it works pretty well.
The arguments against Tom's true free will seem to imply that there is a fixed response to every scenario, given readings on all sorts of variables. If a human's complete experiences could be measured, personality weighed (much more precisely than most current psychiatric tests), memories copied, and environment completely controlled - even the color of the sky matters! - a computer could make a perfect simulation of the human's response to any given situation before it happens. If we built an Oversoul-like system of computers that did that for the whole world, we could build a utopian communist global society that fixes our future and controls humanity. This is probably where the original quote in the first post comes from. We should treat people as if they have a choice in what they do, because if it is perceived that there is no choice, that WILL affect everyone's experiences and personalities to make difficult outcomes.
The argument against free will is that the variation in decisions of people is caused by the variation in variables; so many variables that it is not likely we can control them all.
This makes such proposals fuzzy science. Even we ourselves don't know everything about ourselves at a given time: we might forget things, we might be in doubt, we could overlook something that our subconsciouses decided was important.
This implies that time is a one-dimensional thread, and we at the present are continuously moving forward on a fixed path. Free will is explained the same way I reject randomness (if you get enough practice rolling a die you can roll it just the right way to get the result you want - randomness is just an inaccurate term for that which is influenced by variables that cannot be measured).
I personally believe futures can be changed by our choices, but I won't devote my post to explaining why; rather trying to make sure I understand the perception of those who do not believe in free will.
In my AI creations, I find it hard to believe that I could actually make something that would be as fully self-aware and (appearing to) have free will as you and me. It's like the jump from primordial soup to life. It's a long ways to go from simple amino acids to replicating life forms, even if they're dozens of times simpler than even viruses (which aren't even considered life), such as it is with going from cause-effect chains to a conscious being. We know what we're made of, but there's something about us that's hard to explain; a hole between our building blocks and ourselves that distinguishes us as life. Our attempts at duplicating either simple life or free will have not answered much.
If I'm conscious, I'm just as much crude matter as the rock that's next to me (hypothetically), and therefore the rock could be conscious too, just a whole lot stupider. It may not be aware, it may not be knowledgeable, it may not care about anything, but it is driven by cause and effect just as much as I am. Everything responds to its environment, and I have trouble grasping the idea that it is a large web entangling our environment, our wiring, and our choices that makes our will and being.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
How do you define free will, C3PO? Is it the nebulous something you just described that you can't define that sits between our building blocks and ourselves?
BTW, the comparison of rock and human misses one extremely important point: The non-random complexity of your structure is orders of magnitude higher than the complexity of the rock's structure. This complexity is why you can't fathom an equivalent computer program. After all, computers are actually quite simple. A few million transistors defining a discrete set of logic circuits, built to purpose. The software can be quite complex but the hardware is not complex at all when compared to your nervous system (for example).
Posted by C3PO the Dragon Slayer (Member # 10416) on :
That's exactly what I'm speculating. Is it just how much there is, or is it a new ingredient?
The rock is not at all complex. By comparison, my brain (and everyone else's) is tremendously complicated, watching thousands if not millions of the biological equivalent of my computer's variables. The rock has inertia, and that's basically it.
The question I'm pondering is whether the response to environment that resonates systematically through me actually creates this consciousness think-therefore-I-am stuff.
How do I define free will? A being able to make a choice independent of outside cause. A being can make a choice based on the environment, mood, personality, etc, but it is not the environment, mood, and personality making the choice.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
What I mean by "true free will:" the ability to make a decision that is not consistently reproducible by someone able to create a mechanical copy of your brain and perfectly replicate all the variables which factored into the process of your decision.
Posted by C3PO the Dragon Slayer (Member # 10416) on :
I guess that's what I mean by "free will" too, from a scientific standpoint.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:If I am not free to choose what to believe or how to act how is it sensible that I should choose to act as if I believe in free will?
You're not. However, you are affecting by outside stimuli (in a deterministic manner). You don't choose to believe anything, but the idea that you should act as if you believe it even if it doesn't exist can act as stumulus that will affect your behavior.
Posted by Raventhief (Member # 9002) on :
Darn, got to this discussion late.
I've been thinking a lot about free will, recently. In my opinion, there are two basic possibilities of existence. Either, there exists nothing other than the physical universe that we perceive (incompletely, perhaps), or there is something more. I personally believe the physical is all. If the physical is all, then my entire existence is caused by and based on my physical self (which was determined for me by others) and my environment (which is made up of others). Therefore, I have no free will.
However (and this seems to be MPH's question), I do have the illusion of free will. I seem to be able to choose green shirt/red shirt, etc. If I don't actually have free will, then it isn't a real choice, but that doesn't change my illusion. A theoretical observer with perfect and complete knowledge might look at me and say "he will pick the red shirt" but I still feel myself picking.
So, if I don't have free will, it is inaccurate to talk of "choosing to act as though I have free will" because choice implies free will. However, I still say, even if I don't have free will, I continue to act as though I have free will, because part of my lack of choice is the perception of choice (wrong though it be). I am not choosing to act as though I have free will, I simply am acting as though I have free will.
I am eager to discuss this further and personally, if people want to email me directly.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
I largely agree with you Raventhief.
I want to get a bit more detailed with the example of choosing a shirt.
Here's an example of an internal monologue that might go with choosing a shirt: "What shirt should I wear? Hmm, looks like I have 2 that aren't wrinkled. I wore the green one a few days ago...I guess I'll go with the red one."
The point of that example is that my process of choice is influenced by a number of things: -My preference to not wear a wrinkled shirt -My preference to avoid the labor of ironing a shirt -I have an idea that there's something undesirable about wearing the same shirt I wore very recently
Each of those things can be broken down: -My preference to not wear a wrinkled shirt ---I was taught wearing wrinkled clothing was socially unacceptable ---I've observed people receiving negative feedback for wrinkled clothing ---I want social acceptance
-My preference to avoid the labor of ironing a shirt ---I am constantly exposed to cultural influence that portrays "housework" as boring and unrewarding ---My shirt isn't that important to me, I'd rather get on to something more meaningful
-I have an idea that there's something undesirable about wearing the same shirt I wore very recently ---again, social influence
This is becoming a very labored example (sorry) but my point is that various things factored into my choice. Those things can be described, and traced backward in time to actual physical inputs into my brain (to an extent). I think all choices are like that - we are often not aware of all the influences on our choice, but I think they are there. I think that the perception of free will is simply the macro-level conscious emergence of the interplay of all the myriad (deterministic or, occasionally, random*) things that might influence any decision. I think this because there's little to suggest to me that any choice that anyone makes can't be reduced to a set of factors that if known, would lead to accurate prediction.
Semi-random additional thought: sometimes, I don't even feel myself making a choice (hitting the brakes when a kid runs in front of my car). I wonder how conditioned reflex response is explained by those who don't believe in deterministic behavior.
*You know that feeling when you're making a completely arbitrary choice? ("Pick a card.") Maybe that feeling is your brain setting part of itself in a state of equipotential so that a random neural event can tip it to a course of action.
Posted by Raventhief (Member # 9002) on :
scifi: Exactly, except for the last bit about arbitrary choice. In all cases, there are factors which go into making a choice. And complete perfect knowledge of those factors by either the chooser or an outside observer would, I believe, make any choice subject to predetermination (IE, knowing the choice before it is made). By my belief, there are no "arbitrary choices", merely choices in which we do not consciously think about the factors that go into the choice.
In the "choose a card" situation, I, because of my history with cards, being right handed, having damaged my wrist in the past, and the way the sun is in my eyes, select a specific card. It's not arbitrary, but it appears arbitrary because the factors that go into the choice are innumerable and subtle. Just as the "choice" to slam on the brakes is influenced by your reflexes, both natural and trained, the "choice" of a card is influenced by your physical being and history as well.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:I am not choosing to act as though I have free will, I simply am acting as though I have free will.
I'd reword that. Insofar as such a thing as "choice" exists, you choose to act as though you have free will. "Choice" is a fiction that shares a page with the fiction of selfhood.
Posted by plaid (Member # 2393) on :
Thanks to this thread, I have new appreciation for the sophistication of Free Willy
[/random]
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:By my belief, there are no "arbitrary choices", merely choices in which we do not consciously think about the factors that go into the choice.
And, honestly, there is no problem with this, as long as people realize that it is an article of faith and not something that has been (or most likely ever can be) established by scientific or rational means.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:Are we talking about localized free will, the ability to make an illusory or artificial "choice" within your internal context, or true free will, the ability to make a choice independent of the manipulation of other contexts?
I'd argue that what you are calling "true free will" is better termed "acting insane". That's because free beings make their choices based on reasons. Reasons are variables that determine the choices we make. In contrast, if you make choices that are not based on any reasons at all, you aren't even really choosing - you are acting randomly. That is not how a rational free-willed being would act. That is how an insane person would act. Therefore, I don't think "true free will" is actually free will at all. And I definitely see no benefit to pretending my actions are random and not based on variables or reasons.
The real true free will is what you are calling "localized free will". That is what it really means to choose: you make a decision based on variables which determine the decision you make. Making a free choice is nothing fancier or more bizarre than that.
There's a lot of confusion in philosophy over the issue of free will, and I think most of that stems from the simple mistaken belief that free will contradicts determinism. We can escape the whole mess simply by recognizing that making free choices does not mean those choices aren't determined by anything. (Otherwise we put ourselves in the bizarre state of having to act in a way opposite of what we believe to be true in regards to free will.)
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
Compatibilism - the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
Tres, You don't seem to understand how determinism is being used here. Your response doesn't make much sense because of this.
edit: To help, having a choice of what influences to use is not possible in the determinism we're talking about.
Although, I may be misunderstanding you, looking back at it.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
Determinism = the notion that our choices are determined entirely by facts of the universe, such as our brain state, etc. Is this not how it is being used?
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
Not exactly. It's that our choices are determined entirely by the material facts of the universe.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
That's not determinism. That's determinism + materialism. I'm not a materialist and a number of people on this forum aren't materialists, so if you want to limit determinism only to materialist determinism, we are going to get hung up there. There are plenty of nonmaterialist determinists though.
Having said that, the argument I gave above does apply to materialist determinism just the same. If the universe was materialist and my choices were not determined by material facts of the universe, that would make my choices random - and thus not really choices at all. Acting randomly is not being free. In fact, that's the opposite of being free...
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
I'm glad we're all agreed that true free will, as it's defined here, is a logical impossibility.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
But again, it's not "true" free will at all. It's truly acting insane.
Someone who acts randomly is not free. He is a slave to his random, irrational behavior.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:I'm glad we're all agreed that true free will, as it's defined here, is a logical impossibility.
I haven't agreed with that. Also, in the context that I'm talking about, it being logically impossible wouldn't necessarily matter.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
You're certainly welcome to your definition. If you choose to define "true free will" as "predictably and consistently behaving in accordance with responses to stimuli," though, I suspect you're going to get some weird looks.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
Perhaps, but not as many weird looks as if I tell people true free will is only when you're acting unpredictable and behaving totally randomly. Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:If the universe was materialist
And that's the crux of the discussion.
We're not talking about free will as decisions being made for no reason. We're talking about whether they are part of a deterministic materialist system where the same material inputs will result in the same outcomes or whether there is a non-deterministic entity or some other aspect involved. This entity would be making choices based on reasons, but these reasons are not reducible to material stimuli.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky:
quote:If the universe was materialist
And that's the crux of the discussion.
We're not talking about free will as decisions being made for no reason. We're talking about whether they are part of a deterministic materialist system where the same material inputs will result in the same outcomes or whether there is a non-deterministic entity or some other aspect involved. This entity would be making choices based on reasons, but these reasons are not reducible to material stimuli.
Not reducible, or not reducible using known means? Does this come down to "something we cannot measure" or "something to which measurement cannot apply"? The latter might be a nice subject for metaphysics or religion, but by definition couldn't be shown to actually exist, and therefore could not disprove materialistic determinism.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:The latter might be a nice subject for metaphysics or religion, but by definition couldn't be shown to actually exist, and therefore could not disprove materialistic determinism.
That's definitely true, but you're missing the point, which is the reverse of this. Using scientific means, these things cannot be shown to exist. Fine. They also cannot be shown not to exist. They fall outside of the scope of science.
Science cannot answer that question. Etiher way, it is a matter of faith.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
You missed a "currently" in there somewhere.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
No, I didn't. The inability to do this crops up on a theoretical level, not a practical one.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:Using scientific means, these things cannot be shown to exist. Fine. They also cannot be shown not to exist.
Practically, almost nothing can be shown not to exist. Does that mean that the existence of unicorns falls outside the scope of science?
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
Unicorns could be shown to exist, so obviously they fall into the scope of science.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
MrSquicky:
quote:They also cannot be shown not to exist. They fall outside of the scope of science.
Me:
quote:You missed a "currently" in there somewhere.
MrSquicky:
quote:No, I didn't. The inability to do this crops up on a theoretical level, not a practical one.
Scratching my head.
You've already concluded that science cannot show that non-material entities or influences do not affect free will? Science has a long way to go before I'd be willing to accept that. I think it's entirely possible that science will reach a point that rules out non-material factors.
This is not to say that such an entity could be disproven, but rather that it could be demonstrated that even if such an entity existed, it did not have any impact on things like individual free will, because any effects that might result from such an entity can be otherwise accounted for.
Posted by Juxtapose (Member # 8837) on :
I have to agree. It sounds an awful lot like we're calling this theoretical entity "non-maerialistic" just because it's expedient to do so.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:Unicorns could be shown to exist, so obviously they fall into the scope of science.
So it's your argument that there is something which is undetectable by any mechanism?
May I ask why you'd bother imagining such a thing, given that by its very definition it is completely irrelevant?
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:May I ask why you'd bother imagining such a thing, given that by its very definition it is completely irrelevant?
How so? Whether or not we have free will seems to me to be very relevant. It's just not measurable or objectively observable.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote: I think it's entirely possible that science will reach a point that rules out non-material factors.
Yes, and it is possible that we'll reach a point where traveling faster than the speed of light is as easy as snapping your fingers. However, right now, both of these things are theoretically impossible.
Look, if you have faith that science will someday overcome the current theoretical limitations on this, that's fine. I'm not going to try to argue with you on that. Regardless, you are still building your ideas on faith, which is basically what I'm arguing.
---
quote:It sounds an awful lot like we're calling this theoretical entity "non-maerialistic" just because it's expedient to do so.
I'm not sure you understaqnd the discussion then. What I'm talking about, by definition, has to be non-materialistic.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:I'm not sure you understand the discussion then.
You may want to grant that no one else is actually having the discussion you want to have about hypothetical, undetectable, non-physical things that appear to do nothing. Posted by Corwin (Member # 5705) on :
Ah,so it was from the bible after all:
Man: 'Free will? What does it do?' God: 'Do? It doesn't do anything - that's the beauty of it!'
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:You may want to grant that no one else is actually having the discussion you want to have about hypothetical, undetectable, non-physical things that appear to do nothing.
I'm pretty sure you don't understand the discussion, Tom. What I'm talking about definitely does things.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
No, it doesn't definitely do things. If it reliably and observably did things, those things could be perceived. And in the absence of this hypothetical thing, those things would not be perceived.
We knew quarks existed before we were ever able to perceive them. Heck, in fact, we don't really know that quarks exist, but theories of their existence have proven useful (which is, as far as science is concerned, almost the same thing). Your imperceptible thingy, if it has a perceptible effect, is a thing of science; if it has no perceptible effect, it does not exist.
Posted by Threads (Member # 10863) on :
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky:
quote:May I ask why you'd bother imagining such a thing, given that by its very definition it is completely irrelevant?
How so? Whether or not we have free will seems to me to be very relevant. It's just not measurable or objectively observable.
If free will is a relevant phenomenon then it should not be possible to perfectly emulate it by natural means (otherwise the concept itself is redundant). However, this presents a dichotomy. If it is emulable by natural means then it is not relevant. On the other hand, if it is not emulable by natural means then it is clearly (if only theoretically) measurable because it would be a phenomenon that violates natural law.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:If it reliably and observably did things, those things could be perceived.
That's what I don't grant. There are more things that go into perceiving something than it existing. Did you never get the white drawing discrimination lesson?
Posted by Corwin (Member # 5705) on :
I'm curious: what's the "white drawing discrimination lesson"?
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:On the other hand, if it is not emulable by natural means then it is clearly (if only theoretically) measurable because it would be a phenomenon that violates natural law.
I'm not sure I understand what you mean by natural law and violating it.
If I had to guess, I'd say you meant a full deterministic, completely accurate model of human behavior. In this case, I'd say that in order to detect a violation of this model, you'd have to have it, which is currently theoretically impossible.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:you'd have to have it, which is currently theoretically impossible...
Why is it theoretically impossible? It's practically impossible, but theoretically possible. Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
White drawing discrimination lesson, in brief:
Someone makes a drawing in the same shade of white as the paper. The drawing exists, but it can't be perceived visually because there is no visual way to discriminate the drawing from the background.
It can still be perceived, of course, but you need to choose a method that allows you to discriminate it from the surroundings.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:It's practically impossible, but theoretically possible.
What theory is that, Tom? It's possible that I haven't been keeping up with my cog sci, but the last I was aware there were several theoretically intractable obstacles to developing and testing any model.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:And that's the crux of the discussion.
We're not talking about free will as decisions being made for no reason. We're talking about whether they are part of a deterministic materialist system where the same material inputs will result in the same outcomes or whether there is a non-deterministic entity or some other aspect involved. This entity would be making choices based on reasons, but these reasons are not reducible to material stimuli.
What I don't understand is why it matters whether or not the things controlling our actions are physical or nonphysical. It seems to me that the person being controlled by a nonphsyical God is no more or less controlled than the person in the Matrix being controlled by physical machines hooked up to his physical brain. Similarly, I would think that a person whose decisions are determined absolutely by the mechanisms of a physical brain is as equally controlled as a person whose decisions are determined absolutely by the nature of some nonphysical spirit. Why would it make a difference whether or not the variables predetermining your decisions are physical or nonphysical? They are still determining your choices either way.
I think we are mixing up two different issues here. Materialism is one question. Determinism is a different question.
----
And in truth, I think Free Will is a third question too - which doesn't necessarily correlate to the other two. Free Will does correlate to another question though: Do I exist? If you believe your personal identity is an illusion, then you definitely can't have free will, because there is nothing doing the willing. Some materialists believe the "self" is one's physical body, and for these people I'd think free will is possible, as long as the body is making decisions. Other materialists believe materialism means the "self" is an illusion, and doesn't exist, so for those folks I think free will of any sort cannot be anything more than illusion. (But that's a great reason to reject the view that "self" is an illusion...)
Posted by Corwin (Member # 5705) on :
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky: White drawing discrimination lesson, in brief:
Someone makes a drawing in the same shade of white as the paper. The drawing exists, but it can't be perceived visually because there is no visual way to discriminate the drawing from the background.
It can still be perceived, of course, but you need to choose a method that allows you to discriminate it from the surroundings.
Thanks.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:the last I was aware there were several theoretically intractable obstacles
Like...?
----------
Squicky, are you going to argue that it's impossible for science to discern whether someone's drawn a white line on a white piece of paper?
Because your particular assertion -- that your hypothetical thingy cannot be perceived by any application of science -- is, I submit, in another category altogether. If something can't be reliably perceived by anything, or even produce effects which themselves can be perceived, it can be confidently said to not exist.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
impossible to perceive by science != impossible to perceive by anything Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
Not true. When someone feels disquiet, that can be scientifically analyzed. It can even, to some extent, be scientifically verified. If something is perceptible, it is perceived in a manner that is scientifically valid.
The issue is one of analysis, and ultimately analysis requires interaction with the illusion of "self;" the analysis, in other words, does not need to reflect the physical world and does not necessarily add any useful validity to the actual sensory perception itself.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:Squicky, are you going to argue that it's impossible for science to discern whether someone's drawn a white line on a white piece of paper?
No, besides being directly contradicted by what I said, that would be absurd.
You miss the point. Something existing isn't enough to render it perceivable. I brought up this classic example to show that it must also be discriminable.
quote:If something can't be reliably perceived by anything, or even produce effects which themselves can be perceived, it can be confidently said to not exist.
But that's silly. We've drawn out the very different worlds that we would live in if we had free will or not in this very thread.
Also, many of this entity's putative effects can be perceived, just not objectively.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:Not true. When someone feels disquiet, that can be scientifically analyzed. It can even, to some extent, be scientifically verified. If something is perceptible, it is perceived in a manner that is scientifically valid.
There relies on an assumption of a materialistic universe that I'm not willing to grant. Tom, you need to be able to distnguish between statements of faith and what can actually be known. I get that if you assume that you are right, then things will show that you are right, but I don't see the usefulness of reasoning in a circle like that.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:Tom, you need to be able to distnguish between statements of faith and what can actually be known.
Dude, you're the one making the positive statement of a faith in something that cannot be demonstrated to exist.
--------
quote:Something existing isn't enough to render it perceivable.
I'm not sure you're using the correct definition of "existing," here. Do you believe that "love" "exists?"
quote:We've drawn out the very different worlds that we would live in if we had free will or not in this very thread.
Why do you think these worlds are necessarily very different?
quote:many of this entity's putative effects can be perceived, just not objectively.
Can you give me your definition of a subjective perception? I think the word I'd use instead is "imagined."
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:Dude, you're the one making the positive statement of a faith in something that cannot be demonstrated to exist.
Yes, of course I am. Have I hid this? I've stated from the beginning that any positive answer on this question is going to come down to a matter of faith.
I choose to believe in free will. You choose not to. I'm not trying to hide this choice, whereas you use it as a implicit assumption when you are describing how the world must be that you then use to support the truth of your assumption.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:I've stated from the beginning that any positive answer on this question is going to come down to a matter of faith.
Which is, of course, a faith-based statement.
quote:I choose to believe in free will. You choose not to.
Not quite. I believe that free will is exactly as real as love, liberty, justice, fairness, and my self. It is real to me because it exists in the same context in which I exist. It has no other reality, however.
Posted by Threads (Member # 10863) on :
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky:
quote:On the other hand, if it is not emulable by natural means then it is clearly (if only theoretically) measurable because it would be a phenomenon that violates natural law.
I'm not sure I understand what you mean by natural law and violating it.
If it does not violate natural law and if natural law does not permit free will (which, as far as we currently know, it does not) then free will is not a meaningful concept. It has no bearing on anything and has no special properties if it can be perfectly emulated by natural means.
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky: If I had to guess, I'd say you meant a full deterministic, completely accurate model of human behavior. In this case, I'd say that in order to detect a violation of this model, you'd have to have it, which is currently theoretically impossible.
We compare the model to ourselves. If free will cannot be perfectly emulated by natural means then we could theoretically detect real differences between the human model and ourselves (lets assume that we know everything about how the model is constructed).
Posted by Corwin (Member # 5705) on :
quote:Originally posted by TomDavidson: I believe that free will is exactly as real as love, liberty, justice, fairness, and my self. It is real to me because it exists in the same context in which I exist. It has no other reality, however.
That makes a lot of sense to me.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:Why do you think these worlds are necessarily very different?
One is a large scale model of a wind up toy. The other is populated by at least partially free actors.
quote:Can you give me your definition of a subjective perception? I think the word I'd use instead is "imagined."
Of coruse you would. It's your implicit assumption you are trying to pass off as fact again.
Subjective perception is an objective reality. When I see something, I may not actually be seeing something that is there, but that I see it is objectively true.
Likewise, when I think something, that I think it, or at least that I think I think it (Or if you prefer, if I imagine that I imagine it), is objectively true.
When I perceive that I choose between things, that perception is itself an objective fact.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:Which is, of course, a faith-based statement.
No, it isn't. It a statement based on the limitations of scientific epistemology.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
Threads, I'm not sure what you are talking about here.
quote:If it does not violate natural law and if natural law does not permit free will (which, as far as we currently know, it does not) then free will is not a meaningful concept.
What natural law does not permit free will?
edit: Also,
quote:We compare the model to ourselves.
What model are you talking about?
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:If something is perceptible, it is perceived in a manner that is scientifically valid.
A cat appears out of nowhere in the middle of the room and is somehow only perceptible to me. Then, moments later, it disappears - never to return again. This cat is perceptible, but is definitely not perceived in a manner that is scientificially valid because: 1) The observation is not objective. Only I can see it. 2) The observation is not repeatable. Nobody could go back and make it happen again.
If the concept of science is to be meaningful in any way, then it has criteria that must be followed. These criteria mean that at least in theory things can definitely be perceived which do not fulfill the criteria needed for science.
If you want to take away all criteria for science, keep in mind that that expands science to include everything - including God, spirits, ghosts, magic cats, etc.
quote:I believe that free will is exactly as real as love, liberty, justice, fairness, and my self. It is real to me because it exists in the same context in which I exist. It has no other reality, however.
I don't understand how you think anything can be more real than that... What other reality is there?
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:One is a large scale model of a wind up toy. The other is populated by at least partially free actors.
And in what way are they different?
-------
quote:When I see something, I may not actually be seeing something that is there, but that I see it is objectively true.
What distinction are you making between a subjective perception and an objective perception? Is an objective perception something that is actually perceived by one's eyes (for example) due to the reflection of light, whereas a subjective perception is something that one believes oneself to be seeing despite the fact that no light has entered the eyes? Is the optic nerve involved in both cases, or only one?
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:If you want to take away all criteria for science, keep in mind that that expands science to include everything - including God, spirits, ghosts, magic cats, etc.
*grin* Now you're getting into the semantic distinction between Science and science -- between simple objectivity and the full scientific method, if you will. If you are merely saying that evidence for your thingies will never be useful or reproducible enough to hold up to the scientific method, but that objective observers are still perfectly capable of perceiving these thingies in ways that unfortunately don't have consistent effects, I'm fine with that.
Of course, that pretty much instantly puts them into the realm of unicorns. Because, like unicorns, it means that you can prove they exist simply by nailing one's feet to the floor.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:And in what way are they different?
One is a wind up toy and the other is populated by free actors. I don't get what you are looking for.
No, the eyes don't perceive anything. They are just receptors that tranduce the stimuli that are then transmitted to where they are perceived. All perception is subjective.
Posted by Raventhief (Member # 9002) on :
quote:Originally posted by TomDavidson: Not quite. I believe that free will is exactly as real as love, liberty, justice, fairness, and my self. It is real to me because it exists in the same context in which I exist. It has no other reality, however.
Nicely put. I don't believe in all those things, but definitely a concise way of summing it up.
On another note, I don't personally see how a completely materialist universe is compatible with a nondeterminist universe. For "free will" in the sense that I understand and use the term to exist, I have to be making decisions which are not based 100% on the physical reality, so a materialist universe (in which there is only the physical reality) precludes free will.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:All perception is subjective.
Ah. Whereas I believe that no perception is subjective, and all awareness of perception is. Would you use another word to describe objective perception, like "sense?"
Posted by Threads (Member # 10863) on :
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky: What natural law does not permit free will?
Clearly the deterministic parts of our universe cannot combine to create free will because free will implies nondeterminism. It is also fairly clear that quantum randomness, as we currently know it, cannot be responsible for free will either. Quantum randomness is purely random (ie: arbitrary). Any actions government by quantum randomness would be arbitrary actions, not free actions.
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky: edit: Also,
quote:We compare the model to ourselves.
What model are you talking about?
It can be a lot of things. Lets say I can build a complete artificial human being using only non-biological parts (really only the brain needs to be non-biological for it to be a model and not an exact replica). If its behavior is exactly like that of a normal human being then free will is not a relevant concept assuming our understanding of the universe as it is currently (see my earlier responses).
There may well be natural causes for free will because of properties of our universe that we do not know of yet. However, any guess as to whether these laws exist is arbitrary.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:Clearly the deterministic parts of our universe cannot combine to create free will because free will implies nondeterminism.
As I've already argued, free will does NOT imply nondeterminism. Free will as we know it essentially REQUIRES determinism, because choosing randomly (which is what nondeterminism is) is not really choosing for freely; it is just flipping a coin. A rational person who makes a free choice will always make the same free choice in the exact same circumstances.
If you believe free will implies nondeterminism, please give an argument why you think this is the case.
(And if your argument is that determinism as we are speaking about it implies materialism - which I don't think it does - then let's simplify things by saying that materialism is the thing that contradicts with the concept of free will.)
Posted by Threads (Member # 10863) on :
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: As I've already argued, free will does NOT imply nondeterminism.
You were not using "determine" in the strong sense in your argument. Determinism essentially means that any event that occurs is the inevitable result of preceding events. In other words, as long as we know the full state of everything in the present (theoretically impossible) then we could perfectly predict every single event that will ever happen in the future. There is no room for freedom.
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: If you believe free will implies nondeterminism, please give an argument why you think this is the case.
It's by definition. There is no argument. You cannot have free will if your brain's outputs are determined entirely by its inputs. Free will requires some independence from outside influence. That independence cannot exist by definition in a deterministic world.
While quantum randomness is nondeterministic*, it does not provide for the existence of free will (as you and I pointed out earlier).
* It may actually not be deterministic but Occam's Razor dictates that we act as if it is for the time being. Whether or not it is deterministic does not affect the conclusion that free will cannot exist given our current understanding of the universe.
Posted by beverly (Member # 6246) on :
quote:Not quite. I believe that free will is exactly as real as love, liberty, justice, fairness, and my self. It is real to me because it exists in the same context in which I exist. It has no other reality, however.
I think I understand what you are getting at. It kind of reminds me of questions I have about quantum mechanics and what is real and what is illusion. About wave functions collapsing and all that. About the empty space between dollars that gives value to stocks and bonds and makes our economy function and run. Free will is as much an illusion or reality as everything else.
:strokes imaginary goatee:
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:Determinism essentially means that any event that occurs is the inevitable result of preceding events. In other words, as long as we know the full state of everything in the present (theoretically impossible) then we could perfectly predict every single event that will ever happen in the future. There is no room for freedom.
Why not? Why does being free equal being unpredictable? I would say that if a person is free and rational, it should definitely be true that that person's decisions are the inevitable results of preceding events. For instance, when I go to Chipotle, I buy a burrito - not tacos. It is completely predictable, and determined absolutely by previous events (such as the past times when I've been to Chipotle and consistently concluded that the burrito tastes great). Someone who knows all previous events and exactly how my brain and mind work would be able to predict it every time. But that doesn't make it not a free choice on my part, because I could have chosen otherwise had I wanted to. I could choose otherwise, but predictably never do, because I never want to choose otherwise. Free will is not unpreditability, and it is not randomness, but rather the capacity to choose differently if you want to.
Compare the above example to the person who does a mental coin toss every time he goes to Chipotle. Let's pretend that the outcome of this mental coin toss is purely random, and not predetermined by anything physical. His decisions are now random and unpredictable - BUT he is actually less free because he is not controlling his own choices. Instead he is letting random chance determine his choices.
Which person do you think is more free - the one who decides everything by randomly picking one option or another, or the one who makes a decision each time based on his own set preferences?
Posted by C3PO the Dragon Slayer (Member # 10416) on :
quote:Originally posted by TomDavidson:
quote:One is a large scale model of a wind up toy. The other is populated by at least partially free actors.
And in what way are they different?
The same way a computer synthesizer that sounds pretty darn like a trumpet is different from a trumpet.
quote:
quote:When I see something, I may not actually be seeing something that is there, but that I see it is objectively true.
What distinction are you making between a subjective perception and an objective perception? Is an objective perception something that is actually perceived by one's eyes (for example) due to the reflection of light, whereas a subjective perception is something that one believes oneself to be seeing despite the fact that no light has entered the eyes? Is the optic nerve involved in both cases, or only one?
This reminds me of my visual-imaginative experiments when I was three-to-four. I found I could visualize, and I could see, but after several weeks of repeating imaginary scenes in my head, I found that while I could not see what I imagined, I could imagine what I saw. And I could imagine imaginary things on top of the imaginary reality to create a perception of something fake in reality. But I could tell the difference between what I was imagining and what was really there according to my objective observations (with the optic nerve).
Not to say I'm implying that subjective perception is imaginary. I just thought I should mention that even three-year-olds work on the subject of subjective-objective connections (though most don't yet have the vocabulary to describe it).
I'm debating with myself whether I should also mention that three-year-olds do a lot of pondering over free will as well. I'll save it for when the thread drifts a bit further.
[ April 04, 2008, 07:24 PM: Message edited by: C3PO the Dragon Slayer ]
Posted by Threads (Member # 10863) on :
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: Why not? Why does being free equal being unpredictable? I would say that if a person is free and rational, it should definitely be true that that person's decisions are the inevitable results of preceding events. For instance, when I go to Chipotle, I buy a burrito - not tacos. It is completely predictable, and determined absolutely by previous events (such as the past times when I've been to Chipotle and consistently concluded that the burrito tastes great). Someone who knows all previous events and exactly how my brain and mind work would be able to predict it every time. But that doesn't make it not a free choice on my part, because I could have chosen otherwise had I wanted to. I could choose otherwise, but predictably never do, because I never want to choose otherwise. Free will is not unpreditability, and it is not randomness, but rather the capacity to choose differently if you want to.
How can you have the capacity to choose if your output is determined precisely by your inputs (ie: it's deterministic). If that is true then our brain is basically just a large function. You wouldn't say a function such as f(x)=x^2 (or any function for that matter) has any capacity to choose. Maybe it does but that capacity is meaningless.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:The same way a computer synthesizer that sounds pretty darn like a trumpet is different from a trumpet.
Ah, but see, that's the thing. You can only differentiate a perfectly-synthesized trumpet from a trumpety trumpet by going outside the system, by looking for attributes which are not currently being replicated. How do you intend to stand outside the system when the system is the entirety of physical reality?
Posted by C3PO the Dragon Slayer (Member # 10416) on :
If you really want to go there... God.
Posted by Corwin (Member # 5705) on :
And if you go outside God? The "problem" with God is that it creates a new layer that (very conveniently) we know nothing about. Then some people stop at God, not wanting to solve what's on his outside. Or say that God *is* all that's on the outside. How do they know that, I don't know. For me, God is an unneeded complication, explaining nothing and adding a lot of unanswerable questions. And I don't like to hit my head against a wall.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
I'm still scratching my head, MrSquicky.
There's no theoretical impossibility of ruling out non-material influence on material reality.
I feel like that above sentence is nonsensical, because if something influences material reality then OF COURSE it is materially real.
I don't rule out an element of randomness. I don't rule out that we might not ever be able to account for all causes.
All I'm ruling out at this point is that we know the answers to those questions, and that we will never know the answers to those questions.
And also that there's any human behavior that might be the result of free will (meaning not deterministic or random) that can't be equally well rationalized as *not* free will.
Please explain why you think it's theoretically impossible to rule out something other than determinism and randomness in the question of free will.
Also what you think it means to be a "free actor" as opposed to an incredibly complex and conscious wind up toy that experiences emotions and thoughts and has motivations, and happens to be an artifact of determinism. (This is really centrally what I think I'm missing from the people that prefer to believe in free will: how exactly free will functions in a way that is qualitatively better than determinism.)
Posted by aspectre (Member # 2222) on :
quote:"Even if free will doesn't exist, it's important that we act as though it does." ...could you please explain to me what it means?
[ April 05, 2008, 04:19 AM: Message edited by: aspectre ]
Posted by steven (Member # 8099) on :
That's an interesting article that aspectre linked. It deserves its own thread.
However, if we're going to discuss that article, it raises tremendous implications. If someone does have a genetic tendency, whether it's that gene in the article, or some other, eventually we'll have to answer the question on a gene-by-gene level as to whether or not it's "right" to use gene therapy to get rid of it. This also raises the question of whether or not we will force someone to take gene therapy to get rid of an objectionable genetic tendency. Doesn't it?
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:How can you have the capacity to choose if your output is determined precisely by your inputs (ie: it's deterministic). If that is true then our brain is basically just a large function. You wouldn't say a function such as f(x)=x^2 (or any function for that matter) has any capacity to choose.
Yes, the deterministic math function does not have free will. The deterministic human being does have free will. What that proves is that some deterministic things have free will and some do not. Or, in other words, being or not being deterministic does not by itself mean you have free will.
(Consider a random math function - f(x) = x+r where r is a random number. Such a function would NOT be deterministic, yet I definitely would not say the function has free will would you? Again, not being deterministic does not give something free will any more than being deterministic would.)
So, if being nondeterministic is not what free will is about, what IS free will about?
In my view, the test for free will is "If I wanted to choose differently, I could have chosen differently." I'd think that test would require two things: 1. You'd have to be the sort of thing that has "wants" - something with some sort of mind. A function does not want anything. A human being does. 2. Your "wants" would have to determine your action.
If you believe a person's "wants" come from their physical brain, then my understanding of free will is consistent with both materialism and determinism - because anyone who could look into my brain to see what I am programmed to want could predict perfectly what I'd choose to do, but it would still be true that I'm choosing to do what I want.
Posted by steven (Member # 8099) on :
The difference is simply whether or not you realize that, from some point of view, the person's behavior is understandable, or not. Punishing people is foolish, if you realize this fact. Protecting yourself or others from future harm is not foolish. Or maybe I'm BSing.
Posted by El JT de Spang (Member # 7742) on :
I love the philosophy threads. I really do.
In any case, the answer to the question of whether I have subjective free will, true free will, or no free will at all makes no difference to my subjective reality. So I choose (or, at least, believe I do) not to give a crap about it. Posted by Threads (Member # 10863) on :
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: Yes, the deterministic math function does not have free will. The deterministic human being does have free will. What that proves is that some deterministic things have free will and some do not. Or, in other words, being or not being deterministic does not by itself mean you have free will.
You missed the point. If you brain is deterministic then it can be perfectly modeled by a function. That means it has no free will.
The "wants" argument is a red herring. The point is that you cannot have the capacity to choose anything if you operate deterministically.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
I didn't miss that point - I just disagree with it. Operating deterministically, or being able to be modeled perfectly by a function, do not mean you have no free will. In fact, things with a free will typically do act deterministically. The examples and argument I've given above I think illustrate why.
Posted by Threads (Member # 10863) on :
We probably have different definitions of free will.
EDIT: I don't mean that sarcastically. I find your use of "free will" rather paradoxical but definitions are not absolute so what can I say?
Posted by rollainm (Member # 8318) on :
quote:Originally posted by TomDavidson:
quote:All perception is subjective.
Ah. Whereas I believe that no perception is subjective, and all awareness of perception is. Would you use another word to describe objective perception, like "sense?"
Thanks a lot. Now I have to spend all night thinking about this instead of writing my government essay.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
I already linked to this page on Compatibilism, but I'll link again because my view is pretty close to what compatibilists like Hume argue:
quote:Further, according to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires. That is, when one says that one could either continue to read this page or to delete it, one doesn't really mean that both choices are compatible with the complete state of the world right now, but rather that if one had desired to delete it one would have, even though as a matter of fact one actually desires to continue reading it, and therefore that is what will actually happen.
Hume also maintains that free acts are not uncaused (or self-caused as Kant argued) but rather caused by our choices as determined by our beliefs, desires, and by our characters.
Posted by rollainm (Member # 8318) on :
Worded that way, it's hard to find any objection to such a view.
It's also completely compatible with a deterministic world and really no different than Tom's view of the "reality" of free will.
Posted by Threads (Member # 10863) on :
That definition is basically a tautology. If things were different then you may have chosen differently. That's the basis of free will? That's like saying if you change the inputs to a function then its output may change. I don't see how that's a meaningful definition.
Posted by Mike (Member # 55) on :
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: ... But that doesn't make it not a free choice on my part, because I could have chosen otherwise had I wanted to. I could choose otherwise, but predictably never do, because I never want to choose otherwise. Free will is not unpreditability, and it is not randomness, but rather the capacity to choose differently if you want to.
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: In my view, the test for free will is "If I wanted to choose differently, I could have chosen differently." I'd think that test would require two things: 1. You'd have to be the sort of thing that has "wants" - something with some sort of mind. A function does not want anything. A human being does. 2. Your "wants" would have to determine your action.
Question is, are you free to change your wants? ("Today I choose to want tacos.") It sounds to me that you do not have free will because you are a slave to your wants.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
quote:Question is, are you free to change your wants? ("Today I choose to want tacos.") It sounds to me that you do not have free will because you are a slave to your wants.
Slave to your wants? I make decisions based on my own internal perception of my needs and wants and that makes me a slave somehow? That makes no sense. Please note that wants can include wanting to do the right thing, or wanting to be unpredictable, or wanting to try something different out of boredom.
How can one be more free than to be able to make choices based on one's wants? If I can do what I want, for my own reasons, then I'm not a slave. That doesn't mean that there aren't underlying mechanisms that cause me to choose a certain way.
The only way a person could be a slave to his wants is if the enslaved self had an identity that was separate from the conscious self. I do not see how the concept of slavery could apply to something that was entirely detached from reality, though.
I do suspect that some objections to determinism stem from religious philosophy, which might include belief in a soul or spirit that is indeed separate from physical reality. I think, however, that even if such an entity exists doesn't mean that it isn't subject to the same sort of rules as the observable/known universe. Meaning, there are causes for effects. (the alternative being randomness.)
LDS theology in particular is one that I think is amenable to determinism. God lives according to laws, etc. Even the idea that we earn the post-mortal status most compatible with our nature.
I keep asking but I don't think I've gotten an answer: what is it about the idea of non-deterministic, non-random "free will" that is so valuable/attractive? I'm really interested in a description of how this free will would operate. (Because, to be honest, I think when you get down to the mechanisms of making choices with this kind of "free will" you begin to see it's indistinguishable from determinism. That anything other than randomness comes down to there being reasons/causes for the way things happen. Those reasons/causes can be intrinsic to consciousness and individual sense of self, even an immortal identity, without precluding a deterministic paradigm.)
Posted by Mike (Member # 55) on :
quote:Originally posted by scifibum: Slave to your wants? I make decisions based on my own internal perception of my needs and wants and that makes me a slave somehow? That makes no sense.
My point is that your wants (and I'm using that term as a placeholder for any internal motivation) are arbitrary and largely beyond your control. You are indeed free in the sense that you make choices based on what you want, but by the same token you are constrained by precisely that. Mind you, I don't think this is a bad thing: I wouldn't want (hah!) for my most basic internal motivations to be so malleable.
Does that make more sense?
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:LDS theology in particular is one that I think is amenable to determinism.
Actually, I think the opposite is true. The idea that you all decided before being incarnated as physical beings to live for a time in bodies to see what would happen makes far less sense in a deterministic universe, as far as I can tell.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
quote:Originally posted by TomDavidson:
quote:LDS theology in particular is one that I think is amenable to determinism.
Actually, I think the opposite is true. The idea that you all decided before being incarnated as physical beings to live for a time in bodies to see what would happen makes far less sense in a deterministic universe, as far as I can tell.
Well, I'm not currently as informed/invested in the theology as I would need to be in order to develop the idea fully, so I don't want to push it necessarily (just a parenthetical observation really) but the core of the idea is the doctrine that mortal-corporeal existence is a necessary step toward immortal-corporeal existence and can't be sidestepped even if God has foreknowledge. That to me implies determinism, albeit determinism that transcends the subset of reality that defines the mortal-corporeal existence. I'd agree that the idea isn't compatible with current scientific knowledge of the universe. Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:Question is, are you free to change your wants? ("Today I choose to want tacos.") It sounds to me that you do not have free will because you are a slave to your wants.
That's where it gets tricky, because depending on how you define "you", some wants may be driven by yourself while other cravings may be coming from something external to you. For instance, when chemicals in an alcoholic drive him crave alcohol, is it actually he that wants that or is it his body that wants it? The answer to that question depends on all kinds of other assumptions (such as "Do I equal my body?" and "Does what I want equal what my body wants?"), and as a result it is pretty fuzzy as to whether or not an alcoholic drinks because of a free choice. It should be fuzzy though, since people in real life actually do disagree as to how much blame to place upon an alcoholic for what alcoholism leads him to do.
Posted by Bokonon (Member # 480) on :
What does it mean to "be free"?
-Bok
Posted by pooka (Member # 5003) on :
quote:Not true. When someone feels disquiet, that can be scientifically analyzed.
I don't accept this. I guess you're trying to say that if we had the determination to, you think it would be possible to read our biology to a degree that we would know what someone is thinking. I don't think that's true.
We can detect certain emotional states, but we don't know what they mean to the person experiencing them. I think there is more to mental life than emotion.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:I guess you're trying to say that if we had the determination to, you think it would be possible to read our biology to a degree that we would know what someone is thinking. I don't think that's true.
Well, while I DO think that we'll eventually be able to read people's minds with technology, what I means specifically is that we can scan minds accurately enough now to know when you're in an emotional state like "disquiet." And we can even administer some drugs with enough accuracy to end or provoke certain emotional states -- in enough of a natural-seeming way that the patient will invent intellectual justifications for those states.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
We can scan minds to know when someone is in an emotional state like "disquiet", but we can't scan minds to learn what "disquiet" as an experience feels like to that person.
Posted by BandoCommando (Member # 7746) on :
Hm. Every time I see this thread at the top of the page, I expect someone to dobie it with an advertisement to win a Free Wii!
It's only by the most supreme efforts of self-control that I contain myself to only talking about making the dobie rather than actually going ahead and doing it.
Posted by Noemon (Member # 1115) on :
Your self-control is to be commended. Your method of satisfying the urge by posting in the thread in question about the dobie that I'd like to be making is how I usually manage it too.
Posted by pooka (Member # 5003) on :
Polygraph examinations are still woefully inadequate - as evidenced by how man "confessed" killers have been exonerated by DNA. And they only work because they are calibrated. The polygraph devices do not "know" anything. They are calibrated based on someone lying or not lying, and the results are interpreted by a human being.
Posted by advice for robots (Member # 2544) on :
quote:Originally posted by BandoCommando: Hm. Every time I see this thread at the top of the page, I expect someone to dobie it with an advertisement to win a Free Wii!
It's only by the most supreme efforts of self-control that I contain myself to only talking about making the dobie rather than actually going ahead and doing it.
I could mention that you've as good as dobied it anyway, but I won't. Posted by Threads (Member # 10863) on :
Pooka, you claimed that it is impossible to determine what someone is thinking. Pointing to current technological inadequacies does not do much to support such a strong claim.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
Nor do I think polygraph tests speak much to determining things like "what someone is thinking."
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
Where is a theoretical physicist when you need one?
Let's begin with the difference between a wind up world and one that features free will. The difference is that the wind up world has only one possible future and free will requires an open future. And that difference is within our abilities to examine scientifically, so it is not an intractable problem.
Next, we should specify between absolute determinism and probabilistic determinism which offers the same difference. Absolute determinism nets one possible future while probabilistic determinism nets an open future which is variously constrained.
Claims that science has moved toward absolute determinism are plain wrong. First off, if there was broad consensus there wouldn't be much of a conversation here. Widespread and fundamental disagreements are a good indicator that we have yet to reach any sort of conclusion. But if we were to examine trends, I think it would be very difficult to maintain that we are trending toward absolute determinism. Just the opposite. Uncertainty a la Heisenberg presents an unavoidable challenge to absolute determinism and sets folks like Tom to espousing theories that can account for uncertainty through yet-to-be-discovered hidden variables. A very hopeful position.
And it is a position that smashes head on into Bell's Theorem:
quote:No physical theory of local hidden variables can ever reproduce all of the predictions of quantum mechanics.
There are deterministic theories that account for quantum mechanics (QM) but, as per Bell's Theorem, they forsake local realism in order to accomplish their task. And these theories have some prominent features which I know Tom well enough to be confident that they will make him squirm. Such is the case for the Bohm interpretation, for instance, which boasts a 'pilot wave' that can never be observed.
The best hope for absolute determinism would seem to be the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of QM. But in this particular world of high irony, the MWI still allows that any particular frame of reference is probabilistically determined within the absolutely determined multiverse. So the one future is every possible future.
There are many flavors of MWI, of course, some that don't conceive of the block multiverse implied by relativity. But they all feature branching of some description. Indeed, treating the measurement problem as any other interaction is one of the most elegant features. So decisions made do alter future of that frame of reference. Doing an experiment in one way nets a different world than if the experiment had been done a different way.
[I should mention that MWI doesn't necessarily violate localism but rather a subset of local realism: counterfactual definiteness.]
Of course free will is a somewhat different argument. It can still be argued that free will is a post hoc rationalization etc. Probabilistic determinism doesn't prove free will. But it does set a different context in which to have this discussion. For instance, when we model the mind, we will likely have to include functional mistakes. I make them all the time. If that model nets the same result 99 times of 100, Tom's current conceptualization of 'true free will' gives it to the 1 of 100 dysfunction. Under probabilistic determinism, the example says nothing at all about free will.
And again, we still haven't really defined free will. Idealized free will, something without prior cause is non-material in my estimation and therein nonsensical. For me, it is not troubling that my choices rest on a materially determined foundation. I might as well be troubled that I need a brain to think.
But it is troubling if my choices are meaningless because that goes counter to my fundamental experience of the world. Free will is the only reality I can ever know. Perhaps the absolute determinists can help me here because I haven't seen my next objection discussed which is likely either a flaw in my thinking or unfamiliarity with better commentaries. But if my one future is set, if selection is illusory, then there really is no point to anything.
No point to my personal decisions obviously, but no point to anything. No point to any experiment since the results could never have been any other way and no applicability of that experiment to any other context. Natural selection is wrong because even nature cannot select meaningfully: it could never have been any other way. Ultimately, it seems absolute determinism results in nihilism.
In more theoretical terms, how does one do science if any particular observable cannot be meaningfully considered as at least quasi-discrete from its context? And, to the point, how can something be considered as quasi-discrete in relativistic block time? In the mega-causal chain of absolute determinism its all just a big blob of 'that's the way it is' stretching back to the ultimate cause: the big bang - for which we are offered no prior cause. It seems both meaningless and useless to me.
[ April 07, 2008, 07:47 PM: Message edited by: orlox ]
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
quote:But it is troubling if my choices are meaningless because that goes counter to my fundamental experience of the world. Free will is the only reality I can ever know. Perhaps the absolute determinists can help me here because I haven't seen my next objection discussed which is likely either a flaw in my thinking or unfamiliarity with better commentaries. But if my one future is set, if selection is illusory, then there really is no point to anything.
No point to my personal decisions obviously, but no point to anything. No point to any experiment since the results could never have been any other way and no applicability of that experiment to any other context. Natural selection is wrong because even nature cannot select meaningfully: it could never have been any other way. Ultimately, it seems absolute determinism results in nihilism.
I'm pretty sure I'm not an absolute determinist - I'd lean more toward what you called probabalistic determinism - but I'd like to respond to this.
Even if every thought and choice you make is inevitable, you still have the conscious experience of them. That's where the meaning lies. This would not be annihilated. Subjectively, qualitatively, nothing is different just because it was inevitable. (Although your beliefs/thoughts about the meaning or significance of events could certainly color your subjective experience.)
I'm having trouble understanding your questions about science and experimentation in that context - I don't see how absolute determinism would hamper these efforts. Just because an experiment can only have one outcome doesn't mean that you don't learn something from doing it. And discrete principles would still be evident from experimental results, and we could still do some reasoning about them to see if they will fit other contexts. So, basically, I don't get what you mean.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
If the future is already set, then causation is just as illusory as free will. The ultimate cause for everything is that it has already happened in exactly that way. There is no sensible means to treat any event or entity as somehow discrete from the unchanging block of spacetime. How is it then sensible to talk of cause and effect or of something not being caused by any other thing? How is it sensible to say that any event was caused by any other event since no event is discrete? All declarative statements become mere descriptions. Science becomes history.
If every choice I make is inevitable, there is no means to differentiate a good choice from a bad choice. No way to assert that non-violence brings about a different future than violence. The future just is. Nothing I can decide will change it so there is no reason to prefer one decision over another.
Subjectively, qualitatively, everything is different if it is inevitable. My ability to help shape the future is what gives life meaning. Without distinguishing a future that I want from a future that I do not want, without the deep sense that the decisions I make differentiate between the two, life is not only meaningless, it is so contrary to my experience, to every experiment that I have ever conducted, that I may as well consider myself a brain in a vat. In other words, it seems to be a useless proposition.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
I don't think your conclusions follow from your premise, at all, so I'm not sure how else to respond.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
I am perfectly willing to accept that may be so. As I said, this is my own take. However, it would be more helpful to be shown how my conclusions do not follow rather than just told. Posted by MattP (Member # 10495) on :
quote:How is it sensible to say that any event was caused by any other event since no event is discrete?
I don't think there is any argument that no event is truly discrete. But for purposes of specific observations, individual causes can be treated as discrete.
A disorganized mind leads to a disorganized schedule leads to forgetting to brush ones teeth leads to build up of plaque leads to tooth decay. What is the cause of the tooth decay? Plaque, poor organization skills, or the big bang? All or any, depending on what causal relationships you are examining.
Why does it matter who your grandmother is, if you've got hundreds of generations before her?
quote:If every choice I make is inevitable, there is no means to differentiate a good choice from a bad choice. No way to assert that non-violence brings about a different future than violence. The future just is. Nothing I can decide will change it so there is no reason to prefer one decision over another.
An argument to consequences isn't an argument for or against a deterministic universe. A deterministic universe may be personally unsatisfying and have disquieting ramifications, but that alone doesn't make it unlikely.
quote:My ability to help shape the future is what gives life meaning.
Or, possibly, your belief that you have the ability to do so produces the illusion of meaning necessary to allow the fiction that is "you" to continue functioning. That may be a form of selection in itself. Perhaps the only conscious beings that can survive in a deterministic universe are those who tend to not conceive of it as deterministic.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
quote:Originally posted by MattP: I don't think there is any argument that no event is truly discrete. But for purposes of specific observations, individual causes can be treated as discrete.
I think for any meaningful result, observables must be in fact, at least somewhat discrete. That is to say, differentiated from their context in some way that can be evaluated/measured. Not 'truly' discrete or arbitrarily treated as discrete but justifiably differentiated. So an electron is one thing and a positron is another.
And in making that differentiation we necessitate a negative. That is not an electron. This electron did not cause your tooth decay. I can't see how this can be anything but an arbitrary statement in non-MWI block time. In that block, this electron cannot be considered sufficiently discreet that I could meaningfully say that it did not cause your tooth decay. Except as an admittedly arbitrary selection of causal relationships. Again, that is not how I understand science.
quote:An argument to consequences isn't an argument for or against a deterministic universe. A deterministic universe may be personally unsatisfying and have disquieting ramifications, but that alone doesn't make it unlikely.
Very true. But stylistically my first paragraph referred to scifibum's last paragraph and that paragraph referred to his previous one talking about subjectivity and meaning rather than a direct argument for or against determinism.
quote:Or, possibly, your belief that you have the ability to do so produces the illusion of meaning necessary to allow the fiction that is "you" to continue functioning. That may be a form of selection in itself. Perhaps the only conscious beings that can survive in a deterministic universe are those who tend to not conceive of it as deterministic.
I would be happy to discuss the post hoc rationalization stuff at some point. But for now, I will confine my comments to non-MWI absolute determinism.
I don't see how nature can meaningfully select any more than free willed conscious entities can. The problem with free will selection is not due to the scope or power of the selecting entity but rather with the structure of spacetime itself: The future already exists. Everything has already been decided. Natural selection can not describe an open ended process in which things could have been different. Thus, it is another more or less arbitrary illusion that we use to pretend there is meaning to the world around us. It makes no sense to talk of reasons why some survive and some do not as if it could ever have been altered. Reasons also are just illusion. What is, is what always has been, and always will be. And it makes no sense how any being's conceiving of the universe makes him more or less likely to survive since his fate was already decided before he was born and cannot be altered by anything he thinks or does.
If I smash my head into that wall, then I have always smashed my head into that wall. If I do not, then I never did. There is no way to pull science out of that philosophical Catch-22 except as an arbitrary illusion. [edit: That is too broad, MWI can describe that situation meaningfully.] And if it were some religion making these claims it would have been derided and dispatched long ago.
Only a Sith deals in absolutes. Obi-Wan Kenobi
[ April 08, 2008, 03:54 AM: Message edited by: orlox ]
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:My ability to help shape the future is what gives life meaning.
Firstly, why is that the only thing that gives life meaning?
Secondly, isn't it possible that you can shape the future, yet the way you are going to shape it has been predetermined by how the past has shaped you?
Posted by twinky (Member # 693) on :
quote:Originally posted by pooka: Polygraph examinations are still woefully inadequate...
ZOMG! Someone other than me quoted Star Wars!
Posted by Raventhief (Member # 9002) on :
quote:Originally posted by orlox: If the future is already set, then causation is just as illusory as free will. The ultimate cause for everything is that it has already happened in exactly that way. There is no sensible means to treat any event or entity as somehow discrete from the unchanging block of spacetime. How is it then sensible to talk of cause and effect or of something not being caused by any other thing? How is it sensible to say that any event was caused by any other event since no event is discrete? All declarative statements become mere descriptions. Science becomes history.
True. "It is a poor effect that has but one cause." Of course, historians and scientists both often talk about "proximal cause" meaning the immediate event. The proximal cause of WWI was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The ultimate cause was, quite possibly, the Big Bang.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax:
quote:My ability to help shape the future is what gives life meaning.
Firstly, why is that the only thing that gives life meaning?
Secondly, isn't it possible that you can shape the future, yet the way you are going to shape it has been predetermined by how the past has shaped you?
Firstly, I try to be cagier than to say the 'only' thing. Who can argue with puppy dogs and the eyes of our children? But I do think it is a predicate for meaning, especially for me, as you will note I specified.
But that is part of what I have been arguing: a closed future doesn't just make free will illusory, it makes science, experience, causation - meaning itself an illusion.
Secondly, I would want to specify whether you mean absolutely predetermined or probabilistically predetermined. And although I will admit that absolute determinism cannot yet be ruled out, I will insist that eventuation appears to be fundamentally probabilistic and absolute determinism will have to account for that. At the moment, the chain of causation breaks at quantum scales. Absolute determinism will have to show that it only appears to be broken and that hidden variables are at work. MWI does this but still nets an open, probabilistic future.
That we are materially determined by our past is not at issue, for me at least. The question is how does that happen? Do I materially select between materially determined options in an open ended material process as it appears? Or is it a rigged game?
Are we determined by our past or our future?
Posted by pooka (Member # 5003) on :
quote:Originally posted by twinky:
quote:Originally posted by pooka: Polygraph examinations are still woefully inadequate...
But they can only read what is known from calibration indices, correct? And I doubt you can take what is known from other brains and apply it to different brains.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
Orlox, You didn't directly answer either question, so I'm not sure how to reply.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
quote:Originally posted by Raventhief: True. "It is a poor effect that has but one cause." Of course, historians and scientists both often talk about "proximal cause" meaning the immediate event. The proximal cause of WWI was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The ultimate cause was, quite possibly, the Big Bang.
So what caused the big bang?
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
I'll try again.
quote:Firstly, why is that the only thing that gives life meaning?
If the future is already set then meaning is just another illusion. Nothing is as it appears to be. My experience of life is a sham and therein, meaningless. Much in the way that a rigged game is a waste of my time and ultimately meaningless.
quote:Secondly, isn't it possible that you can shape the future, yet the way you are going to shape it has been predetermined by how the past has shaped you?
It is possible if the future is open. If the future is set, then I am predetermined by the future and therefore any notion that I can shape it is void.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
Consider that your experience of your life is wholly subjective, regardless of whether the future is set or open. If your definition of "sham" is "not as I subjectively experience it" then your whole life is already a sham. Sorry.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:If the future is set, then I am predetermined by the future and therefore any notion that I can shape it is void.
Well, I disagree with your assumption that if a future is predetermined I can't shape it.
I would argue that it is entirely possible that I can shape the future in a predetermined way.
Posted by Raventhief (Member # 9002) on :
quote:Originally posted by orlox: If the future is already set then meaning is just another illusion. Nothing is as it appears to be. My experience of life is a sham and therein, meaningless. Much in the way that a rigged game is a waste of my time and ultimately meaningless.
I'd agree that meaning may be illusion, but just because the game is rigged, doesn't make the game pointless or not enjoyable. It's like reading a book. Nothing you do will affect the outcome of the book. Nothing the characters do will affect the outcome. The outcome is set. But the book is still enjoyable, often still has meaning of some sort. Life could be like that. You are reading the book of your life from the 1st person limited perspective of yourself. You don't know how long the book is and you don't have the option of flipping to the back, but the book has a definite length and a definite ending. You'll get there when you get there.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
It wouldn't be the first time that we have disagreed Tres.
But I suspect that much of our problem is in how we are conceptualizing time. I plucked this graphic from SEP to help us out.
I am only arguing that you can't change the shape of the future in the block universe. If you are conceiving of time in either of the two other conceptualizations, then our differences are minor. [Edit: better word]
If you are asserting that you can alter eternal block time then I am not really qualified to comment. [Edit: Except, of course, a MWI eternal block time which still couldn't be altered, apart from your frame of reference.]
Raventhief, I think your analogy is predicated on the assumption that "I" am immaterial in some way.
[ April 09, 2008, 07:19 PM: Message edited by: orlox ]
Posted by Raventhief (Member # 9002) on :
How so? "I" is your perspective, just as it is mine. I am experiencing this life the way I do a book (with more detail and layers, of course) and I perceive my ability to choose the way the character in the book does. For all I can tell there is an author writing my story (a la Heinlein) or my story may be determined by the purely physical reality of myself and my surroundings. That doesn't change my perception.
In short, trapped in a book or not, I still experience my life from my point of view, and I can enjoy the illusion of choice in the same way I can enjoy reading a book.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
Analogies are always tricky. But from a strictly materialist POV you can't conceive of yourself as 'something' somehow reading a deterministic script. So in your analogy, "I" would more properly be thought of, not even as the script, but as the reading of it. Which brings up more messy questions and the analogy breaks down. You have a ghost in your machine.
In short, "I" am not my 'perspective' but the meaty process that constructs it. That "I" am determined by the meat and the process history/environment is one thing. That I am determined by the superimposition of an unknowable nature is... well, supernatural.
Maybe, the Heinlein scripting our reality is really just a brain in a vat in a higher reality etc.
Posted by Raventhief (Member # 9002) on :
Ah yes, Cartesian philosophy as applied to free will. Always fun.
True, I have no absolute way of knowing I am not a brain in a vat. And true in a materialist universe, the me that is thinking my thoughts and observing through my POV must be strictly constructed from meat (of some kind). However, that doesn't automatically invalidate the point of my analogy.
Let's drop the analogy. My point in bringing up the analogy was this: whether or not my actions, my fate, and the world around me are predefined or not, there is no way for me to know what my fate is until I reach my end. I cannot perceive or conceive all of the factors that go into my decisions, so my decisions appear to be made on the basis of free will. That appearance may be true, or it may be false, but the appearance remains. The journey of my life is full of surprises and windfalls from my limited POV, and so, I enjoy the journey. The truth about its predetermination doesn't affect my perception and, therefore, my enjoyment.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:If you are asserting that you can alter eternal block time then I am not really qualified to comment. [Edit: Except, of course, a MWI eternal block time which still couldn't be altered, apart from your frame of reference.]
I am asserting that you could have altered the eternal block of time if you had chosen otherwise. You won't choose otherwise and thus you won't alter the block, since your choice is determined by your own nature and your wants - but that doesn't mean you could not have chose otherwise if you'd had different wants and desires. Free will isn't about actually altering the eternal block of time. It is about whether changing the part of the block that represents you in the present would have resulted in the rest of the block changing too.
Why wouldn't you be qualified to comment?
I don't think the "block model" is the best way to think about free will, though. Free will arises from existing within the universe, as a cause of future events. Taking the perspective of someone outside the time of the universe looking in tends to obscure the whole idea.
quote:But from a strictly materialist POV you can't conceive of yourself as 'something' somehow reading a deterministic script.
Some materialists do conceive of 'themself' as being equal to their body.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
Let me try to put it this way... S = your self (your own state) P = the past state of the universe F = the future state of the universe -> = determines
Determinism says: P -> F Free will says: S -> F
Both are true if: P -> S -> F
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
That's actually a very elegant way of expressing that, Tres. I'm not entirely sure that the definition of "free will" in that post is really universally shared, but it's close enough for government philosophy.
Posted by twinky (Member # 693) on :
quote:Originally posted by pooka:
quote:Originally posted by twinky:
quote:Originally posted by pooka: Polygraph examinations are still woefully inadequate...
But they can only read what is known from calibration indices, correct? And I doubt you can take what is known from other brains and apply it to different brains.
I'm not quite sure what you mean by the first part, but it's still a vast step up from polygraph tests, which, as I said, aren't a very good example.
Sorry I am so tardy in my response. I am still paying for my BSG marathon two weeks ago!
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: I am asserting that you could have altered the eternal block of time if you had chosen otherwise. You won't choose otherwise and thus you won't alter the block, since your choice is determined by your own nature and your wants - but that doesn't mean you could not have chose otherwise if you'd had different wants and desires.
I think we continue to talk past each other and that is due to continuing differences in conceptualizing the block universe where spacetime itself is considered static and eternal. Metaphysically, nothing could have ever been different because it is eternal and already 'out there'. So the past and the future are actual and unchanging. Your statement here seems to be a near perfect tautology. Choice is somehow available but unattainable. You seem to be adding metaphysical structure without a physical counterpart. Choice and change are not real features of the non-MWI block universe, they are only an illusion.
Simply put, do you think spacetime is dynamic or static?
quote:Free will isn't about actually altering the eternal block of time. It is about whether changing the part of the block that represents you in the present would have resulted in the rest of the block changing too.
Again, nothing ever changes in eternalism. So free will is metaphysically impossible in non-MWI eternal block time and the appearance of such, an illusion. Block time specifically avoids attributing a direction to time. By treating time as if it were another spacial dimension within a relativistic universe, we deny that any frame of reference is more real than any other. So the arrow of time that we perceive moving in one direction only is merely a product of our relative motion. There are frames of reference in the block universe in which events occur before causes leading to the assertion that it is all a set piece.
quote:Why wouldn't you be qualified to comment?
Within the logic of eternalism, nature is set and unchanging. If nature is unchanging, then changing it requires supernatural powers. Whether you actually have supernatural power or only claim to, either way, I am not qualified to comment.
It's a joke son!
quote:I don't think the "block model" is the best way to think about free will, though. Free will arises from existing within the universe, as a cause of future events. Taking the perspective of someone outside the time of the universe looking in tends to obscure the whole idea.
I guess I sort of agree with you here. But the block universe, if it is true, makes free will metaphysically impossible. So the first hurdle in a discussion about free will is whether the structure of spacetime itself allows for even the possibility.
I submit that if you conceive of the future as not already actual, then you do not accept the block universe as valid and we will have to find our disagreements elsewhere. It is possible, I suppose, to conceive of the block universe with 'holes' that would allow some local deviations from the block but that opens a Pandora's box which most scientist would find unsatisfactory. It is a very complicated argument though which can be found here. [edit to add: That argument, I believe, casts the most serious doubt on the block universe aside from QM. It is a bear though. ]
quote:
quote:But from a strictly materialist POV you can't conceive of yourself as 'something' somehow reading a deterministic script.
Some materialists do conceive of 'themself' as being equal to their body.
I am not exactly sure what you are trying to accomplish here. If it is just an offhand comment, that's fine. If it is supposed to be an objection then I have to point out that you had to physically strip out the sentence that specified that statement was within the logic of an analogy and ignore my next paragraph in which I declare that I am one of those materialists. Further, if someone were to conceive of themselves as being something other than their body, they are no longer materialists in any way that I can figure. Perhaps you can explain.
[ April 16, 2008, 08:08 PM: Message edited by: orlox ]
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: Let me try to put it this way... S = your self (your own state) P = the past state of the universe F = the future state of the universe -> = determines
Determinism says: P -> F Free will says: S -> F
Both are true if: P -> S -> F
In the block universe, there is no preferred direction to time so:
P,F,S are determined.
If time does have a direction, and we live in the possibilist universe, your formula is valid with a slight correction for local realism:
P -> S -> F(S)
And in presentism:
P(S) -> S -> F(S)
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
It is amusing how otherwise strict materialists can be convinced that they are somehow NOT their brain.
Soon et als and Libet have the same problem: Assuming that their results refer to free will.
Consider this thought experiment. Suppose that Soon or Libet hook me up to their machines but I decide that I will not follow their instructions and not press any button at all. Will the machine then demonstrate that I had no choice but to press?
In other words, there is a significant difference between how the brain functions for a given task (such as when to push a button or which button to push) and the assertion that we do not exercise choice.
Skepchick is having this discussion too but with far less sophistication than in this thread.
Raventhief, I will get you something as soon as I can. Maybe tonight or tomorrow.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
If no one here believes in non-MWI eternal block time then what?
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
Then we will have agreed that we can tell the difference between a universe that is absolutely determined and one that at least allows the possibility of free will.
We would be an enlightened minority ready to discuss historical determinism and the neurological post hoc rationalization of Libet and Soon.
To which end, I would like to introduce Ian Waterman through Oliver Sacks and Radiolab. Ian, who has lost his proprioception, could only ever push Soon or Libet's buttons through an extraordinary effort of conscious will.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:Again, nothing ever changes in eternalism. So free will is metaphysically impossible in non-MWI eternal block time and the appearance of such, an illusion. Block time specifically avoids attributing a direction to time.
That is an interesting way of looking at time, but again I don't think it is an appropriate model for any discussion of free will. In particular, if there is no "direction" to time, then that seems to dissolve the entire notion of cause and effect - which in turn makes not only free will appear impossible, but also the laws of science which are based on the assumption that present causes lead to future effects. It may be possible to come up with some way of talking about cause and effect (as well as free will) within the sort of framework you are describing, but it would be very confusing and counterintuitive.
Instead, I'd propose we approach time in a more traditional way - at the very least assuming that time has a direction, and that things we do in the present influence the events of the future.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
I would say that is a very good summation of what I have been trying to argue. So I agree. [edit to add: It is however, Einstein's conception of time, so it should not be taken lightly.]
I suspect that the definition of free will is creeping up on us now.
If free will is conceived in some idealized form as without prior cause, then I contend that it is immaterial and therefore nonsense.
If free will is conceived as making a meaningful choice between materially determined options, then I contend that we have plenty of it.
That the moment of choice be absolutely predetermined seems to go against the nature of a probabilistically determined universe and this Rube Goldberg machine of a brain we have.
Worse, our consciousness, being embedded in time and language is fundamentally linear and can't possibly be determined by all the things that should determine it.
We make mistakes. We act against our interests. Much of the time, we have no idea what we are doing. Because however you conceptualize time, you experience it Now. Now requires action. Best guess when you have to. Mostly, we stick to well worn conventions. We are fragmentary creatures, not even capable of absolute determinism.
But our decisions are meaningful. Meaningful as life or death.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
quote:Originally posted by orlox: Then we will have agreed that we can tell the difference between a universe that is absolutely determined and one that at least allows the possibility of free will.
We would be an enlightened minority ready to discuss historical determinism and the neurological post hoc rationalization of Libet and Soon.
Ok, cool. I already agreed that I don't think the universe is absolutely determined - I accept that at the quantum scale we don't know whether particular results are determined or essentially random. (Can't speak for anyone else of course.) Not sure to what degree, but I think its possible that these probabilistic events can affect events at the macro level. And I think time has a direction, and that the future doesn't exist.
I'm not sure I understand the implications of this that you seem to see. Let me respond to a couple of your later paragraphs:
quote:If free will is conceived in some idealized form as without prior cause, then I contend that it is immaterial and therefore nonsense.
If free will is conceived as making a meaningful choice between materially determined options, then I contend that we have plenty of it.
Can you clarify "meaningful" here? Because if free will is merely probabilistically determined instead of absolutely determined, I fail to see how that makes it more meaningful. And if there's an alternative to a) absolute determinism, b) probabilistic determinism, and c) lack of prior cause, then I am missing it.
quote:That the moment of choice be absolutely predetermined seems to go against the nature of a probabilistically determined universe and this Rube Goldberg machine of a brain we have.
Not sure about that. It depends on the mechanism of choice, and whether it is sensitive to quantum-scale events. But it seems like a possibility.
quote:Worse, our consciousness, being embedded in time and language is fundamentally linear and can't possibly be determined by all the things that should determine it.
Can't possibly? What do you mean by that?
quote:We make mistakes. We act against our interests. Much of the time, we have no idea what we are doing. Because however you conceptualize time, you experience it Now. Now requires action. Best guess when you have to. Mostly, we stick to well worn conventions. We are fragmentary creatures, not even capable of absolute determinism.
Don't you mean incapable of making the "correct" decision every time? That doesn't seem like it has anything to do with the underlying mechanisms of our choices.
quote:But our decisions are meaningful. Meaningful as life or death.
I agree that our choices are highly meaningful, but I don't tie this meaning to an interpretation of quantum mechanics or the nature of time...
I think we still disagree on what "meaning" means. Posted by Threads (Member # 10863) on :
quote:Originally posted by orlox: That the moment of choice be absolutely predetermined seems to go against the nature of a probabilistically determined universe and this Rube Goldberg machine of a brain we have.
Evolution does not favor the development of Rube Goldberg-ish structures.
Posted by TomDavidson (Member # 124) on :
quote:Evolution does not favor the development of Rube Goldberg-ish structures.
This is not necessarily true. Evolution favors effective structures. It also favors latent variability. If a structure can maximize variability while remaining effective, it may be more successful than one that maximizes effectiveness without being variable.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
quote:Originally posted by Raventhief: Let's drop the analogy. My point in bringing up the analogy was this: whether or not my actions, my fate, and the world around me are predefined or not, there is no way for me to know what my fate is until I reach my end. I cannot perceive or conceive all of the factors that go into my decisions, so my decisions appear to be made on the basis of free will. That appearance may be true, or it may be false, but the appearance remains. The journey of my life is full of surprises and windfalls from my limited POV, and so, I enjoy the journey. The truth about its predetermination doesn't affect my perception and, therefore, my enjoyment.
I think when you invoke the word 'fate' you seem to be referring to another question entirely, specifically to what happens after you die. If you are talking about fate in this world then I would contend that you can, and do, know something about what will happen but you can't know it perfectly. Our sense of free will arises from the dynamic relationship we have with the universe. Our actions appear to result in differing eventuation. Our 'fate' differs if we choose to ignore stop signs or pay close attention. Or if we choose to build or destroy. Our circumstances here on this world, at least to some degree, are made by us.
If you are enjoying the journey of life, I contend that it not serendipitous happenstance or the scribblings of a supernatural script. We ride on the back of a hard fought history. And our decisions help build, or impede, the circumstances in this world for future generations. There are futures we could choose that are not full of windfalls or happy surprises or anything we would associate with enjoyment. How much and in what ways we are determined is important. And we can determine how much and in what ways we are determined. Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
quote:Originally posted by scifibum: Can you clarify "meaningful" here? Because if free will is merely probabilistically determined instead of absolutely determined, I fail to see how that makes it more meaningful. And if there's an alternative to a) absolute determinism, b) probabilistic determinism, and c) lack of prior cause, then I am missing it.
Meaningful in the sense that there really is a choice, that the future differs depending on the outcome, and that the process of deciding is somewhat, though not entirely, what it appears to be in our experience. So, there really is a chance I will punch that guy in the nose, and there really is a chance that I will laugh if off. And the future is different either way. And although the process of deciding is conducted within material constraints, it is a genuine experience with the exact outcome somewhat unpredictable.
I think it is undeniable that some aspects of our experience could be characterized as illusory. We know, for instance, what we 'see' at any given time is a representation constructed by our brain but that 'illusion' (if you will) is materially determined. Unlike the Cylons, we cannot wholly chose what to see. There is a materially determined relationship between our representations and reality. What we see is not exactly what is 'out there' but it is nonetheless real.
quote:It depends on the mechanism of choice, and whether it is sensitive to quantum-scale events. But it seems like a possibility.
If events generally can only be probabilistically determined this would seem to apply to all events, even the ones in our head.
Quantun events net reality. We don't know exactly how, but it is reality on a quantum scale. The fields in every atom of your body are governed by QM. I don't think it is necessary for my argument but Penrose did suggest a theory of consciousness based on quantum computation.
quote:Can't possibly? What do you mean by that?
I mean that if a given event has a number of potential contributing determinants, any one of those could only be attributed with a probability that they will, indeed, influence the final outcome. And that event will, in fact, only be determined by a subset of the potential contibutors and that subset could only have been predicted probilistically.
Or, I am just not smart enough to consider all the things I should consider when making any particular decision. Thus, I occassionally lose at chess. And the circumstances in which I will lose, are not entirely predictable. There is a probibility of making a mistake and severe limitations on the predictability of exactly when that mistake will occur.
quote:Don't you mean incapable of making the "correct" decision every time? That doesn't seem like it has anything to do with the underlying mechanisms of our choices.
I think it speaks directly to the nature of the mechanism of choice and whether inputs could be wholly determinant if the mechanism occassionally and unpredictably misfunctions. Moreover, it lends credance to the notion that an event could have been determined in a different way than how it was determined.
Further, if the nature of the mechanism is fundamentally serial (linear) then it limits which of the complex of parallel potential determinants could be processed in order to cause an event. There is an attention bottleneck. You can't have two patterns of neuronal activity simultaneously overlapping. So I knew that my opponent likes to castle, but I forgot to consider that. It was possible that I would have remembered and impossible to prefectly predict if, or when, I would forget. Macaques have much the same problem.
quote:I agree that our choices are highly meaningful, but I don't tie this meaning to an interpretation of quantum mechanics or the nature of time...
I think we still disagree on what "meaning" means.
Perhaps you can describe what you mean by meaningful.
Posted by Raventhief (Member # 9002) on :
quote:Originally posted by orlox: I think when you invoke the word 'fate' you seem to be referring to another question entirely, specifically to what happens after you die. If you are talking about fate in this world then I would contend that you can, and do, know something about what will happen but you can't know it perfectly. Our sense of free will arises from the dynamic relationship we have with the universe. Our actions appear to result in differing eventuation. Our 'fate' differs if we choose to ignore stop signs or pay close attention. Or if we choose to build or destroy. Our circumstances here on this world, at least to some degree, are made by us.
If you are enjoying the journey of life, I contend that it not serendipitous happenstance or the scribblings of a supernatural script. We ride on the back of a hard fought history. And our decisions help build, or impede, the circumstances in this world for future generations. There are futures we could choose that are not full of windfalls or happy surprises or anything we would associate with enjoyment. How much and in what ways we are determined is important. And we can determine how much and in what ways we are determined.
By "fate" I meant fate in this lifetime. How my life will turn out. As to whether or not we know, I contend that we can make certain predictions. I'm reasonably certain not to end up the dictator of a third world country. However, the fact that I can make predictions is, to my mind, an argument against free will. If I knew all the circumstances that affect my life, then I could know for certain how my life will turn out, including what choices I will make when specific situations arise. Clearly if I walk in front of a car, my life will be different than if I don't. However, the question is not whether there will be a difference, but whether or not I can choose to walk in front of a car. You say, "of course you can," but I haven't done it. My past experience and my beliefs about my future prevent me from walking in front of a car. So, is my choice really a choice, or is it determined by my past?
Either way, I enjoy my life. Either way, I must act as though I have free will, because I can do no other. Even something like tossing a coin to make a decision seems to be a choice I make (I chose to toss the coin) so belief in free will will have no apparent affect on my life.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
quote:Here is a twenty minute Radiolab segment that runs through eternal block time, MWI, free will and post hoc rationalization with Brian Greene, Michio Kaku, Lisa Randall and VS Ramachandran.
If you liked that and want to listen to the entire broadcast you can listen or download here. Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
It is possible to enjoy life believing that the sun spins around the earth. There is not much apparent difference. But the truth is important nonetheless.
Free will is important for moral and legal implications and our understanding of the truth about how our brain operates is important in ways that we can probably no more comprehend than Copernicus's contemporaries could anticipate what we would do with the knowledge he offered.
There is a difference between free will and not free will and the difference is important, to the species if not to a particular individual. And since we can know, since it is not an intractable problem, we should know.
I think there is determinism in our choices. You need cars to step out in front of one. But that doesn't mean that your experience of choice is an illusion. Setting a decision on a coin flip is determined in many ways. The idea of flipping a coin, the existence of coins to flip, that coins are two-option disks rather than cubes, etc. But the results of that flip are only probabilistically determined, it is not certain.
Similarly, you conduct decision making in ways that are material, determined by language, brain structure etc. But that process doesn't have just one outcome. The process is just as real as the determinative factors that go into it.
Posted by Raventhief (Member # 9002) on :
quote:Originally posted by orlox: I think there is determinism in our choices. You need cars to step out in front of one. But that doesn't mean that your experience of choice is an illusion. Setting a decision on a coin flip is determined in many ways. The idea of flipping a coin, the existence of coins to flip, that coins are two-option disks rather than cubes, etc. But the results of that flip are only probabilistically determined, it is not certain.
Similarly, you conduct decision making in ways that are material, determined by language, brain structure etc. But that process doesn't have just one outcome. The process is just as real as the determinative factors that go into it.
Not sure I agree. Certainly one can flip a coin and have the result be either heads or tails. However, the question that I'm asking is: given the precise conditions of the coin, the agent doing the flipping, and the total environment of the flip, is it possible for the coin to land on either side? I don't think so. I think that if the total conditions were known, then the result could be calculated. When we say the outcome of a coin toss is 50-50, we are merely expressing ignorance as to the total conditions. If we knew all the conditions, there would (I believe) be no chance at all.
Similarly, if the total conditions of my circumstance and existence at the moment of choice are known, then I believe it is possible to know (not guess with accuracy) what my choice will be. Hence, free will is an illusion brought about by our incomplete knowledge. We can make no choice other than the one we make, but we can't tell beforehand which of two choices is the one we are going to make.
Posted by orlox (Member # 2392) on :
I'm sure we don't agree. Even if we know all that can be known, there is still uncertainty. The search for local hidden variables is, as I have argued, extremely hopeful at best and likely to result in a theory that still admits probability limitations such as MWI.
Coin flips are quite predictable if you know all the initial conditions but not with absolute certainty. The universe just doesn't seem to work that way.
Laplace's demon either cannot be or will have to settle for probability. Hence, the universe is not determined in such a way that free will must be illusion.
Posted by Raventhief (Member # 9002) on :
Long post, sorry.
Hm, I haven't studied LaPlace's Demon extensively, but it seems to me to be a simplistic and outdated statement of my thoughts on the matter. When the theory was originated, atoms were believed to be the smallest division of matter. Energy was thought to be only a characteristic of matter, and not it's own entity. I would expand the statement and leave it open: the theoretical demon would need to know also the entire quantum state of every atom, sub atomic particle, energy photon, anti-matter particle (of any size) etc.
As to the thermogoddammic objection, yes, the second law indicates that a single state of the universe is unique and not recreatable (is that a word?) in full. However, that does not mean that a single state of the universe allows two or more states to derive from it. Entropy cannot currently be analysed, but that doesn't mean it is not analysable (another questionable word). And even still we can calculate the increase in entropy even if we aren't entirely clear on what entropy is. So it seems that there is no theoretical objection to "knowing the complete state of the universe".
Now, on the other hand, it is entirely possible that "knowing the complete state of the universe" is a logical impossibility. Certainly it isn't possible for you or me right now and it may never become possible. But my contention is not that you or I or any person may someday be able to predict with absolute certainty the actions of people, merely that a prediction of that nature seems to be theoretically possible and that possibility indicates that free will is as much of an illusion as standing still.
Either way, the illusion or fact of free will remains. I believe it is pointless to talk about not having free will until and unless something practical can come of it. Orlox stated earlier that there is a difference between free will and not free will. I do not argue, said difference does exist if free will does. He (she? Orlox) also stated that the difference is important to the species if not the individual. Here I disagree. I believe that perception is more important than reality, because we operate on our perception of reality, not reality itself (that's another discussion). If we perceive ourselves as having free will (which we do) then that perception has an affect on us. If we perceive ourselves as not having free will, that perception would affect us. We cannot easily change the reality. We appear to be able to change the perception.
Posted by Mike (Member # 55) on :
There are some things that we simply cannot calculate because of the sheer amount of processing power required. A coin flip is probably simple enough that if we know the initial conditions (location, velocity, angular velocity of the coin; atmospheric temperature and pressure; the geometry, elasticity, adhesiveness, etc. of the landing surface; the gravitational field) then we can calculate the outcome to a very high degree of accuracy. As you note, orlox, we can never have absolute certainty: there's always the possibility that the coin will spontaneously tunnel to somewhere in South America.
However, try the same thing with human behavior and all of a sudden there is too much data involved to make any meaningful prediction. But just because we can't calculate something doesn't mean that it isn't determined.
On the one hand, it all comes down to whether there are local hidden variables (and honestly, spooky action at a distance doesn't really bother me that much). If there are true quantum probabilities involved, then of course the future is not fully determined by the present state of the universe. That's tautology territory. I actually really like the MWI in this case.
On the other hand, as Eric pointed out, most expressions of probability are in fact very highly (I hesitate to say absolutely) determined, to a much higher degree than 50:50 (for a coin toss), 1 in 6 (for rolling a die), or 1 in 25,000,000 (jackpot on a lottery ticket). I'll go out on a limb and say that quantum probabilities have no bearing whatsoever on what we call free will. I'd say that free will is a very useful fiction, like love and anger, like your bank balance, like your mother-in-law. All these things have very little meaning if you're looking at the universe on the scale of quantum events.
[Edit: I posted before I saw the previous post. I agree with the last paragraph.]
Posted by Destineer (Member # 821) on :
quote:Originally posted by orlox: The search for local hidden variables is, as I have argued, extremely hopeful at best and likely to result in a theory that still admits probability limitations such as MWI.
What about Bohm's quantum theory? That's an example of a deterministic form of QM with nonlocal hidden variables.
Posted by Raventhief (Member # 9002) on :
Mike, my point is that right now with our current understanding of quantum (and newtonian) behavior, it seems that the hypothetical coin could spontaneously tunnel to South America, but if we had complete knowledge and understanding, the tunneling which appears spontaneous actually has a cause. Quantum theory is only our current best understanding of the sub-atomic universe. It's not necessarily gospel truth.
Posted by Mike (Member # 55) on :
My understanding is that for some theories tunneling to South America has a cause, and for some it is a truly random occurrence. I also understand that in the current theories in the former category there are also bizarre effects that look like instantaneous communication. I could be wrong about this: IANAQP.
I think our basic viewpoints on this are very similar.
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