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Originally posted by Lyrhawn:
It'll either be struck down by the courts, or Congress will kill it.

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Posts: 32919 | Registered: Mar 2003  |  IP: Logged | 

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Originally posted by cmc:
I'm pretty sure this will get me nowhere but I take it to mean that 'walls' mean nothing if you've got the right meaning behind getting beyond them...

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Posts: 10645 | Registered: Jul 2004  |  IP: Logged | 

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Originally posted by rivka:

quote:

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Originally posted by Lyrhawn:
It'll either be struck down by the courts, or Congress will kill it.

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Agreed. Pretty horrifying that it's being proposed, though.

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Posts: 1762 | Registered: Apr 2006  |  IP: Logged | 

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Originally posted by Silent E:
I smell a huge, stinking pile of bull excrement. I don't buy this story for a second.

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Posts: 2867 | Registered: May 2005  |  IP: Logged | 

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Originally posted by rivka:
Error message.

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Posts: 2867 | Registered: May 2005  |  IP: Logged | 

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Originally posted by cmc:
Orinoco - what exactly did I get caught in? To be honest, in my 1:20 post - I wasn't even replying to King of Men's response specifically. I was replying in a general context.

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Posts: 6394 | Registered: Dec 1999  |  IP: Logged | 

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III. Proposed Rule

Under the manifest transmission time requirements of the existing APIS regulations, which mandate transmission of passenger manifests no later than 15 minutes after departure of an aircraft en route to the United States, CBP has the ability to fully vet commercial aircraft passenger information after the aircraft has departed. The identification of a high-risk passenger soon after the aircraft becomes airborne may result in the diversion of the aircraft to a U.S. port other than the original destination or the return of the aircraft to the port of departure (referred to as a ``turnback''). This action could prevent the hijacking of the aircraft and the potential use of the plane as a weapon of mass destruction against U.S. or other targets, and would enable CBP to detain, or arrange for the detention of, the high-risk passenger. The same results could be obtained with respect to aircraft departing from the United States when identification of a high-risk passenger occurs after the aircraft is airborne. This post-departure identification could occur since the APIS regulations require the transmission of manifests only 15 minutes prior to departure.

However, high-risk passengers allowed to board before they have been fully vetted may pose a security risk for aircraft en route to or departing from the United States. A boarded high-risk passenger would have the opportunity to plant or retrieve a disassembled improvised explosive device or other weapon. The detonation of an explosive device could have devastating

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consequences, both in terms of human life and from an economic perspective (damage to aircraft and airport infrastructure and any ripple effects on the airport's and the carrier's business and across the U.S. economy). Thus, requiring the collection and vetting of passenger information before the boarding of passengers on flights en route to or departing from the United States would allow CBP to identify high risk passengers before such passengers could pose a threat to fellow passengers or to the aircraft and airport.

Therefore, CBP has concluded that the prevention of a high-risk passenger from boarding an aircraft is the appropriate level of security in the commercial air travel environment. Manifest data received and vetted prior to passenger boarding will enable CBP to attain this level of security. Further, this vetting of passengers on international flights should eliminate the need for passenger carriers to conduct watch list screening of these passengers, upon publication and implementation of a final rule. Accordingly, with this proposed rule, CBP is proposing two transmission options for air carriers to select from at their discretion: (i) the submission of complete manifests no later than 60 minutes prior to departure or (ii) transmitting passenger data as individual, real-time transactions, i.e., as each passenger checks in, up to but no later than 15 minutes prior to departure. Under both options, the carrier will not permit the boarding of a passenger unless the passenger has been cleared by CBP.

With respect to the commercial vessel travel environment, CBP has determined that the appropriate level of security for departing vessels is to prevent vessel departures with a high-risk passenger or crew member onboard. Thus, the proposed rule requires vessel carriers to transmit complete manifests no later than 60 minutes prior to departure. An alternative procedure based on individual passenger/crew transactions, as is provided in the air travel environment to address a need for flexibility, is not offered given the generally less time- critical nature of the commercial vessel travel environment.

Finally, with this rule, CBP also is proposing to change the definition of ``departure,'' as discussed immediately below. A. Change Regarding Definition of ``Departure'' for Aircraft

Under the existing APIS regulations, the departure of an aircraft occurs at the moment an aircraft is ``wheels-up,'' meaning that the landing gear is retracted into the aircraft after liftoff and the aircraft is en route to its destination (19 CFR 122.49a(a)). In practice, wheels-up can occur as much as 15 to 25 or more minutes after an aircraft leaves the gate (which is referred to as ``push-back''). This meaning of ``departure,'' applied under either the existing regulations or the proposed regulations, would result in CBP receiving manifest data later in the process than is sufficient to perform full vetting and prevent high-risk boardings. CBP believes that departure for aircraft, as applied to manifests for passengers, crew members, and non-crew members under the APIS regulations, should mean the moment when an aircraft pushes-back from the gate. This change would assist in providing CBP with sufficient time to complete the full vetting process. Therefore, this rule proposes to revise the definition of ``departure'' in 19 CFR 122.49a(a) accordingly (which will be applicable to other APIS aircraft provisions as well: 19 CFR 122.49b, 122.75a, 122.75b). B. Proposed Options for Transmission of Manifest Data by Air Carriers

To provide maximum flexibility for the air travel industry and aircraft passengers while improving the ability of DHS to safeguard air travel, CBP is proposing two options for the electronic transmission of manifest information by air carriers. The two transmission options proposed in this rule differ to some degree in timing, programming, and procedures. Nevertheless, both are equally effective in obtaining the advance information needed to achieve the appropriate level of security necessary for aircraft (prevent a high-risk boarding) and thereby to ensure that the purposes of the governing statutes are met. An air carrier's election of either option would depend on the individual carrier's particular operations and its capability to electronically transmit the manifest data to CBP. CBP also notes that the current APIS regulations providing for electronic transmission of manifest data 60 minutes prior to departure for crew and non-crew on flights to, from, continuing within, and overflying the United States are unchanged (19 CFR 122.49b and 122.75b).

Under one option, air carriers would transmit all required passenger data to CBP in batch form (all passenger names and associated data at once) no later than 60 minutes prior to departure of the aircraft. This option, known as APIS 60, is similar to the current electronic transmission process to the extent that manifest data would be transmitted in batch form and CBP would perform security vetting against all data at once. Under the other option, known as APIS Quick Query (AQQ), air carriers would transmit required passenger data to CBP individually as each passenger checks in for the flight, from the beginning of the check-in process up to 15 minutes prior to departure. CBP would perform its security vetting as it receives the data.

The electronic transmission system employed under these options would be ``interactive,'' allowing the carrier to electronically receive return messages from CBP that can be sent within seconds or minutes, as opposed to the capability of the APIS manifest transmission process as implemented under the current regulation where any communication by CBP with the carrier is performed by telephone. Thus, the term ``interactive'' is used in this document to refer to or describe the electronic communication system employed under the APIS 60 option and the AQQ option described further below.

CBP believes that both APIS 60 and AQQ provide sufficient time to achieve the appropriate level of security sought in the commercial air travel environment, i.e., to prevent a high-risk boarding. These options are offered because the unique ``just in time'' nature of the commercial air travel environment, characterized by busy airports, tight arrival and departure schedules, the carriers' need to minimize time aircraft spend at the gate, and the immense focus on timeliness as a performance measure, justifies flexibility in this environment.

CBP anticipates that both options will be well-utilized, and the comment period is expected to provide an indication of which option the carriers are likely to select. However, CBP expects that the AQQ option would be selected by those carriers that have pre-existing reservations control systems, whereas smaller or charter carriers may be more likely to use the APIS 60 option. A subset of air carriers would not be able to adopt either option; this is discussed further below.

Throughout the period that these proposed amendments were in development, CBP consulted with various industry associations and considered their comments concerning the impact various manifest transmission alternatives would have on business processes, operating costs, and legitimate passengers who might experience travel delays and miss connecting flights. The dual-option approach for air carriers described above is responsive to those comments and is designed to balance the security

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and facilitation goals of government with the needs of the industry.

CBP submits that these options, if adopted in a final rule, will result in CBP and the air carriers achieving a far higher success rate in keeping high-risk passengers from boarding aircraft than is possible under the current regulations. With this change, instances of diversions and turnbacks will be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, due to the increased effectiveness of the process. Further, the impact on the industry will be substantially less than would be the case with other alternatives due to the greater flexibility provided by the dual- option approach.

CBP notes that there is a subcategory of air carriers that would be unable to adopt either the APIS 60 option or the AQQ option as described in this document. These carriers, typically unscheduled air carrier operators that employ eAPIS (Internet method) for manifest data transmission, such as seasonal charters, air taxis, and air ambulances, would not be able to adopt the interactive communication functionality that the APIS 60 and AQQ options employ. Consequently, CBP would manually (i.e., by e-mail or telephone) communicate vetting results to these carriers. These carriers, however, would be bound by the requirement proposed in this rule to transmit passenger manifest data no later than 60 minutes prior to departure. The proposed regulation treats these carriers as a subset of air carriers that will transmit complete manifests, as opposed to carriers that will transmit manifest data per individual passenger as passengers check in for the flight. This document discusses primarily the two major options that will be available to the air carriers that will employ an interactive communication system for manifest data transmission, as set forth in this section (Section B of Part III) (but see subsection (4) of this section further below). 1. APIS 60 (Interactive Batch Transmission) Option

APIS 60 would apply as one option to transmit passenger manifests prior to departure for aircraft arriving in and departing from the United States, and as the sole requirement for transmitting passenger and crew manifests for vessels departing from the United States (see Section C of this part for these vessels). The APIS 60 procedure is, with some exception relating to transmission time requirements and interactive communication between carriers and CBP, similar to the APIS procedure currently employed to implement the current APIS regulations. For arriving and departing aircraft, air carriers would be required to transmit passenger manifests in batch form (all names and associated data at once) to CBP no later than 60 minutes prior to departure of the aircraft (as defined under this proposed rule) at which time the vetting process would begin.

Under APIS 60, the vetting of aircraft passenger data would be performed in two stages. The first would be an initial automated vetting of passenger data against appropriate law enforcement (including terrorist) databases. The second would be the further vetting of names identified as a match or possible match during the initial automated vetting stage, as well as names associated with incomplete or inadequate transmitted data.

When the initial automated vetting process identifies a match between an individual passenger's data and data on a terrorist watch list, a close possible match, or an incomplete or inadequate passenger record, CBP would send by electronic return message a ``not-cleared'' instruction to the carrier within minutes of CBP's receipt of the manifest data (CBP return messages relative to not-cleared instructions based on an inadequate record would also instruct the carrier to retransmit complete/corrected data). Since boarding usually commences 30 to 45 minutes prior to departure (as defined in this proposed rule), a not-cleared instruction relative to a match or possible match, or an inadequate record, would ensure, in most cases, that the associated passenger will not be allowed to board the aircraft (subject to the occasional instance of unexpected results due to error, technical anomaly, etc., or a carrier beginning the boarding process outside the 60-minute vetting window.) The manifest transmission requirements under the current regulations--no later than 15 minutes after departure for flights en route to the United States and no later than 15 minutes prior to departure for flights departing from the United States--do not achieve this critical result (even if departure were defined as push- back). An aircraft en route to the United States is already airborne before CBP even receives the manifest. For flights departing from the United States, no manifest information is received by CBP until--at the earliest--15 minutes, and often 30 minutes or more, after boarding begins (CBP notes that under the current procedure, only a passenger who is a match or possible match would be subject to further vetting).

The further vetting of passengers who generate a not-cleared instruction during the initial vetting stage would be handled by an analyst with access to additional data resources. During this stage, CBP would be able to confirm or correct matches and resolve possible matches and incomplete or inadequate passenger records, enabling most passengers who are eventually cleared to make their flights. CBP would notify a carrier by return message where the results of further vetting clear a passenger for boarding.

When the initial automated vetting procedure results in CBP's returning not-cleared instructions to the air carrier, the carrier's personnel would have to ensure that the identified passenger is not permitted to board with other passengers and that the passenger's baggage is not loaded onto, or is removed from, the aircraft. In rare instances, the carrier may have to remove the passenger from the aircraft (which may occur in the case of an oversight or other error in the boarding process or should a carrier begin the boarding process outside the 60-minute vetting window). When further vetting confirms a not-cleared passenger as high-risk, the next step in the process would include CBP communicating to the appropriate authorities the results of the vetting and any action to be taken to secure the confirmed high- risk passenger. In some circumstances, during the further vetting process, either the carrier, CBP, or other appropriate domestic or foreign government official would have to interview the passenger to complete the confirmation (or further vetting) process, a step that would take additional time.

The further vetting process, the communication step that follows, and the taking of appropriate action are the steps that, together, would consume the most time under the APIS 60 procedure. With passenger data being transmitted in a batch, CBP could have several names that require further vetting. Each query pursued in further vetting is unique and some queries will take more time than others. Further, the communication and appropriate action steps of the process are subject to additional complexities, especially when foreign carriers or government personnel are involved or an interview is required. Thus, the full process and related steps described above require more time than the current regulation provides to meet the appropriate level of security sought.

While the not-cleared instruction after the initial automated vetting stage would prevent a high-risk or potential high-risk passenger from boarding the aircraft when the carrier begins the boarding process, thereby achieving CBP's security goal, completion of the

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further vetting process is necessary to make a final determination regarding the passenger subject to the not-cleared instruction. This final resolution is especially critical with respect to possible matches and incomplete or inadequate passenger records. A required transmission time frame of 60-minutes prior to departure would provide the time necessary to accommodate this process and thereby effectively achieve the appropriate level of security. CBP notes that further vetting, in most cases, would be completed in time for the passenger to make his intended flight; however, in some circumstances, further vetting could take longer than normally expected, resulting in the passenger having to be rebooked on a later flight (if ultimately cleared for flight by CBP).

As a final step in the process, the air carrier would have to transmit to CBP a list, referred to as a close-out message, consisting of a unique passenger identifier for each passenger who checked in for the flight but was not boarded for any reason. The close-out message must be transmitted as soon as possible after departure and in no instance later than 30 minutes after departure.

CBP is committed to having the APIS 60 option for pre-departure interactive electronic transmission fully available for industry use prior to publication of a final rule. 2. APIS Quick Query (Interactive Real-time Transmission) Option

Under the AQQ option, which is applicable only to aircraft arrival and departure passenger manifests, air carriers would transmit passenger data to CBP in real time, i.e., as individual passengers check in, up to but no later than 15 minutes prior to departure of the aircraft; data received by CBP less than 15 minutes prior to departure would not meet the requirement.

Under the AQQ procedure, the carrier would be able to transmit data relative to a passenger as soon as passengers begin checking in for the flight, as early as 2 hours or more prior to departure (as defined in this document). Since passengers on international flights are routinely advised to arrive as much as 2 hours before departure for check-in, manifest data for most passengers would be transmitted to CBP well before departure of the flight. Moreover, fewer names and associated data would be transmitted to CBP at one time than would be the case with the batch transmissions made under the APIS 60 procedure. Under APIS 60, over 200 passenger records may be included in one batch transmission, while under AQQ, a transmission would contain the name and data for one passenger (or up to 10 passengers traveling on one itinerary).

Also, under AQQ, the messaging for CBP vetting results could be returned directly to the carrier's reservation system, reducing the time needed for human intervention. Thus, CBP would be able to respond within seconds of the carrier's transmission of data. Carriers then would have to return a message to CBP confirming receipt of any not- cleared instructions and would not issue a boarding pass to any passenger unless cleared by CBP. As with the APIS 60 option, any passenger data generating a match, possible match, or inadequate record would be forwarded to an analyst for further vetting. CBP would electronically notify the carrier as soon as possible if, upon additional analysis, a change to the not-cleared instruction is warranted (such as would be the case if a match or possible match was determined during further vetting to be cleared for boarding).

At its discretion, a carrier would be able to use a dedicated telephone number provided by CBP to seek a resolution of a not-cleared instruction by providing additional information relative to the not- cleared passenger if available, such as a physical description. CBP would consider the additional information as it proceeds with the further vetting of the passenger already in progress. In some instances, CBP would instruct the carrier to retransmit data (as in the case of inadequate data). In any case, CBP would return a message to the carrier to clear a passenger for boarding if warranted by the results of additional analysis.

Where CBP is unable to complete its additional analysis prior to departure, the carrier would be bound by the not-cleared instruction and would not be permitted to issue a boarding pass for that passenger. This could result in a passenger not making his flight and having to be rebooked should the not-cleared instruction eventually be corrected and the passenger be cleared for flight. Alternatively, and at its sole discretion, the carrier could delay the flight until CBP could clear the passenger for boarding. Finally, as with the APIS 60 option, the carrier would have to transmit to CBP, no later than 30 minutes after departure, a close-out message consisting of a unique passenger identifier for each passenger who checked in for the flight but was not boarded for any reason.

Under the AQQ procedure, carrier real-time manifest data transmission would provide sufficient time for CBP to perform an effective vetting of the passengers. Most passengers check in well before departure of international flights, so very late arrivals are likely to be comparatively few. These facts enable CBP to propose a transmission time frame that some carriers will find more compatible with their business operations.

For passengers checking in early, there generally would be ample time for completion of the vetting process. For the few passengers checking in late, CBP would be able to quickly vet the data in most instances. Thus, CBP expects that no identified high-risk passenger will receive a boarding pass and, for most flights, any passengers subject to further vetting and cleared for flight will make the flight. Also, more connecting passengers would be able to check in, be vetted, and make their flights than is anticipated under the APIS 60 procedure. This is a major advantage over the APIS 60 procedure for air carriers with connecting flight operations.

Accordingly, AQQ would achieve the appropriate level of security sought in a way that some airlines may prefer to the APIS 60 method. In addition, this procedure would prevent a high-risk passenger from gaining access to the security area, since access for domestic and most international airports is restricted to those with boarding passes. Also, a high-risk passenger's baggage would not be loaded onto the aircraft which avoids the necessity of having it removed, as may sometimes be necessary under the APIS 60 procedure.

There is, however, one exception to the foregoing: connecting passengers arriving by aircraft at the departure airport, for a flight en route to or departing from the United States, who were issued boarding passes (for the flight to or from the United States) prior to arrival at that departure airport and whose data was not previously transmitted to CBP for vetting. These passengers will already be within the security area as they transit the airport from the gate they arrived at to the gate of the connecting flight. For this unique group of passengers, CBP, in implementing AQQ, would consider the boarding passes they possess as provisional and would require that carriers obtain required data from these passengers in a manner compatible with their procedures and transmit such data to CBP as required. The carrier would be required to wait for CBP to clear any such passengers before validating the boarding passes or permitting the passengers to board the aircraft.

CBP currently is developing user requirements for the programming

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necessary to implement the AQQ transmission procedure. CBP will have to make adjustments to its automated systems to offer this data transmission option to the carriers, as will carriers who elect to use this option. CBP will consider these factors, as well as others identified during the comment period, in structuring an implementation plan and schedule that coincides with the readiness of CBP's IT infrastructure to support the AQQ option. CBP is committed to having the AQQ option for pre-departure interactive electronic transmission fully available for industry use prior to publication of a final rule. 3. System Certification and Delayed Effective Date

Prior to a carrier's commencement of manifest transmission using either of the above-described APIS 60 or AQQ options, the carrier would receive a ``system certification'' from CBP indicating that its electronic transmission system is capable of interactively communicating with CBP's APIS system as configured for these options. Carriers already operating under the APIS procedure (under the current APIS regulation which requires batch manifest transmission but under different time requirements and a less interactive process) who opt to employ the APIS 60 option for their manifest transmissions would obtain certification only for new functionalities (relating to system interactivity) and would not undergo a full system certification.

To accommodate carriers who choose the interactive system for manifest transmission under either the APIS 60 option or the AQQ option, CBP, in this rule, is proposing that the effective date of a final rule be delayed for 180 days from the date of its publication. This should provide all such carriers sufficient time to make any necessary program changes or system modifications and to obtain system certification and implementation. CBP strongly encourages carriers to begin efforts to obtain system interactivity and certification by contacting CBP as soon as possible. 4. Carriers Opting Out; Non-Interactive Batch Transmission Process

As stated previously, some carriers, notably those currently using the eAPIS Internet method of transmitting required manifest data (typically, small, unscheduled air carrier operators, such as seasonal charters, air taxis, and air ambulances), may not be able to adopt either the APIS 60 option or the AQQ option. These carriers do not seek an interactive electronic communication method to make transmissions, as such a system does not fit their operations, technical capabilities, or budgets. Nonetheless, these carriers would be bound by a requirement to transmit manifest data no later than 60 minutes prior to departure, as proposed in this rule. The proposed rule contains a subparagraph that accommodates these carriers as transmitters of batch manifest data without interactive electronic communication capability. These carriers would not have to seek system certification. CBP will employ a manual process using email or telephone communication (by which CBP would send not-cleared messages) to accommodate these carriers. This manual procedure may slow the vetting process to some extent, but CBP believes that the goal of preventing a high-risk boarding would be achieved, as carriers would not board passengers subject to a not-cleared instruction unless cleared by CBP. C. Proposed Change for Transmission of Manifests by Departing Vessels

Typically, vessel carriers allow boarding several hours (typically 3 to 6 hours) prior to departure. Thus, a manifest transmission requirement designed to prevent the possibility of a high-risk vessel- boarding likely would require substantial adjustments to the carriers' operations. This would frustrate CBP's intent, and the purpose of various requirements governing Federal rulemaking, to achieve the agency's goal (enhanced security) without imposing an unreasonable burden on affected parties.

CBP believes that, under this circumstance, the appropriate level of security sought in this scenario is to prevent the departure of a vessel with a high-risk passenger or crew member onboard. The change proposed in this rule is designed to achieve this level of security for vessels departing from the United States and to thereby meet the purposes of the governing statutes. Thus, for vessels departing from the United States, the proposed amendment provides for transmission of passenger and crew manifests 60 minutes prior to departure. CBP notes that the electronic system for transmission of required vessel manifest data (arrival and departure) is the U.S. Coast Guard's (Internet based) eNOA/D system. This is not an interactive system, and, unlike air carriers operating under the APIS 60 or AQQ options described above, vessel carriers would not have to obtain system certification.

After transmission of the manifest data, the initial automated vetting would result in a not-cleared instruction for matches, possible matches, and incomplete/inadequate passenger records or crew data. Carriers would attempt to prevent the boarding of such persons if it had not already occurred due to the very early boarding allowed. CBP notes that a not-cleared message returned to the carrier by CBP for an inadequate record would instruct the carrier to retransmit complete/ corrected data.

During further vetting, passengers and crew for whom not-cleared instructions were sent during the initial automated vetting procedure would be either confirmed as high-risks or resolved and cleared. CBP would communicate with the carrier where further vetting resulted in the clearing of a passenger. In some instances, CBP would communicate with the carrier and other CBP personnel to take necessary action to verify (by conducting an interview if necessary) the high-risk status of passengers or crew and, as needed, secure a confirmed high-risk passenger or crew member. In this process, a confirmed high-risk passenger or crew member likely would have to be located and removed from the vessel before departure, in which case his baggage would be removed as well. Whether a further search of the vessel is warranted would be determined by CBP on a case-by-case basis. (The carrier would be free to undertake a further search at its discretion.)

The current requirement for batch manifest transmission no later than 15 minutes prior to a vessel's departure does not provide enough time to fully vet passengers or crew members or allow, where necessary, for the removal of a confirmed high-risk passenger or crew member from a vessel prior to departure. In contrast, the proposed APIS 60 procedure is expected to provide CBP the time it needs to fully vet not-cleared passengers and crew members and to remove those confirmed as a high-risk from the vessel prior to departure. The APIS 60 procedure therefore would achieve the appropriate level of security sought by CBP.

In addition to preventing a high-risk departure, this procedure would enhance CBP's capability, in some circumstances (where carriers allow already checked-in passengers to board within 60 minutes of departure), to prevent high-risk vessel boardings, as compared to what is achievable under the current regulation. An alternative option (such as AQQ or something similar) is not as necessary, given the less time- critical nature of the commercial vessel travel environment.

For vessels departing from foreign ports destined to arrive at a U.S. port,

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CBP is retaining the requirement to transmit passenger and crew manifest data at least 24 hours and up to 96 hours prior to a vessel's entering the U.S. port of arrival. This requirement is consistent with the U.S. Coast Guard's ``Notice of Arrival'' (NOA) requirements. (Under 33 CFR 160.212, arriving vessel carriers transmit manifest data to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to meet its NOA requirement. The data is then forwarded to CBP, permitting additional compliance with CBP's APIS requirement with the one carrier transmission.) Moreover, the threat posed by a high-risk passenger or crew member once onboard a vessel is different from that posed by a high-risk passenger onboard an aircraft. A hijacked vessel's movements over the water and its range of available targets could be more readily contained than those of an aircraft, thus reducing the opportunity for a terrorist to use the vessel as a weapon against a U.S. port or another vessel.

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Posts: 26071 | Registered: Oct 2003  |  IP: Logged | 

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Originally posted by kojabu:

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Originally posted by rivka:
Error message.

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Go to http://www.regulations.gov/ . Using the basic search:
1) select "All Documents (Open and Closed for Comment)";
2) Under Agency, select "Department of Homeland Security - All";
3) For the Keyword, put in "Passenger Manifests" (without quotes).

When you search, this should bring up three documents that are the proposed rules.

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Posts: 32919 | Registered: Mar 2003  |  IP: Logged | 

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As I read it, all that is occurring is that a list of passengers are vetted prior to departure vs. after departure by utilizing the CBP (whatever that is). It appears that this is already being done now, correct?

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