posted
Oftentimes "pro-choice" (I really don't dig the whole "pro-life" and "pro-choice" thing at all, it draws stark lines where there is in fact a very blurry moral area) advocates will propose that abortion be allowed up to the point at which the fetus is "viable." This typically means that the fetus can survive without its mother but with any and all available medical expertise and technology.
Insofar as the debate is divided into two sides, "pro-life" advocates want to use the point of conception as the point past which abortion is not allowed (with certain exceptions), while "pro-choice" advocates want to use the point of viability (Added: I'm sure there are lots of "pro-choice" advocates who think abortion is fine past the point of viability as well, but I'm generalizing here ). Of course, the point of viability is constantly changing with advances in medical knowledge and technology.
There is one other forum where I have been registered for just about as long as Hatrack, and while I have fewer posts there I actually read it more regularly (it's a tech news site). I don't think much of the premise of the thread, but the post I'm quoting below (which I linked directly, the proverbial diamond in the rough) is pretty interesting. This poster is one of the ones whose posts I almost always stop and read when I come across them. As he notes, this is not intended to convince people on the "pro-life" side of the debate, but rather to explain his version of the rationale behind the viability criterion to those people.
There's a bit of nested quoting, as hiphink is responding to someone else.
quote:
quote: Agreed, I hope. In that case, perhaps we can start over: can you make explicit a cogent argument that concludes personhood should depend on viability? (I tried construct such an argument with your previous posts but was unable to do so.. I apologize for my failure on this front.)
Augh. A legitimate (and very polite) request, but quite a task in itself. It doesn't help that while the basic tenets are typically shared, the viability criterion exists in several versions. It was central to Roe v. Wade, for example, but that doesn't mean I necessarily agree with that specific incarnation, etc and so on and so forth.
I'd like to start in a rather backwards manner and talk a little about different approaches to categories like personhood, individuality, consciousness etc. Consider this quote from Marcus Aurelius, Meditations VIII;
quote: This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution? What is its substance and material? And what its causal nature (or form)? And what is it doing in the world? And how long does it subsist?
Posit as “the thing” the human self. Or, the mind, or consciousness or something along those lines. This self, what is it in itself, in its own constitution? We can’t answer that. Like the old judge commenting on what is obscene or lewd, we can’t say, but we know it when we see it. We know what it isn’t. I am I, because I am not you, and so on.
What is its substance and material? We don’t know. We can’t say. (Yet, at least.)
What is its causal nature (or form)? This, we can begin to explain. Without knowing what the self is, we can observe the various ways in which it manifests itself. Essence is shrouded, but form is not. The same is true of Aurelius’ two following inquiries.
Socrates was also gunning along these lines when he commented that rather than blind your eye by looking straight at an eclipse, take precaution and look at its reflection in the water.
As an aside, this is how much of science operates. It doesn’t try to rush into the unknowable right away, asking “what is it, in itself?”, rather it slowly pushes on by looking at the manifestations, ordering them, structuring them, theorizing. If you’re lucky, you can get to the thing itself in due time. A classic example is the development of the theory of the atom, where we for example had the periodic table long before we knew much about the inner workings of the atom.
Now, the reason for this lengthy digression is that the absolute standard argument against the viability criterion, a counter-argument that you can find in almost any pro-life tract that brings it up, is that it is not acceptable because 1) it doesn’t refer to the thing itself, i.e a feature of the fetus that corresponds to an essence in, for example, personhood, but looks at things external to it (as you stated; “an intrinsic part of certain organisms (based on their possessing morally relevant characteristics)”); and 2) since it does not refer to an essence, but external factors that are influenced by change, it is unstable and in flux, e.g the viability criterion is not stable in time since it has been moved back several weeks in just a few decades.
What I have attempted to hint at is that what is harnessed as the principal arguments against the viability criterion is exactly it’s greatest strengths. It does not attempt to answer the unknowable by recourse to essence or material substance. It points out the position of the fetus in a system of relationships, some of which are prone to change. This is not to say this feature is exclusive to the viability criterion; it isn’t, but it’s certainly quite apparent in it. While I don’t want to appeal to authority, I think it is quite telling that jurisdictions from the SCOTUS to the pseudosocialist shores of that odd land Sweden have embraced it, and between them, every medical association I am aware of that has commented on it directly (that is not to imply all have done so, just that all I’m aware of has.)
All this aside, how does viability function as a demarcation? In all variants I know, it comes down to the question of dependence and separation. Before viability sets in, the organism in question is so absolutely and exclusively dependent on the host that it can’t in any meaningful way be described as separate or distinct from it. It doesn’t have rights, because it is not separate enough from the host to have a claim to it. To someone who believes in essence, in some kind of material switch, this doesn’t say much. I know that. But in a world where relationships and delineation is more important than the thing in itself, it makes all the difference.
As such, I don’t think anyone will be converted by this approach to the problem, but I hope the pathway is at least a bit more clear.
quote:Before viability sets in, the organism in question is so absolutely and exclusively dependent on the host that it can’t in any meaningful way be described as separate or distinct from it. It doesn’t have rights, because it is not separate enough from the host to have a claim to it.
Partly because of my experiences watching my wife give birth to three children (and hopefully a fourth in February), the viability argument doesn't do much for me. After birth, the baby is just as dependant on the mother (or on somone else) as before. The big difference is that now it won't let you sleep at night. That baby is no more able to claim his rights than a cucumber is.
Of course, the "or on someone else" is really the rub, eh?
I don't think that the that the fact that the nurturing of that baby/fetus cannot be passed off to a third party really makes a moral difference. It makes things a heck of a lot more inconvenient for the mother, but it's not a permanent inconvenience.
It seems to me that it is weighing the temporary inconvenience of a woman against the life of a (potential/almost/quasi) human and deciding that the inconvenience is too much to bear.
If the decision were mine, I would rule the other way.
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quote:Before viability sets in, the organism in question is so absolutely and exclusively dependent on the host that it can’t in any meaningful way be described as separate or distinct from it. It doesn’t have rights, because it is not separate enough from the host to have a claim to it.
But it IS separate and distinct by all criteria that we can use. It's got different DNA, it can even be a different gender from the mother. It is a distinct individual that shares genetic material with the mother, but I don't think it can be considered solely an extension of her own body.
That argument doesn't work, because if it is part of the woman's body, and it's healthy and normal then removing it is analogous to cutting off a perfectly healthy finger or toe. That's not something doctors routinely do.
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posted
I have to say that dependency always leads me back to other dependent people, like dialysis patients, who do not give up their rights for being totally dependent on another to survive...
But the guy does seem thoughtful and well-spoken Posts: 3846 | Registered: Apr 2004
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quote:To someone who believes in essence, in some kind of material switch, this doesn’t say much. I know that. But in a world where relationships and delineation is more important than the thing in itself, it makes all the difference.
I think he needs to rephrase the last sentence to "But (edit: to someone) who believes relationships and delineation are more important than the thing in itself, it makes all the difference."
With that change, I think he's accurately defining a kind of center-mass of each of two competing life views.
quote:Partly because of my experiences watching my wife give birth to three children (and hopefully a fourth in February), the viability argument doesn't do much for me. After birth, the baby is just as dependant on the mother (or on somone else) as before. The big difference is that now it won't let you sleep at night. That baby is no more able to claim his rights than a cucumber is.
This brought to mind a mental image of antrhopomorphic cucumbers marching in the streets.
However, a newborn baby is clearly separate and distinguishable from its mother in a way that even a baby that's going to be born tomorrow is not. I think that regardless of your stance on the issue, there are certainly substantive differences between a baby, an unborn baby, a fetus in early-to-mid-development, and an embryo or whatever the proper term is for what comes before that. Whether it's right or wrong to kill any or all of those things is, of course, the subject of the debate, and as hiphink says, he is not trying to convince you. What the post shows (fairly successfully in my view) is that the argument makes sense from the perspective of someone who doesn't believe in what he describes as "essence." This does not imply that all people who do not believe in "essence" do or should subscribe to the view, of course; it simply shows that it's not an unreasonable view to hold.
quote:It seems to me that it is weighing the temporary inconvenience of a woman against the life of a (potential/almost/quasi) human and deciding that the inconvenience is too much to bear.
I think that's tangentially related, but really the subject in your sentence (the second "it") is actually the decision to have an abortion, not the viability argument. I'm sure that pregnant mothers who choose to have abortions aren't really thinking about viability; it's people discussing it who talk about these sorts of things.
Belle:
quote:But it IS separate and distinct by all criteria that we can use.
No, I don't agree. If the criterion is, for example, physical separation, then it isn't separate and distinct until it's born and the umbilical cord is severed. I tend to be very Euclidean in my sense of self -- I am that which occupies the space bordered by my skin, roughly speaking. If I hold strictly to that view, then I should use the physical separation criterion. I don't, and I don't think it's reasonable to do so, but saying "it is separate and distinct by all criteria we can use" is equally unreasonable.
I also don't think your analogy works. If the embryo (if that's the right term) is not distinct from the host in a meaningful sense as far as being granted rights is concerned, this does not imply it is equivalent to a part of the host's body (like a finger). But if I accepted your analogy, I could extend it: Say that having sex resulted, for some bizarre reason, in me growing a sixth finger on one hand. I don't think a doctor would have any particular problem with removing it.
Jim-Me:
quote:I have to say that dependency always leads me back to other dependent people, like dialysis patients, who do not give up their rights for being totally dependent on another to survive...
Dialysis patients still have a great deal of autonomy despite this dependence, though. Newborn babies also have (comparatively speaking) a lot of autonomy.
quote:But the guy does seem thoughtful and well-spoken
What amazes me is that English isn't his first language (he's Swedish).
Dagonee:
quote:With that change, I think he's accurately defining a kind of center-mass of each of two competing life views.
Your sentence is missing "to someone," but other than that I completely agree with you. Posts: 10886 | Registered: Feb 2000
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quote:However, a newborn baby is clearly separate and distinguishable from its mother in a way that even a baby that's going to be born tomorrow is not. I think that regardless of your stance on the issue, there are certainly substantive differences between a baby, an unborn baby, a fetus in early-to-mid-development, and an embryo or whatever the proper term is for what comes before that.
Granted. My point was that after seeing my kids born and suckled, I think that the difference between unborn and born is less significant to me than it was before.
quote:I think that's tangentially related, but really the subject in your sentence (the second "it") is actually the decision to have an abortion, not the viability argument. I'm sure that pregnant mothers who choose to have abortions aren't really thinking about viability; it's people discussing it who talk about these sorts of things.
quote:Aren't you a little old to be watching Veggie Tales?
quote:My point was that after seeing my kids born and suckled, I think that the difference between unborn and born is less significant to me than it was before.
quote:But if I accepted your analogy, I could extend it: Say that having sex resulted, for some bizarre reason, in me growing a sixth finger on one hand. I don't think a doctor would have any particular problem with removing it.
If that sixth finger would, in nine months time, grow into a separate and distinct human being then doctors might well have a problem removing it.
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posted
Let's see, if someone were in a coma but it was guaranteed that they would recover completely if they were left on it for a specified amount of time, would it be a solely academic question whether to continue allowing them to waste the nation's health care dollar by beng on life support?
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posted
This is why I don't like analogies in the context of this particular discussion. An embryo in the early stages of development is not something that can readily be described by analogy, which is one of the reasons I'm mostly very impressed with hiphink's wording (though I definitely agree with Dagonee's amendment).
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posted
I think hiphink has a really good argument, but there are a couple points that just don't sit well with me.
quote: ...what is harnessed as the principal arguments against the viability criterion is exactly it’s greatest strengths. It does not attempt to answer the unknowable by recourse to essence or material substance. It points out the position of the fetus in a system of relationships, some of which are prone to change.
First, I don't really like the idea that the measure of a person's rights is based on current technology. A two month old fetus may not have rights today, but tomorrow a one month old fetus may have rights because of new technology. It seems to be saying to me that rights ultimately comes down to timing. It would make sense in a world where relationships and delineation were more important than the thing in itself, but I don't view the world that way. He already acknowledged this so I'm not really saying it's a flaw in his argument, just my reason for not accepting that theory.
Additionally, contrary to what he says, I don't think ignoring the issue of essence is a strength of the viability criterion. Consider this analogy (sorry but I can't think of a way to explain it any other way and if it wasn't 1:30 in the morning I may have thought of a better analogy too):
Imagine if there were conjoined twins that shared every single part of the body except for the feet. No one would say that it is two individuals, just one individual with an extra set of feet.
Now consider conjoined twins that shared every single part of the body except for the head. They share every organ and so are completely dependent on each other. If one dies, without fail the other one does too.
In the two scenarios, both conjoined twins share the same amount of organs and body tissue and are both completely dependent on each other, yet we view their individuality differently.
In other words, there can't be a simple rule stating that a certain amount of shared processes or dependence determines individuality and separateness. Human essence has to at least be acknowledged even if it can't be understood.
None of this actually conflicts with his argument about the reasoning behind the viability criterion, because as he alluded to, it all comes down to what you believe.
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quote:(I really don't dig the whole "pro-life" and "pro-choice" thing at all, it draws stark lines where there is in fact a very blurry moral area)
I'd just like to point out that while I consider myself pro-choice, I think this blurry moral area is probably the strongest argument for allowing a woman to make her own choice, and for her own reasons.
I personally don't think the "viability" argument is a very good one. I think sentience is a much better divinding point. Of course, I don't have a religious concept of the soul, so to me a soul begins to form as the fetus (or zygote, or whatever) develops brain and nervous tissue. To me, there's a stark line between where there is no possibility of sentience. When no cells have differentiated into nerve cells, there can be no sentience, so an abortion is no more taking life than cutting off a callous.
Nevertheless, a fetus is a potential life, which is full of implication for the mother and father,grandparents, etc. But it's of virtually no implication for people that are completely unrelated to it. They have no business trying to affect the decision to sustain that potential life, or end it, as long as the life isn't sentient.
Of course, the potential for life exists before conception. That "glimmer in the eye" is just as full of the possibility of life to someone who wants a child as the reality of pregnancy. Viability starts to take form first in the mind of the parents, as people make plans for their life and choose mates.
Those that want children certainly see possibility as being almost indistinguishable from viability. That's what makes the argument so divisive. It's really hard to see from someone else's viewpoint, especially when that viewpoint is diametrically opposed to one's own.
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). Of course, the point of viability is constantly changing with advances in medical knowledge and technology. 
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