Its a thought provoking question, because the speed and size of the destruction provokes swift and terrible decisions. 90% of the time you can bet that the other side will retaliate and cause mass destruction to the provoker, so why would he risk attacking?
These are the assumptions - there are no ICBMs; all bombs/missiles are delivered by bomber, sub, or something similar.
There is no way to disable all of the enemy's bombers, bombs, subs, etc. Retaliation is a given.
Can you think of any reason why one of these superpowers would resort to nuclear attack under this kind of scenario?
Or, a third party launches a single nuclear attack on Russia or the United States, deliberately hoping to provoke a war between the two. That's been used quite a bit in fiction: The Sum of All Fears, and at least one James Bond movie, if memory serves.
Barack Obama said:
quote:
With the Soviet Union, you did get the sense that they were operating on a model that we could comprehend in terms of, they don't want to be blown up, we don't want to be blown up, so you do game theory and calculate ways to contain. I think there are certain elements within the Islamic world right now that don't make those same calculations.
I'm not enamored with the guy, but he makes a very good point.
Speaking of game theory, threat of MAD keeping things in check is an example of Nash equilibrium. Look under "Occurrence" on that page, and specifically pay attention to the first subsection there: "Where the conditions are not met".
The game theory is interesting stuff. _Prisoner's_Dilemna_, by Poundstone was a good read. (Part Game Theory and part biographical of John von Neumann.)
One interesting thing would be to investigate the different ways in which just war is determined. Just War Theory that emerged from Christianity, for example, is very restrictive in nature. It tries to prevent you from heading into war if you haven't fulfilled a strict set of criteria, and it attempts to curtail leaders from disproportionate responses. It's emphasis is prevention. (It unfortunately seems to have less traction these days.) Some ideologies, on the other hand, seek affirming reasons for warring and other killing. They often hide behind the ever amorphous concept of "rights."
Enough hot air from me, though. I am coming dangerously close to tediousness if I'm not already there. But for the sake of a story, I would definitely look into those areas.
Then again, an ideology that was insane enough might find a reason.
[This message has been edited by mfreivald (edited April 11, 2007).]
But having worked in technology for years and years, I can say I can honestly see scenarios where the systems we put into place to protect us, and the layers upon layers upon layers of backups and failsafes and whatever...FAIL. More likely due to things like negligence, lack of understanding of the core architecture of the systems, lack of maintenance on the computer systems over time, etc.
MAD would never work with Iran, since if they die in battle, they go to heaven and are served by 72 virginians.
The solution to having a nation that has no care for their population, is to know where the leadership is at all times, and they be the only target. the general population is not going to go to war on their own, especially if they fear the leadership and the leadership is suddenly gone.
Wasn't that sort of what was intended with Saddam Hussein? Once you got hold of him -- through the barrier of his armies and guards -- then game over? But it didn't work. Something perhaps worse filled the vacuum too fast.
[This message has been edited by arriki (edited April 12, 2007).]
There's the "Madman" theory---that one leader of one side is crazy enough to risk it all by using the bomb, betting he has more chips left at the end of the game then at the beginning.
There's the "No Prior Use" scenario---A-tests, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki didn't happen, the sides are involved in a conventional war, and nobody appreciates just how powerful these weapons are.
quote:
MAD would never work with Iran, since if they die in battle, they go to heaven and are served by 72 virginians.
Anyway, I'm just thinking out loud here, so forgive the ramble. For some reason, this question tweaked my brain this morning.
The breakdown of MAD assumes the breakdown of our ability to make rational decisions. We seem to be presenting multiple categories for how that can happen.
MFreivald's comments about Bertrand Russell, of all people, show one way rationality can break down -- strict adherence to a faulty ideology or model. The religious leader who would start a nuclear war, whether a third party or not, may be a rational thinker with faulty ideology. (That's the thing that scares me most about Ahmadinejad: I think he's sane, but his worldview is radically wrong.)
Pure error is another. Technically, it's not a breakdown of rationality, but it's an error in perception that causes people to make choices that they would never otherwise make. Computer error and mistaken intelligence could do that. Robert's "No Prior Use" scenario also fits here.
A third is more psychological. This would be an actual breakdown in rational or moral sense. Some types of religious leaders might fit this bill: people who ostensibly fight for their religion, but have actually gotten caught up in their ability to indulge sadistic or other immoral tendencies.
To sum up: defective worldview, defective knowledge, or defective mind. Can anyone think of any other categories?
So the challenge is to think up a scenario that's somewhat original, but believable, that falls into one or more of those categories.
Here's one from the "defective mind" category. Maybe a fascist leader -- think Stalin more than Hitler, because Hitler actually cared about the German people, whereas I'm not sure Stalin cared about Russians -- nearing the end of his life realizes that his control is all going to end. (Maybe he's not dying of old age, but of something terminal, fast-acting, and untreatable, so enemy leaders wouldn't expect this type of breakdown.) After years of living under MAD, he's convinced that the other side won't be ready for it, so he'll try a first strike. If it fails, and both sides are destroyed, so be it; if he can't rule the world in toto, no one will. If it succeeds, it's the greatest legacy he could possibly leave to the world.
Defective mind again: a totalitarian leader becomes clinically paranoid.
In both cases, you'd need to show why people would go along with him. Perhaps he engages in one of the purges that characterize a totalitarian regime; as he's purging, he emphasizes loyalty above everything. People think he's testing their loyalty with his crazy schemes, but he'd never really do it, right? Or maybe he takes closer and closer personal control over "the button".
Defective worldview: ecoterrorist thinks that humans are a scourge on the earth, and thinks that even if the earth is harmed by a series of nuclear strikes -- he doesn't want everything blown up, just a couple of major cities -- there will be less harm overall than if the current crop of humans continues to destroy the world. Plus nuclear winter will counter the effects of global warming. (Okay, maybe this one's not that great -- but I'm sure people have believed stupider things before.)
It's an interesting question. I'm going to have to chew on it some more.
Regards,
Oliver
Suppose gov #1 truly accidentally released some plague. I think one in published novels right now was a virus that killed all grasses. Gov. #2 might go all out to prevent the spread. Panic rises. Decisions become less rational.
And yes, biological weapons could also be employed, but big bad nuclear bombs are so much sexier... :P
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1. The players all will do their utmost to maximize their expected payoff as described by the game.2. The players are flawless in execution.
3. The players have sufficient intelligence to deduce the solution.
4. There is common knowledge that all players meet these conditions, including this one. So, not only must each player know the other players meet the conditions, but also they must know that they all know that they meet them, and know that they know that they know that they meet them, and so on.
5. (not listed in the "Occurrence" section of the article) The game is finite in length.
Here's how things might break down because reality might not fit the conditions:
1a. What if the game cannot describe expected payoff (or cost)? For example, if death holds no terrors, which has been brought up.
1b. What if the game does not describe the situation (or cost)? If one side, for example, not known to the other, has some kind of quick evacuation plan (develops teleporter technology - even if it works only half the time), or sufficient backup in human capital off-earth, they may be inclined to strike.
Remember, MAD as a Nash equilibrium requires that all sides know all the information that describes the abstract game.
2. We've talked about flawed execution, specifically technological breakdown. IMHO, I think a communication breakdown is the likeliest type. IMNSHO, this has been way overdone, and if I were writing a story, I'd avoid it.
3. One side is stupid. Heh. Not a good story. Maybe a comedy?
4. This is the most interesting to me. What if both sides are utterly rational, but one side believes the other isn't? They might try something that would otherwise be irrational in order to elicit an irrational (and weak) response from the other side. Or they may strike early, having calculated that the other side is likely to strike soon.
5. Realizing that the game is potentially infinite, both sides may agree just to disband their nuclear programs. (Not likely, IMO.) Or a side that believes it has a slight edge may institute an attack.
That's my favorite.
Both sides need to value human life for it to work; the loss of life is the cost.
The simplest way for me to envision MAD failing is for one side to perceive the other side as weaker (either in weaponry or in will); one side has to believe that the other side can't (or won't) retaliate against a first strike. But this does not meet the terms of your question, Danger; you are positting equal sides, so for your story my notion won't work.
Go with paranoia, or some other loss of rationality; it is MAD, after all...
[This message has been edited by NoTimeToThink (edited April 12, 2007).]
4. This is the most interesting to me. What if both sides are utterly rational, but one side believes the other isn't? They might try something that would otherwise be irrational in order to elicit an irrational (and weak) response from the other side. Or they may strike early, having calculated that the other side is likely to strike soon.
This is really the situation we had with the soviets. We were positive they would strike first.
The space programs with eyes beyond the reach of missles, was what kept things quiet. They could find out anything about us by reading a newspaper, while we had to have spies in their country to find out if it had rained in the grain belt. The eyes in the sky allowed us to verify what they were up to, and they us, so we both knew if the other was esculating or just blustering.
Knowledge is always the most effective weapon.