quote: The study relied on non-invasive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to interfere with the right TPJ, temporarily impeding the normal firing of neurons in that region. In one experiment participants were exposed to TMS for nearly half an hour then asked to complete a quiz in which they had to judge characters' actions based on their intentions. In a second test, subjects were hit with a 500-millisecond burst of TMS just as they were evaluating a moral problem.
In both cases, control subjects were able to evaluate the harmfulness and morality of characters' intentions, whereas those exposed to TMS made judgments based purely on outcome. For example, one common question asked whether or not it was morally permissible for a man to allow his girlfriend to cross a bridge he knows is unsafe, even if in the end she makes it across safely. Control subjects found the intention to do harm morally impermissible, but those exposed to TMS largely based their judgment solely on the outcome; no harm, no foul.
Posted by Samprimary (Member # 8561) on :
And I never took off my tinfoil hat
WHO'S LAUGHING NOW
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
rollainm, I think you'll really enjoy this TED talk from Rebecca Saxe, who was the lead researcher on this project. The talk is a bit more expansive.
The Magnetic Fields' 69 Love Songs can make me more moral? Sweet.
Posted by King of Men (Member # 6684) on :
Where's your qualia now? When moral judgements - surely the epitome of the non-materialistic account of the mind - can be changed by a magnetic field, it's time to give up on dualism.
Posted by JonHecht (Member # 9712) on :
Yo, you ain't no Daniel Dennett. Don't be dissing my red color quale! I got qualia up the wazoo. In any case, I can have qualia and not be a property dualist. Besides, the materialistic aspect of moral judgments does not entail materialism with regards to moral objects.
Of course, the whole idea of morality is rather speculative, but whatever.
Posted by rollainm (Member # 8318) on :
Thanks, Strider. Watching now.
Hmm...I don't have a "right TPJ". What does it mean?!
[ March 30, 2010, 04:08 PM: Message edited by: rollainm ]
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:Where's your qualia now? When moral judgements - surely the epitome of the non-materialistic account of the mind - can be changed by a magnetic field, it's time to give up on dualism.
What does this have to do with qualia?
I think its fairly obvious, at least to anyone who's ever seen someone drunk, that purely physical changes to the brain can alter human judgement.
Posted by King of Men (Member # 6684) on :
I'm glad you admit it. This being so, how can you hold on to a dualistic theory of the mind?
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
Because I think physical things can influence nonphysical things.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
quote:Originally posted by JonHecht: Yo, you ain't no Daniel Dennett. Don't be dissing my red color quale! I got qualia up the wazoo. In any case, I can have qualia and not be a property dualist.
I tend to agree. Part of this is really dependent on how one defines qualia. I don't think any of us would be willing to say that subjective experience doesn't exist. I separate a bit from Dan Dennett on this point, in that I can say that there is something very important and currently not understood about the nature of the phenomena we call qualia, while still holding a completely materialistic view of the universe.
I don't agree that the hard problems of consciousness don't exist, and the research being done by Rebecca Saxe doesn't in any way change my views on that.
Posted by MattP (Member # 10495) on :
quote:Because I think physical things can influence nonphysical things.
Doesn't the "physical things can influence" part negate the "nonphysical" part? Isn't that what physical means?
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
Wouldn't that be a circular definition? Physical things are things that can be influenced by physical things?
That definition would also mean God, by essentially every Biblical portrayal of him, is physical by virtue of responding to prayers by physical human beings. And then souls would be physical by virtue of being influenced by God.
Posted by MattP (Member # 10495) on :
quote:That definition would also mean God, by essentially every Biblical portrayal of him, is physical by virtue of responding to prayers by physical human beings.
This is a fairly robust criticism of the supernatural - that to the extent that it can influence the physical world, that influence could be measured. The inability to demonstrate that influence empirically suggests that the influence doesn't actually exist.
Posted by King of Men (Member # 6684) on :
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: Because I think physical things can influence nonphysical things.
Great, that means we can measure the 'nonphysical' things. Off you go and measure up some gods, then.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
I'm pretty sure that Tres would say that he has empirically experienced and measured God's influence. I'm not sure why you think that he couldn't.
Posted by King of Men (Member # 6684) on :
Experiencing != measuring, especially when other experiences directly contradict the conclusions drawn.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
err...how is it different?
[ March 30, 2010, 05:30 PM: Message edited by: MrSquicky ]
Posted by MattP (Member # 10495) on :
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky: err...how is it different?
Think of fish stories - "It was *this* (holds hands way apart) big!" - that is experiencing. Measuring is when you put the thing on a scale and take a photo.
Posted by JonHecht (Member # 9712) on :
I have the suspicion that physical and natural are being conflated. If this is the case, then I agree that God and miracles can be considered natural, as opposed to supernatural, if natural is defined as occurring within the system.
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
quote:Originally posted by MattP:
quote:Originally posted by MrSquicky: err...how is it different?
Think of fish stories - "It was *this* (holds hands way apart) big!" - that is experiencing. Measuring is when you put the thing on a scale and take a photo.
I'm not really following this. In the first part, you seem to be focusing on telling someone else about it, not the experience of catching the fish. Is telling the "fish story" what you consider experiencing the fish?
In the second part, I don't get how taking a picture is part of measuring. To me, putting it on the scale and comparing it against the standard would be measuring. Are you saying that if you put it on a scale, but didn't take a picture, it wouldn't be measuring?
Posted by BlackBlade (Member # 8376) on :
I'm confused, was the question "Would you allow your girlfriend to cross a bridge you knew was unsafe even if you knew she would cross safely?"
Posted by MrSquicky (Member # 1802) on :
I believe that the people were presented with a vignette about a guy allowing his girlfriend cross a bridge he knows is unsafe and then asked to judge the morality of his action. I'm unclear if it is established that he actively desires his girlfriend to get hurt on the bridge or is just negligent.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
quote:Originally posted by BlackBlade: I'm confused, was the question "Would you allow your girlfriend to cross a bridge you knew was unsafe even if you knew she would cross safely?"
No, that would be contradictory. It's not unsafe if you know the outcome in advance.
I think the question is more about whether the choice to send her across was moral, given the outcome (she happens to arrive safely).
Normally people can recognize that the morality of that choice doesn't depend on the outcome, but on what you know at the time you make the choice. It's not OK to send a person across a bridge if you know there's a 30% chance of dying, even if she makes it.
This experiment tended to show that people weren't capable of that kind of moral reasoning if part of their brain was effectively turned off.
Posted by BlackBlade (Member # 8376) on :
scifibum: Ah thanks, I don't have time to read the entire article now, but that part confused me. I'll definitely check it out later.
Posted by Xavier (Member # 405) on :
quote: It's not OK to send a person across a bridge if you know there's a 30% chance of dying, even if she makes it.
Is it okay for me to let me wife drive on the highway if there is a 0.0001% chance she'll die? (assuming that there is a significantly lower chance she'll die at home) At what percentage is the risk deemed moral?
Not trying to be a snot, just these kinds of questions are fun, even if they don't really have answers (and I don't expect you to come up with one).
I am fascinated with the study as described here. I may check out the TED talk if I get a chance. The human brain is the most fascinating thing in the known universe, IMHO.
While I would not go as far as to make the claims KoM is making, this sort of thing is indeed why I think there is no need to believe in a human soul. The physical brain accounts for everything we can observe about human behavior, so what's left to attribute to the soul? For me the answer is, of course, nothing.
(I know the religious have their own answers to this that are satisfactory to themselves, I'm not necessarily inviting debate, though it's not unwelcome either)
Posted by JonHecht (Member # 9712) on :
"Is it okay for me to let me wife drive on the highway if there is a 0.0001% chance she'll die? (assuming that there is a significantly lower chance she'll die at home) At what percentage is the risk deemed moral?"
It is OK for you to let her drive if it's 100% that she'll die. And it's not OK if there's 0% that she will.
To be quite frank, the claim made about qualia appears to be mostly, if not completely, unrelated to the study to me.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: Because I think physical things can influence nonphysical things.
Great, that means we can measure the 'nonphysical' things. Off you go and measure up some gods, then.
I think you have my claim backwards. If nonphysical things can influence physical things, then we could measure the nonphysical using its influence on the physical.
But that's not what I said. I said physical things can influence nonphysical things. That just means I can measure the physical usings its influence on the nonphysical. And I definitely can. For instance, I can tell a stove is physically hot if I touch it an experience the nonphysical sensation of burning pain.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
But the "nonphysical" sensation of burning pain has an exact physical/neural correlate.
Posted by Kwea (Member # 2199) on :
Not always, and phantom pain is very much real pain.
Posted by Foust (Member # 3043) on :
Ah, one-way causation. The last refuge of superstition.
Posted by JonHecht (Member # 9712) on :
I wouldn't go so far as to say that epiphenomenalism is superstitious... People seem to dismiss these options too readily because they do not fit our pretty picture of reality, but that does not mean that they are epistemically any more suspect than materialism.
Posted by Foust (Member # 3043) on :
Nah, it's a hopeless rear-guard defense of dualism, one of the last intellectually respectable superstitions.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:Ah, one-way causation. The last refuge of superstition.
I believe there is likely two-way causation. The other direction of the causation is just far harder to prove/explain, and is unrelated to this magnetic field experiment.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
quote:Originally posted by Kwea: Not always, and phantom pain is very much real pain.
phantom pain has an exact neural correlate and we know what it is.
edit: to be fair, we have a good idea of what it is, and I don't think there's any reason to assume it's caused by anything nonphysical.
[ March 31, 2010, 10:13 AM: Message edited by: Strider ]
Posted by Kwea (Member # 2199) on :
quote:Originally posted by Strider:
quote:Originally posted by Kwea: Not always, and phantom pain is very much real pain.
phantom pain has an exact neural correlate and we know what it is.
edit: to be fair, we have a good idea of what it is, and I don't think there's any reason to assume it's caused by anything nonphysical.
We have an idea, and sometimes, in some patients. However, it is a bit of a "the chicken or the egg" problem. Things outside of the brain cause pain, which can be observed by observing brain activity centers. However, not all pain registers the same, and not all phantom pain shows up on brain scans.
I don't know anyone who thinks that chemical changes DON'T have an influence on consciousness or perception. However, that does not mean that all changes are chemical/physical. Nor does it mean that understanding those changes makes you a better human being.
If anything, a tendency to limit all of human experience to chemical/physiological changes makes you less of one.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
Glad to know I'm less of a human being! I'll make sure to have an appropriately devalued view of life from now on.
Posted by Geraine (Member # 9913) on :
This is really cool, but scares me..If a magnetic field can alter a person's sense of morality, could it be used to do other things?
I better buy some Rossum Corporation stock.
Posted by Xavier (Member # 405) on :
quote:If anything, a tendency to limit all of human experience to chemical/physiological changes makes you less of one.
quote:Glad to know I'm less of a human being! I'll make sure to have an appropriately devalued view of life from now on.
And every other atheist* with you. Nice Kwea.
* Or at least those who don't believe in a soul, which I guess I can't claim is 100%.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
The thing I think you're forgetting, Kwea, is that even if we believe that behavior is deterministic (except where it's random) and the way we work is entirely chemical/physiological, we still have the same kinds of conscious experience that anyone does. "I think, therefore I am" resonates with everybody, and we all experience ourselves making choices and feeling things.
Neural damage might limit someone's human experience, but beliefs about what experience means, and why we have it, do not.
Posted by MattP (Member # 10495) on :
quote:If anything, a tendency to limit all of human experience to chemical/physiological changes makes you less of one.
This is a remarkably narrow-minded view of what constitutes humanity. It's entirely possible to both have an academic understanding of human experience that recognizes in it only the laws and substance of physics and chemistry while still fully experiencing the emotion, awe, and even reverence for that phenomena that only humans are really capable of.
I don't have to see the roller coaster as anything more than bolts and steel for it to produce a pleasurable or frightening experience. I don't have to view a movie as more than a projection of light through film in order to experience all that a film can produce in me. In many cases, the understanding of the basic physical processes enhances the experience beyond the mystery that proceeded that knowledge.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
quote: In many cases, the understanding of the basic physical processes enhances the experience beyond the mystery that proceeded that knowledge.
QFT
quote:Originally posted by Geraine: This is really cool, but scares me..If a magnetic field can alter a person's sense of morality, could it be used to do other things?
I better buy some Rossum Corporation stock.
Worth noting Geraine, they were able alter peoples' moral judgments of other people's actions, not alter someone's morality. Though when they figure out how to do that, I'll make sure to warn you!
but yes, much of the application for research going on right now in neuroscience certainly has the possibility to be used in scary ways. And many wonderful ways as well.
Posted by King of Men (Member # 6684) on :
quote:Worth noting Geraine, they were able alter peoples' moral judgments of other people's actions, not alter someone's morality.
It seems to me that the brain likely uses the same circuits to judge other people's morality, and the morality of one's own actions. So I don't think the distinction you suggest is useful.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
I'm not sure if that's right. My understanding is that the RTPJ is involved in theory of mind calculations. And that when judging whether someone else committed a moral act or not we use the RTPJ to model that person's brain state and deduce their intent. By disrupting that area of the brain, we are not able to do that and so our judgments are more utilitarian.
It seems to me that input from the RTPJ feeds into whatever areas are responsible for moral judgments, and while you're right that my own ethical actions are somewhat influenced by my understanding of other people's beliefs and desires, there is certainly not a 1:1 correlation.
So I think it IS a useful distinction.
Posted by MattP (Member # 10495) on :
Are you suggesting that someone might express a different morality for their own actions than for the actions of others? That he didn't do anything wrong when he sent his girlfriend across an unstable bridge but I would be doing something wrong if I acted in the same way?
We usually discuss morality in terms of what is right or wrong regardless of the identity of the individual actors. That's sort of a core element to morality - that universality of it.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
okay, take a look at some of the results from the study. people across the board thought that blame should be attributed when individuals caused other people harm. When no harm was intended, but harm occurred, people on average attributed less blame to the individual who caused harm. But when the RTPJ was disrupted, people judged individuals who caused unintended harm as harshly as those who caused intended harm.
also, relatedly, individuals who attempted to cause harm, but no harm occurred were normally still judged harshly, but when the RTPJ was disrupted, people judged failed attempts at harm as morally permissible.
Their morality was not fundamentally altered. Harming other people was still bad. What changed was how the intentions of the actors were incorporated into their moral judgments.
So given that, I DO think there is an important distinction to be made regarding what was being done here.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
from the more detailed article linked to at the beginning of the above article:
quote:“It doesn’t completely reverse people’s moral judgments, it just biases them,” says Saxe.
When subjects received TMS to a brain region near the right TPJ, their judgments were nearly identical to those of people who received no TMS at all.
While understanding other people’s intentions is critical to judging them, it is just one piece of the puzzle. We also take into account the person’s desires, previous record and any external constraints, guided by our own concepts of loyalty, fairness and integrity, says Saxe.
“Our moral judgments are not the result of a single process, even though they feel like one uniform thing,” she says. “It’s actually a hodgepodge of competing and conflicting judgments, all of which get jumbled into what we call moral judgment.”
Posted by JonHecht (Member # 9712) on :
quote:Originally posted by scifibum: "I think, therefore I am" resonates with everybody, and we all experience ourselves making choices and feeling things.
I'm going to get yelled at now... I deny that there is any good reason to believe in the self or "I".
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
quote:Originally posted by JonHecht:
quote:Originally posted by scifibum: "I think, therefore I am" resonates with everybody, and we all experience ourselves making choices and feeling things.
I'm going to get yelled at now... I deny that there is any good reason to believe in the self or "I".
true, agreed, but even if the idea of the self is an illusion, it's certainly a persistent illusion! And so given that this collection of atoms that you guys refer to as Strider is able to feel pain and joy and has all sorts of emotions and thoughts, I will continue to value those experiences and thoughts that bring me happiness. I'll sometimes even value the ones that bring me unhappiness!
Posted by natural_mystic (Member # 11760) on :
quote:Originally posted by JonHecht:
quote:Originally posted by scifibum: "I think, therefore I am" resonates with everybody, and we all experience ourselves making choices and feeling things.
I'm going to get yelled at now... I deny that there is any good reason to believe in the self or "I".
Please elaborate.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
quote:Are you suggesting that someone might express a different morality for their own actions than for the actions of others?
I didn't specifically answer your question Matt. Yes, I do think that. And I think that because I am able to take my own intentions into account when judging my own behavior, without using my RTPJ, that is not true for judging other people. The disruption of that brain region would keep my judgments of my own actions the same, while changing my judgments of others' actions. And in general, without knowledge of someone else's intentions I might judge them differently than I judge myself.
Posted by JonHecht (Member # 9712) on :
quote:Originally posted by natural_mystic:
quote:Originally posted by JonHecht:
quote:Originally posted by scifibum: "I think, therefore I am" resonates with everybody, and we all experience ourselves making choices and feeling things.
I'm going to get yelled at now... I deny that there is any good reason to believe in the self or "I".
Please elaborate.
Well, there are a lot of good arguments, such as those presented by Hume.
My reason for denying the self is something completely different, though, that I doubt anyone (aside from Hartry Field) would agree with. I'm a mereological nihilist. Yay. Fun stuff.
quote:Originally posted by scifibum: "I think, therefore I am" resonates with everybody, and we all experience ourselves making choices and feeling things.
I'm going to get yelled at now... I deny that there is any good reason to believe in the self or "I".
I'm also interested in elaboration, but I'm not going to yell at you in any case.
I note that you're still using the word "I" the same way that it's used in the sentence you quoted, even as you deny the existence of its referent.
Edit: Oops, I posted before I saw the elaboration. I'll see if I have any chance to understand what that mereoleic nibblism thing is.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
natural_mystic, much of the data coming from psychology and neuroscience tells us that our everyday conception of the self is far from true. When we begin to understand that there is no real "I" that makes decisions and acts, but rather that there are a whole load of competing processes and subsystems, all processing data and producing some output, the idea of a self falls by the wayside.
Posted by scifibum (Member # 7625) on :
quote:Originally posted by Strider: natural_mystic, much of the data coming from psychology and neuroscience tells us that our everyday conception of the self is far from true. When we begin to understand that there is no real "I" that makes decisions and acts, but rather that there are a whole load of competing processes and subsystems, all processing data and producing some output, the idea of a self falls by the wayside.
What I was getting at - badly - is that even if we begin to understand the everyday conception of a self isn't accurate, it's still experientially essential. I don't think the idea can fall by the wayside, because it's central to our conscious perception. Perhaps we'll find other modes of consciousness, but until we do, it's not a concept we can abandon, even if we want to.
Posted by MightyCow (Member # 9253) on :
quote:Originally posted by JonHecht: I'm going deny that there is any good reason to believe in the self or "I".
I guess you fail to see the irony of this claim.
Who is denying the claim?
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
scifibum, there are different ways to abandon a concept. Intellectually I think the idea of a self is an illusion. But I agree with the meat of your post.
Just like intellectually I understand that water is hydrogen and oxygen, but that doesn't help me drink it.
I also think free will is an illusion and it doesn't stop me from treating other people as if they do have it. Though it certainly helps inform the way I think about certain things.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:I don't have to see the roller coaster as anything more than bolts and steel for it to produce a pleasurable or frightening experience. I don't have to view a movie as more than a projection of light through film in order to experience all that a film can produce in me.
This illustrates that you can take benefits from something without understanding why it has the benefits it has. You can take medicine without knowing anything about chemicals or biology. You can live in a house without knowing what it is constructed with. And you can experience life without ever believing it consists of anything more than protons and electrons. So, no, simply believing in strict materialism does not prevent you from experiencing all aspects of human life - although I think it may make it difficult or impossible to explain some of those aspects within your worldview.
Posted by MattP (Member # 10495) on :
quote:This illustrates that you can take benefits from something without understanding why it has the benefits it has.
That was pretty much my whole point. That the experience of humanity is not tied very much to our opinions about the fundamental nature of existence.
quote:So, no, believing in strict materialism does not take away any of your humanity - although I think it may make it difficult or impossible to explain aspects of that humanity within your worldview.
Well, no. It just makes me think that "I don't know [at this time]" is a more honest answer to some of those issues. Having an explanation is not the same thing as having a correct explanation, after all.
Posted by Xavier (Member # 405) on :
quote:So, no, simply believing in strict materialism does not prevent you from experiencing all aspects of human life - although I think it may make it difficult or impossible to explain some of those aspects within your worldview.
Like what?
Posted by Xavier (Member # 405) on :
Also, the wiki on Mereological nihilism is interesting, but it seems to me that if nothing composed of parts exists, than pretty much nothing exists at all. Even atomic particles are made out of quarks, and even those quarks may be made out of something else.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:Like what?
Like the experience of joy or pain (I don't think these can be explained by the sort of world Daniel Dennett proposes). Or perhaps more importantly, why things matter (which becomes very had to explain without things like joy and pain to give worth to elements of life).
Posted by Juxtapose (Member # 8837) on :
quote:natural_mystic, much of the data coming from psychology and neuroscience tells us that our everyday conception of the self is far from true. When we begin to understand that there is no real "I" that makes decisions and acts, but rather that there are a whole load of competing processes and subsystems, all processing data and producing some output, the idea of a self falls by the wayside.
I sort of suspect that the thing we think of as "self" refers to a single type of brain process, of the many we may be running. I further suspect that that process is the one that allows us to anticipate things.
EDITED to add quotes.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
Matt, before the thread goes completely off track, does what I said on the previous page about morality and this experiment make sense?
Posted by JonHecht (Member # 9712) on :
quote:Originally posted by MightyCow:
quote:Originally posted by JonHecht: I'm going deny that there is any good reason to believe in the self or "I".
I guess you fail to see the irony of this claim.
Who is denying the claim?
No, I see the irony (teehee, there it is again). "I" is merely shorthand for "those parts aligned me-wise" or some other like thing.
And concerning mereological nihilism entailing the denial of everything, what about strings? That seems satisfactory.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
Juxtapose, but my point is exactly the opposite. That what we think of as the self is made up of LOTS of brain processes. Would you say that the self is mainly what we consider as consciousness? If it's more than just what we're conscious of, you already have a division in processes. But even consciousness, which we're far from understanding, depends on the functioning, and communications between, many different brain systems. There is no central hub that all these systems feed into which can be called the seat of your "I". Your sense of self comes about from the interplay of all these things simultaneously.
Posted by JonHecht (Member # 9712) on :
My real issue is how to account for mutability over time, even if we take the conscious state as a "whole", do we deny that it is subject to time? That, combined with my mereological nihilism, is a problem. Not to mention all those fun little thought experiments that appear to be so damaging, such as Parfit's (I think he comes to the wrong conclusions based on his experiments, and the proper conclusion is not only to deny identity but to deny the survival of the self as well, for what is the self without identity?)
Posted by Xavier (Member # 405) on :
quote:Like the experience of joy or pain...
I know you believe that experience is somehow distinct from the physical, electrical, and chemical goings on of your brain. However, I don't believe I've ever seen you present a rational for this besides "my brain tells me my experience isn't from my brain". Declaring that you know them to be separate doesn't mean it is hard to explain with a materialistic view.
quote: Or perhaps more importantly, why things matter (which becomes very had to explain without things like joy and pain to give worth to elements of life).
"Why things matter" is not an aspect of human life, so I don't see how that's relevant to the discussion at hand. My personal answer is: nothing "matters" unless you think it does, in which case it matters to you only. When many people in a society have things that matter to them then I suppose matters to the society as a whole. Starting from a premise that "things matter" doesn't mean much to those who don't accept your premise.
Posted by Juxtapose (Member # 8837) on :
I'm probably using "process" incorrectly here. I mean, something in our brain allows us to perform a kind of calculus. We track trajectories. We do it when we're trying to catch a ball, or anticipate someone's behavior (including, I think, our own). Whatever that thing is, it's what I'm calling a process. If you're using process in a strictly neurological sense, well, I just won't really be able to keep up with that conversation for very long. If you're saying that our predictive behavior is known to be made up of many different neurological processes, consider me to be in agreement with you.
I think there are other processes we're conscious of, but which we are traditionally less likely to think of as self. Speculating even further, I think that would explain a portion of religious behavior.
Posted by natural_mystic (Member # 11760) on :
quote:Originally posted by JonHecht: Well, there are a lot of good arguments, such as those presented by Hume.
My reason for denying the self is something completely different, though, that I doubt anyone (aside from Hartry Field) would agree with. I'm a mereological nihilist. Yay. Fun stuff.
quote:Originally posted by Strider: natural_mystic, much of the data coming from psychology and neuroscience tells us that our everyday conception of the self is far from true. When we begin to understand that there is no real "I" that makes decisions and acts, but rather that there are a whole load of competing processes and subsystems, all processing data and producing some output, the idea of a self falls by the wayside.
Interesting stuff. Thanks.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
natural mystic, It's sort of like the humunculus fallacy. You open your eyes and you see the world. But "who" is actually seeing? It's not like there's a little man inside your head watching the input from your eyes like a picture on a screen(it would just beg the question who is watching from inside their head). Light falls on your retina, which sends signals back to your primary visual cortex, where different pathways are carrying information about color or contrast or area of the visual field, etc...none of this is available to your conscious self(damage to the signal leaving your visual cortex will leave you blind even if the signal makes it all the way there unaffected). After these signals leave the visual cortex they are actually broken up into two main pathways, one which determines "what" you're looking at, and a separate one which determines "where" it is(certain types of brain damage will allow someone to identify what they're looking at but not be able to tell you where it is, and visa versa). There is no one area where the picture you see of the outside world "comes together".*
I imagine consciousness, and thus the self, is similar.
*this was a necessary vague account of vision...
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:I know you believe that experience is somehow distinct from the physical, electrical, and chemical goings on of your brain. However, I don't believe I've ever seen you present a rational for this besides "my brain tells me my experience isn't from my brain". Declaring that you know them to be separate doesn't mean it is hard to explain with a materialistic view.
It'd be more along the lines of "my mind tells me that my experience is not consistent with the properties of a thing that could be part of my brain". And given that my personal experience is a subjective thing only observable by my mind, I'm not sure how there could be any rationale other than one based on what my mind tells me.
quote:"Why things matter" is not an aspect of human life, so I don't see how that's relevant to the discussion at hand. My personal answer is: nothing "matters" unless you think it does, in which case it matters to you only. When many people in a society have things that matter to them then I suppose matters to the society as a whole. Starting from a premise that "things matter" doesn't mean much to those who don't accept your premise.
Why do you believe that thinking something matters makes it matter, even if just to you? I don't think there's an answer to that under materialism. If you build a purely material robot that takes in inputs and outputs "these inputs matter to me", I don't think those inputs actually matter to the robot, no matter how much the robot is programmed to "think" it matters.
Posted by JonHecht (Member # 9712) on :
I think what is intended is that if something is genuinely valuable, then its value is intrinsic, and thus our recognition of it as such is irrelevant. This applies to materialism and anything else.
Posted by Xavier (Member # 405) on :
quote:It'd be more along the lines of "my mind tells me that my experience is not consistent with the properties of a thing that could be part of my brain". And given that my personal experience is a subjective thing only observable by my mind, I'm not sure how there could be any rationale other than one based on what my mind tells me.
I fail to see how that makes it something that materialism has to explain, except perhaps to you and anyone else that has been convinced in a similar fashion as you have. My own mind has come to no such conclusion, so its not something I need to explain to myself.
quote:Why do you believe that thinking something matters makes it matter, even if just to you? I don't think there's an answer to that under materialism. If you build a purely material robot that takes in inputs and outputs "these inputs matter to me", I don't think those inputs actually matter to the robot, no matter how much the robot is programmed to "think" it matters.
I think you didn't pick up on why I was using the scare quotes. I do not believe that anything objectively matters. Whether something matters or not is entirely subjective to a person. I don't think the way humans view something to matter is much different from your hypothetical robot.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
not entirely subjective...what matters to us is in large part due to our particular evolutionary history and physiology. though it manifests itself differently in people based on their genetics and experience.
Posted by JonHecht (Member # 9712) on :
Psst, that means subjective, but to a larger group.
Posted by Xavier (Member # 405) on :
quote:not entirely subjective...what matters to us is in large part due to our particular evolutionary history and physiology. though it manifests itself differently in people based on their genetics and experience.
I don't disagree with any of this. I would include evolution as be a factor in what led to your brain being the way it is, and the brain is the entity that derives what matters to a person.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
fair enough, but I do think it's worth noting. There are objective facts you can state about what humans value GIVEN evolution/physiology.
Posted by JonHecht (Member # 9712) on :
But what humans value has nothing to do with what is actually valuable. Merely what we value. If what we value happens to lock on to what is actually valuable (if there is any such thing), then that would merely be a happy accident. Now I have no idea what the conversation is about, anyway. Whatever.
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
define "value" and "valuable". My point isn't there are objective truths of the universe, but that there are objective human truths. The conversation was about "why things matter"...I think! And while what particular things matter to each individual might be relatively subjective, they are all based on fundamental truths regarding the human condition. Because natural selection and evolution led to brains that control bodies that avoid pain and seek pleasure, etc...
Posted by swbarnes2 (Member # 10225) on :
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: It'd be more along the lines of "my mind tells me
Can you explain the practical method one uses to distinguish between "what your mind tells you" and "what you wish to be true"?
Because I suggest that if you have no answer, you substitute my phrasing for yours (since they are practically indistinguishable, even to you), and see how convincing it sounds then.
Posted by King of Men (Member # 6684) on :
quote:Originally posted by JonHecht: But what humans value has nothing to do with what is actually valuable.
By what other yardstick do you propose to measure value? Do you intend to go around looking at atoms for the little XML tag that says 'valuable = yes'? Even if there were an obelisk on Mars stating that coffee is valuable and tea is not, why should you care, if it happened that you like tea better? You can't very well say to yourself "My perception of which tastes better has been wrong, and I should work on getting my rebellious neurons to recognise true value". The only possible response to an outside force telling you what's "actually" valuable is to say "I disagree", and continue as before. There is nothing you can substitute for your own judgement, even if you are religious; for a religious person must decide that the words of his god are correct, before he can follow their guidance as to value.
Posted by JonHecht (Member # 9712) on :
Kom: I don't think you read the third sentence in that post. "If what we value happens to lock on to what is actually valuable (if there is any such thing)" That is to say, there might be things that have intrinsic value. For example, some people claim that knowledge is intrinsically valuable. What does that mean? I don't really know, but some people claim it. I'm not even sure what the term "valuable" as such mean, even if it is intended to be solely in relation to human value. If a human values short life, then life extending things are not valuable. The term "valuable" is problematic.
I am simply trying to use the terms that have been used. And my way of using it does not appear any more problematic than any other. So if you want to give a strict definition of value that avoids these issues, please feel free to do so and I would very much appreciate it, though I doubt it would match with what someone else's conception of value is.
Strider: See the above on value.
"My point isn't there are objective truths of the universe, but that there are objective human truths." I have no idea what the hell objective means at this point, or objective human truths. Objective truths about humans or objective within humanity or what? And I think we're using the word objective in different ways. Do you mean universal, as in it applies to all humans? If so, then that is clearly not the case, as there are exceptions (though you might want to say that they are aberrations and thus not really human, but this is not entirely satisfactory). The best that you can say is that, (probably) because of evolution, humans tend to do X. That is all you can say. This has nothing to do with anything being objective or universal. This is an empirical diagnosis.
Posted by sinflower (Member # 12228) on :
quote:What I was getting at - badly - is that even if we begin to understand the everyday conception of a self isn't accurate, it's still experientially essential. I don't think the idea can fall by the wayside, because it's central to our conscious perception. Perhaps we'll find other modes of consciousness, but until we do, it's not a concept we can abandon, even if we want to.
What about "out of body experiences"? When experiencing one, people find that their sense of self becomes separate from their body. Often they will say things like "My body down there is in pain" but not experience the emotional repercussions of that pain themselves. And that's simple-- a good dose of ketamine can create the sense of separation from certain of our bodily and mental processes, in which the person doesn't identify them with "I" anymore--but they're still having conscious perception, aren't they? They just don't associate some of the things they perceive as part of "themselves" anymore. And then there's the phenomenon where we can induce people, via a complex arrangement of mirrors/lighting, to think that a mask is part of their "self" and respond accordingly. We can also induce people to think that they're personally experiencing sensations they are actually only seeing other people experience. So the conception of self is pretty easily altered, and we'll no doubt discover more methods of doing that in the future. Maybe methods of picking and choosing what we consider part of our conscious selves.
Of course we're nowhere near the point where we can fiddle with our conscious perception of self in any sort of useful or even non-detrimental ways... I think we agree that a constant state of "out of body" isn't a very safe way to live. But I think the day when we CAN manipulate our everyday conception of self, and our conscious perception, safely and positively, isn't as far off as we may think.
Posted by MightyCow (Member # 9253) on :
Sinflower: I would file all those experiences under "delusion", or at least "confusion." Imagining that one doesn't have a body does not make that true any more than seeing a magic trick makes the Statue of Liberty disappear.
Out of body experiences are illusionary. We are easily fooled. There still must be someone who is being fooled. Do "I" stop being myself when I'm drunk?
Posted by sinflower (Member # 12228) on :
quote:Imagining that one doesn't have a body does not make that true any more than seeing a magic trick makes the Statue of Liberty disappear.
I think you're misunderstanding the situation. It is not imagining that one does not HAVE a body--it is receiving and perceiving input from certain bodily processes but no longer associating this information with the subjectively created entity we call our "conscious self." It's quite extraordinary that this can be consistently induced by physical changes in the brain. The effect is illusory only in the sense that "the self" in itself is illusory. It may be, depending on what your definition of illusory is--but what matters is that it shows we can reliably alter, through physical and inducible changes, such an integral thing as our sense of self. It shows that there isn't one immutable set of physical processes and inputs that we can associate with "the self," but that this set is alterable, and that what we currently categorize as "consciousness" can come in different modes. This is quite, if you think about it, awe-inspiring.
[ April 01, 2010, 01:14 AM: Message edited by: sinflower ]
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:I fail to see how that makes it something that materialism has to explain, except perhaps to you and anyone else that has been convinced in a similar fashion as you have.
Yes - it is something that materialism has to explain to me. When it comes to me deciding what *I* should believe, that's what matters.
For you, it you truly don't have nonphysical subjective experiences, then I agree that there's no reason that'd be a problem with materialism for you. But, given that originally I believed subjective experience was simply neuron firings until a great deal of analysis and introspection convinced me otherwise, I think its possible that you also could be convinced.
quote:I think you didn't pick up on why I was using the scare quotes. I do not believe that anything objectively matters. Whether something matters or not is entirely subjective to a person. I don't think the way humans view something to matter is much different from your hypothetical robot.
But again, I don't see why things would even subjectively matter under materialism. I wouldn't say that anything really subjectively matters to that robot. The robot just acts as if it does.
To value something is a nonphysical function of the mind - without it, you can't even subjectively care. The best you could do is act as if you were something that cared. If "I act as if I care about it" is all that you mean by saying something is subjectively valuable to you, then okay. But that's now what I think of when I say something is valuable to me. I think that it actually means that thing is valuable to me in my mind, regardless of how I act.
quote:Can you explain the practical method one uses to distinguish between "what your mind tells you" and "what you wish to be true"?
If it wouldn't cease to appear true if you started wishing it is false, then you'd know it is not just what you wish to be true.
Posted by Xavier (Member # 405) on :
quote:Yes - it is something that materialism has to explain to me. When it comes to me deciding what *I* should believe, that's what matters.
Why should a materialist care what you believe?
The quote was this:
quote:So, no, simply believing in strict materialism does not prevent you from experiencing all aspects of human life - although I think it may make it difficult or impossible to explain some of those aspects within your worldview.
But this is dishonest, because materialists can explain the things you've come up with as examples quite easily. It is just that the answers don't satisfy you, who has already decided that materialism is false.
quote:To value something is a nonphysical function of the mind..
You keep claiming things like this as if saying them makes it true.
Posted by Tresopax (Member # 1063) on :
quote:Why should a materialist care what you believe?
Because chemicals in their brain make them act that way?
But really.... people should care what other people believe because sometimes what one believes is wrong, and by exchanging beliefs one can sometimes improve or check one's own. In the case of materialists, I think they should care about what I believe, because I have faith that their consciousness operates the same way mine does, and thus we can better understand the ways our minds work by comparing the way we think about it.
But beyond that.... KoM asked why I believe what I do. If people don't care, or don't want to know, don't ask!
quote:But this is dishonest, because materialists can explain the things you've come up with as examples quite easily. It is just that the answers don't satisfy you, who has already decided that materialism is false.
If you see your car with a broken windshield and your neighbor is standing next to it with a baseball bat, and if you ask your neighbor to explain how the window suddenly was broken, and if your neighbor responds by saying "Oh no, your car window is not broken", that isn't really explaining it.
Posted by rollainm (Member # 8318) on :
sinflower, I agree with MC that the out of body experience is just a delusion. More specifically, it's a delusion influenced or brought about by the numbing or confusion of certain processes in the brain. The person has a limited awareness of, say, pain or physical contact and the mind simply fills in the gaps in much the same way it would with an optical illusion or, as a better example, when being physically disturbed while dreaming. In other words, it's nothing extraordinary.
Posted by naledge (Member # 392) on :
So does this mean that HAARP could be used as a mind control device?
-nal
Posted by Strider (Member # 1807) on :
quote:Originally posted by rollainm: sinflower, I agree with MC that the out of body experience is just a delusion. More specifically, it's a delusion influenced or brought about by the numbing or confusion of certain processes in the brain. The person has a limited awareness of, say, pain or physical contact and the mind simply fills in the gaps in much the same way it would with an optical illusion or, as a better example, when being physically disturbed while dreaming. In other words, it's nothing extraordinary.
actually, I agree with sinflower's interpretation of this. Sure, it's nothing mystical, but it is amazing that it can happen. And we know how it can happen, and how to induce it. Which tells us that it's a very real physical phenomena, and it also tells us something very important about the nature of the self and consciousness.
Posted by aspectre (Member # 2222) on :
MattP and KoM, did you guys see my responses to you on the previous page? Does what I said make sense?
Posted by King of Men (Member # 6684) on :
Nu, the point seems to be open to experiment: Have people play the ultimatum game or some other measure of altruism while under the magnet, and see what happens.
Posted by Mike (Member # 55) on :
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: But, given that originally I believed subjective experience was simply neuron firings until a great deal of analysis and introspection convinced me otherwise, I think its possible that you also could be convinced.
I, for one, would love to hear more details about the analysis and introspection that so convinced you. Indeed, if it was so convincing, you should be able to explain why it changed your mind.
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