posted
Just read his current "OSC Reviews Everything" Essay and admittedly I skipped to the bottom when I saw Carthage in the title. He review was on the novel "The Punic Wars" by Adrian Goldsworthy.
I have to say, I haven't read that particular book on the Punic Wars, and I'm a bit troubled by what OSC relates from it. The book strikes me as a glowing review of determined Rome beating an equal or at times superior Carthage. But it also appears to lend some sort of moral credence to the Romans as well.
I'd urge Card (if this is in fact the case, and if it is, I'll have to read this book myself to get a feel for what it says) to read more on the subject. In fact, I'd urge him to read the source material itself.
We'll never know for a fact what happened. Carthaginian texts were mostly destroyed by the subsequent Roman occupation and dismemberment of the Carthaginian empire, and the utter destruction of Carthage itself. But many of the Roman and Greek historians, writing both during the time, and the decades and centuries following had a great deal to say on the subject. Some good, some bad. Some even wrote with direct access to the Imperial Archives in Rome.
As such, any book you're going to read today would almost have to pull a majority of it's source material from ancient historians, or from the scholarship of more modern historians. But reading the work of others can be very misleading.
Carthage had a majority foothold in Sicily long before Rome even considered taking a stab at the island. They used the plea from a border city (Tarantine? I think) as an excuse for war, then moved in. They broke from almost all Roman tradition in the Punic Wars. They instigated fights, burned cities to the ground when they used to simply leave behind a garrison, and acted with outright naked aggression throughout all three of the wars, not just the third.
The first war was NOT won solely because Rome refused to give up. Hell, it was won almost entirely based on Carthaginian blunders, which almost boggles the mind when you consider the advantages they had going for them when the war started. It was blind luck, or what the Romans themselves would call "Fortune" that they held on as long as they did.
After the first war ended, it seemed the two of them could even live in peace. But Rome abrogated several parts of their peace treaty, occupying Sardinia and the Balearic Islands based on lies and trumped up reasoning, just at a time when Carthage and Rome were starting to almost become friends. Hannibal at this time was merrily conquering his way through Spain, which by the way should have been no surprise to the Romans at all, as in the treaty that concluded the first Punic War, Carthage was given free rein to conquer, plunder and colonize as they pleased south of the Ebro River.
Hannibal, upon laying siege to and conquering Saguntum, which was a good ways south of the Ebro River, was charged with breaking the treaty, as Saguntum had recently formed an alliance with Rome, which in itself should have been a violation of the treaty. And thus Rome felt it had a cassus belli, which was nothing more than a smokescreen for what Rome really wanted. It wanted land, and it wanted money, and that's exactly what it got.
Ancient history has already been covered by ancient historians. If you're going to read a modern historical take on an ancient historical event, take it with a great degree of skepticism (as you should really approach any history book). Everyone has their biases, and their own agenda, from the ancient historians to the more modern ones. Goldsworthy sounds to me like a pro-Roman, or a Rome apologist. There is a great amount of material that we have that wasn't covered by the ancient historians that can be used to augment and supplement the overall picture of the topic in question, but sometimes going right to the source can raise a lot of questions, and in this case, I think Goldsworthy is quite a bit misleading.
quote: I have to say, I haven't read that particular book on the Punic Wars,
quote: in this case, I think Goldsworthy is quite a bit misleading.
I'm having a bit of trouble making sense of those two positions. I also read OSC's review, and though I don't have nearly the background of information that you do, I didn't get the impression that he was defending Rome, nor was it a "glowing review." He states clearly that he believes Rome was an agressor, and was wrong to fight the wars. He also stated out, correctly, that Rome ended up winning because they refused to lose. If they had accepted the fact that Carthiginian forces were superior, and given up, then they would have lost. They would not have been in a position to capitalize on Carthage's "strategic blunders." One of the more interesting conclusions that can be drawn from OSC's essay is that when you're fighting an enemy that is absolutely determined not to lose, then the only way to win is to match that determination, no matter how superior your forces are.
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quote:They used the plea from a border city (Tarantine? I think) as an excuse for war, then moved in.
Messana, controlled by the mercenary group called the Mamertines, was attacked by Hiero of Syracuse, a Greek. The Carthiginians offered to help, and Hiero was driven back. Then the Mamertines decided the Carthaginian presence was too great, so they asked the Romans to help throw out the Carthiginians.
The Senate was too evenly divided to give a recommendation, and popular assembly, still war-weary after Pyrrhus, showed initial hesitation but were won over by the consuls.
The Carthaginians were spooked off, left Messana, made common cause with Hiero, and tried to re-take the city. Rome consquently re-inforced its earlier expeditionary force with a consular army.
Neither side had planned the war, and both could have avoided it.
quote:It was blind luck, or what the Romans themselves would call "Fortune" that they held on as long as they did.
I would argue it was more Roman prowess (e.g., the sack of Agrigentum and the invasion of Africa), Roman ingenuity (the invention of the "corvus"), and Roman determination (doggedly overcoming their own stupid mistakes and disasters) over a period of over two decades that won them the war.
quote:Hannibal, upon laying siege to and conquering Saguntum, which was a good ways south of the Ebro River, was charged with breaking the treaty, as Saguntum had recently formed an alliance with Rome, which in itself should have been a violation of the treaty.
My undergrad Roman history textbook notes: "It is clear that Hannibal had deliberately precipitated war at a moment which he regarded as favourable to himself. The legal position is both complicated and unclear, since it depends on a number of uncertain factors, such as the precise content of the Ebro treaty and the temporal relation of it to the Roman agreement with Saguntum" (Cary & Scullard 125-6).
quote:And thus Rome felt it had a cassus belli, which was nothing more than a smokescreen for what Rome really wanted. It wanted land, and it wanted money, and that's exactly what it got.
And Hannibal got exactly what he wanted, too: war with Rome and a chance for land, money and revenge. Once the Romans threatened war if Saguntum was attacked, he could have just turned around. But he knew that the Romans already had their hands full with military actions against the Gauls and Illyrians and timed his provocation very cleverly.
The Romans were no more to blame than the Carthaginians--particularly the Barcid generals--for the 2nd Punic War.
Also, it is a central truth of all three Punic Wars (but especially the Second) that the Romans' unflinching, almost pathological determination not to surrender was a central factor in their victory. Hannibal kept beating them; and they kept raising more armies from their allies and sending them along.
I'm not sure whether that's a particularly attractive moral quality, but it is undeniable that sheer Roman determination was crucial to their success against Carthage.
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quote:Also, it is a central truth of all three Punic Wars (but especially the Second) that the Romans' unflinching, almost pathological determination not to surrender was a central factor in their victory. Hannibal kept beating them; and they kept raising more armies from their allies and sending them along.
I'm not sure whether that's a particularly attractive moral quality, but it is undeniable that sheer Roman determination was crucial to their success against Carthage.
Yeah so Dante stated my point better that I did. And his facts are cooler.
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<laughs> And I read Brian's post and thought, "Well, that was much more succinct and readable."
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If the Scullard in your text book is H.H. Scullard, I'm not impressed. I've read the bulk of his work having to do with the Punic Wars, and the area preceding it, and I found it extremely lacking. The man quotes the work of others, but rarely takes it a step further by offering his own analysis. He's good at assembling data already collected by others, but I think as an historical analyst he leaves much to be desired.
Might as well just skip him and go right to Polybius, Mommsen and De Sanctus. It'll take longer, but you get to read what he's reporting on without doing it through his eyes.
quote:Originally posted by Dante:
quote:It was blind luck, or what the Romans themselves would call "Fortune" that they held on as long as they did.
I would argue it was more Roman prowess (e.g., the sack of Agrigentum and the invasion of Africa), Roman ingenuity (the invention of the "corvus"), and Roman determination (doggedly overcoming their own stupid mistakes and disasters) over a period of over two decades that won them the war.
The sack of Agrigentum goes to show a major shift in the Roman way of thinking. Why sack and pillage a city that they'd usually just leave a garrison at? In their history, they'd always attacked, defeated and then befriended city's. Hell, even Tarantine (THAT's who I was confusing Messana with earlier), who was an ally of their vicious enemy Pyrrhus only got that kind of treatment (a garrison I mean). Instead they brutalized it. Also, I wouldn't point to the invasion of Africa as a shining moment in the first punic war. Once the Carthaginians hired Xanthippus to train their army, Rome got the crapped kicked out of them. I'm amazed Carthage didn't do that sooner, or that they didn't try harder to get the Spartan to stay longer.
I will agree that the invention of the corvus totally changed naval warfare in the Med. Carthage was ill prepared to deal with this tactic, and every time they tried, they usually got their butts handed to them.
However you misunderstand my point, I meant that the only reason Carthage stayed in the war as long as they did (and wasn't defeated a lot earlier) was that Fortune often intervened to help them. Three times Rome lost major fleets numbering more than 200 ships because of a combination of bad seamanship and the weather. Every time that happened, Carthage went back on the prowl but was slowly beat down until it happened yet again.
Yes, Rome's greatest benefit was that they utterly refused to admit defeat, something that goes back to the foundations of Roman society, back to Etruscans and invading Celtic armies. But I'm curious as to their resolve to win, had Carthage not screwed up so badly. Carthaginian blunders sent Hiero of Syracuse away from them and into Rome's hands. Had Hiero stayed with Carthage, the war would have gone differently. Carthage also suffered from a war to suppress it's hinterland, as North African "allies" rebelled from Carthage at a rather bad moment and Carthage was forced to use badly needed troops to suppress them at a time when they could have been used to great effect at Sicily.
Had things gone differently, I'm not entirely sure of whether or not Rome would have settled for a stalemate or not. Keep in mind, they did in the end settle for a treaty that left a broken but living Carthage at their backs. And while they have never given up the fight when it came to Rome proper, or the Italian penninsula, that doesn't automatically translate to wars of aggression.
quote:And Hannibal got exactly what he wanted, too: war with Rome and a chance for land, money and revenge. Once the Romans threatened war if Saguntum was attacked, he could have just turned around. But he knew that the Romans already had their hands full with military actions against the Gauls and Illyrians and timed his provocation very cleverly.
The Romans were no more to blame than the Carthaginians--particularly the Barcid generals--for the 2nd Punic War.
Also, it is a central truth of all three Punic Wars (but especially the Second) that the Romans' unflinching, almost pathological determination not to surrender was a central factor in their victory. Hannibal kept beating them; and they kept raising more armies from their allies and sending them along.
I'm not sure whether that's a particularly attractive moral quality, but it is undeniable that sheer Roman determination was crucial to their success against Carthage.
I'm not convinced that Hannibal was in it for either land or money, but certainly for revenge. Considering what Rome had done to Carthage, I don't blame him. Rome instigated war at every turn. They more or less invaded Sardinia and Corsica, and the Belearic Islands. The Ebro treaty stated that Carthage couldn't cross north of the river, and Saguntum, clearly to the south, wasn't a part of that treaty. That Saguntum created a separate alliance with Rome outside of the treaty is another matter, a gray area perhaps. But Carthage's hackles were already raised from previous naked Roman instigation. They wanted a war. They wanted the money, the slaves, the resources that came with conquering Spain, and that came from war itself.
And I don't see how anyone could argue that Rome's refusal to quit had anything to do with the Third Punic War. If you want to talk about revenge and bloodlust, you need look no further. Cato the Elder, a censor, ended every speech given in Rome and elsewhere with: "Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam" which translates (usually) to: "Moreover, I advise that Carthage should be destroyed." At that point, they convinced the Numidians to attack Carthage, and Carthage, not being allowed to make war with ANYONE for ANY reason (as per the terms of the treaty that ended the second punic war), defended themselves and thus gave Rome a technical cassus belli for the third war, if you even want to call it that. Rome preyed then upon a vastly weakened Carthage, beseiged Catharge (the city) and won an easy victory. They offered to let Carthage exist, if they destroyed their city and moved 10 miles inland. Carthage, being a seafaring state said no, and were destroyed.
It wasn't the same Rome that fought the Etruscans, or even the Macedonians. I'll agree that their steadfast refusal to give up was a major factor in their victories, most especially and centrally in the second punic war. But in the first and third (especially third, where it played no part at all, unless you count bloodlust in that definition), it was less so. Carthage bungled the first war. Rome got a sweet tooth for conquest after that, and wanted more. So they instigated the second war, after enjoying the fruits of the first, and finished Carthage off with a savage attack in the third.
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quote:If the Scullard in your text book is H.H. Scullard, I'm not impressed.
<laughs> Okay, your lack of impression is noted. Are we just going to play a game of my Classicist could beat up yours? Because, if we are, I gotta tell you that I could probably come up with a lot of "yo Mommsen's so stupid that..." jokes. I mean, are you gonna whip out Gibbon as an authority next? De Sanctus I've never heard of. Do you mean De Sanctis? Or were you actually going to appeal to post-1900 scholarship?
quote:Carthage bungled the first war. Rome got a sweet tooth for conquest after that, and wanted more. So they instigated the second war, after enjoying the fruits of the first, and finished Carthage off with a savage attack in the third.
I guess that's one way of looking at it.
Mine would be: Carthage got their butts handed to them in the first war, brooded about it until they could start a second one, beat the Romans repeatedly in Italy but couldn't defeat them, got their butts handed to them again, and then were eventually wiped out because of Cato's bizarre determination that it needed to be destroyed.
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quote: I have to say, I haven't read that particular book on the Punic Wars,
quote: in this case, I think Goldsworthy is quite a bit misleading.
I'm having a bit of trouble making sense of those two positions. I also read OSC's review, and though I don't have nearly the background of information that you do, I didn't get the impression that he was defending Rome, nor was it a "glowing review." He states clearly that he believes Rome was an agressor, and was wrong to fight the wars. He also stated out, correctly, that Rome ended up winning because they refused to lose. If they had accepted the fact that Carthiginian forces were superior, and given up, then they would have lost. They would not have been in a position to capitalize on Carthage's "strategic blunders." One of the more interesting conclusions that can be drawn from OSC's essay is that when you're fighting an enemy that is absolutely determined not to lose, then the only way to win is to match that determination, no matter how superior your forces are.
Israel should take a lesson from that.
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quote:One of the more interesting conclusions that can be drawn from OSC's essay is that when you're fighting an enemy that is absolutely determined not to lose, then the only way to win is to match that determination, no matter how superior your forces are.
Which is why the ultimate lesson taught by all war is that war is evil, since war manages to turn even decent people indecent in their pursuit of victory.
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Of course it does, if one's enemy is willing to do anything to win. And if they aren't willing to do anything to win, by the above logic, they don't deserve to win.
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The lesson is that survival requires determination to win in the face of an implacable enemy. Look how half of all Americans are uncertain about our efforts in Central Asia and you can see why Card is raising the red flag. If we have it in us to just quit our purpose in Iraq, he rightly fears we may be giving up our place in history.
Why call war inhuman? It seems to be uniquely human or at least normal human behavior.
quote:Of course it does if one's enemy is willing to do anything to win. And if they aren't willing to do anything to win, by the above logic, they don't deserve to win.
I don't see this argument being made by OSC or by Lyrhawn.
I'm a little confused about what you're arguing here...
We can be determined to win in Iraq without having soldiers cutting off Iraqi citizens heads on national television.
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quote:We can be determined to win in Iraq without having soldiers cutting off Iraqi citizens heads on national television.
Not if -- and this is the big "if" -- our best strategists have determined that's the only way to win.
And if we feel that's the only way to win and choose NOT to do it, we've chosen -- as OSC points out -- to lose.
Once ONE combatant has figured this out and committed to victory, the other one will (barring enormous tactical advantages which make determination irrelevant -- although of course one of the points OSC was trying to make is that determination is never irrelevant) lose unless he is willing to make similar sacrifices of his ideals.
Rules of warfare only apply as long as one side is willing to lose.
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quote:I don't get the 'victory at any cost' vibe that you seem to be getting from it.
If you're not willing to do what's necessary for victory at any cost, you're willing to lose. We could "win" the Middle East right now by nuking it to a cinder; in fact, in the hypothetical future of OSC's Shadow books, that's what basically happens. If it turns out that's the only way to "win" the Middle East, and we choose not to do it because we feel it'd be immoral to do so, then we've chosen to lose that war.
I don't get this "vibe" from what OSC's written, either; I doubt he considered this POV when he was writing it, or trying to make the point that we need more stomach and determination. But I think we need to keep in mind that MOST countries will "lose" a war to avoid paying a higher cost for engaging in it, whatever that cost -- principles, money, lives, reputation -- may have to be. And that this is probably not a BAD thing.
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The thing is, it takes two to fight limited wars, but only one to make a war total. That's why France was so successful for so long under Nappy : France loses a battle, France raises another army. The Ancien Regime loses a battle, the Ancien Regime sues for peace. That's what you did in the eighteenth century, and it worked pretty well in keeping wars small and moderately civilised. It's a good thing as long as both sides agree. But if one side refuses to play the game, then you get Really Bad Stuff. I think this is what OSC is saying about Rome : It was fighting a total war where Carthage was fighting a limited one. He misses the point that the Carthaginians eventually wised up and fought to the bitter end, but by then they'd been so weakened that they lost anyway. But the siege took two years.
Now, I disagree with OSC that we should always fight total wars, which is what he seems to be saying. But you have to be prepared to fight one if your enemy does, as was the case in, for example, WWII. And, I think, in the struggle against terrorism. There is no limited concession that bin Laden and his ilk will accept. Even in Vietnam, the US did manage to get out of the war by giving the enemy what they said they wanted! You can argue the morality, but it did work to the extent of getting a peace for the US. I don't think that would happen here.
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quote:If the Scullard in your text book is H.H. Scullard, I'm not impressed.
<laughs> Okay, your lack of impression is noted. Are we just going to play a game of my Classicist could beat up yours? Because, if we are, I gotta tell you that I could probably come up with a lot of "yo Mommsen's so stupid that..." jokes. I mean, are you gonna whip out Gibbon as an authority next? De Sanctus I've never heard of. Do you mean De Sanctis? Or were you actually going to appeal to post-1900 scholarship?
quote:Carthage bungled the first war. Rome got a sweet tooth for conquest after that, and wanted more. So they instigated the second war, after enjoying the fruits of the first, and finished Carthage off with a savage attack in the third.
I guess that's one way of looking at it.
Mine would be: Carthage got their butts handed to them in the first war, brooded about it until they could start a second one, beat the Romans repeatedly in Italy but couldn't defeat them, got their butts handed to them again, and then were eventually wiped out because of Cato's bizarre determination that it needed to be destroyed.
Yes I meant De Sanctis, my apologies for screwing up a single vowel. You really have Mommsen jokes? I'd love to hear them
Quite frankly I'd prefer to stick to mostly ancient historians, and would rather avoid Gibbon altogether. I like the ancient historians. Scullard by the way, in the books I have read, which weren't text books, but scholarly works of his, tends to overly use a combination of historians and ancient historians without using much of his own actual research (I mean, nothing going beyond what he's read from someone else). I think he's really good at organizing it, and certainly he's one of the easiest historical writers to read (it wasn't dry stuff), but I just don't happen to agree with the man, and I think he lacks a lot of supporting evidence to back up the conclusions he comes to.
I suppose we should agree to disagree.
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quote:Rules of warfare only apply as long as one side is willing to lose.
I think morality is more important than victory.
Losing it means losing EVERYTHING, which is why I get hives when I read some of the more hawkish Jatraqueros and their views.
I don't get hives when I read OSC's article on Carthage. I don't get the 'victory at any cost' vibe that you seem to be getting from it.
Am I misintrepreting you at all?
If you consider a loss of morality, despite a victory in combat, to ultimately be a defeat, then the Romans were utterly defeated. Forgive me if I come off preachy, I spent a lot of time last semester researching this specific topic.
Rome entered into the First Punic Wars as what I would honestly consider a morally superior people during the time. Yes, they did many things wrong, but when you consider the alternatives at the time, they were fair, they were honest, more democratic than anyone else around, and loyal to their friends. They didn't brutally slaughter or enslave people. While they had slaves, those slaves were Italians, and were often considered members of the family.
By the end of the three Punic Wars. Rome was a slave state, enjoying the selling and buying of foreign peoples they considered themselves morally superior to, they happily and satisfyingliy butchered women and children, instigated wars purely for profit, and many of their colonial governors became highly corrupt, such as those in Sicily after the first Punic War.
Rome lost whatever moral superiority and quality it had at the end of these wars.
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Matching determination does not equate matching tactics. An army can fight a war with a "refuse to lose" mentality without resorting to a policy of doing evil. In individual battles, I will concede that sometimes a win-at-all-costs attitude will lead to atrocious (sp?) behaviour on the part of individual soldiers, but that doesn't make the war inherently evil.
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quote:I will concede that sometimes a win-at-all-costs attitude will lead to atrocious (sp?) behaviour on the part of individual soldiers, but that doesn't make the war inherently evil.
To me, War itself is evil; the men and women who participate in it may not be. The ideals that the war is conducted over may not be. But the fact that there is a schism so great that it apparently cannot be solved by anything but bloodshed and conquest-- evil.
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quote:Originally posted by Scott R: I think morality is more important than victory.
That made me think of this:
"You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory because it is better to perish than live as slaves." -Winston Churchill
Edit to add: Lyrhawn, your latest post shares the historical perspective of one of my Favorite books, GKC's The Everlasting Man, though he does not connect Rome's moral downfall to its war on Carthage, but rather views it as a rotting from within that was separate and inevitable.
Also to add, Scott, I like your summation of why war is evil, but something about it bugs me. War as a fact is a reflection of humanity's inherent evil, but I also think that war as an action is sometimes justified.
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Again, referencing Churchill above, sometimes the determination is to resist an enemy rather than to defeat them, and it's possible to do so honorably and without resorting to evil (other than the already stated, inherent evil of the fight itself).
Or like in Return of the King where the Rohirrim are saying "we can't win" and Theoden agrees saying, "but we will fight."
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quote:That morality can only coexist with that mentality as long as that army is winning.
Has there ever been a war that REQUIRED the committing of atrocities (rape, terror, etc) in order to acheive victory?
quote:War as a fact is a reflection of humanity's inherent evil, but I also think that war as an action is sometimes justified.
I agree, but very tenuously. Justification is a word that can be handily spun, and I'm wary of the term.
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quote:That morality can only coexist with that mentality as long as that army is winning.
Has there ever been a war that REQUIRED the committing of atrocities (rape, terror, etc) in order to acheive victory?
I'd say that terror produced by atrocities was pretty central to the success of the Mongol conquests. It wasn't the only factor that contributed to the Mongol victories, but the demoralizing effect of the terror they produced in their opponents was an important element.
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I'm reminded of the invasion of Norway in 1940. The government flees from Oslo just ahead of the storm troopers; a German envoy finds them and demands surrender and that Quisling be appointed head of government. It's pretty clear that the military position is hopeless. (Well, actually, that's just how it looks to the government that morning. Just a smidgen of ordinary competence on the part of the Allies could at least have held Northern Norway in the fight. But I digress.) There does not seem to be any military purpose in fighting. Nonetheless, King Håkon chooses to fight on :
quote:I am deeply affected by the responsibility laid on me if the German demand is rejected. The responsibility for the calamities that will befall people and country is indeed so grave that I dread to take it. It rests with the government to decide, but my position is clear.
For my part I can not accept the German demands. It would conflict with all that I have considered to be my duty as King of Norway since I came to this country nearly thirty-five years ago.
To fight Nazi Germany, even with no real hope of victory, simply for the honour of the nation; because giving in would be a worse evil than fighting. Churchill may have said it; King Håkon lived it.
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quote:Has there ever been a war that REQUIRED the committing of atrocities (rape, terror, etc) in order to acheive victory?
That's a hard one to answer. Was Sherman's March to the Sea, for example, necessary? Did Genghis Khan need to stack up pillars of skulls outside besieged cities? Had Norway -- to use KoM's example -- had a nuclear bomb, would they have used it on Berlin?
A better question is: has there ever been a war won in which the victor did not commit atrocities?
Any war with real stakes is going to see the loser break the rules of war just to survive, because they believe that they are inherently better people than the other guy and, therefore, are justified in bending their own morality temporarily to keep their superior morality in existence. It's the same reason you don't see wars decided by single combat, or why sci-fi stories about planets that now resolve their differences through ritual robot sports are ludicrous (although I suppose that sort of thing MIGHT become possible if both sides were aware that the other side would annihilate them in the event of a real victory.)
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quote:Originally posted by TomDavidson: Any war with real stakes is going to see the loser break the rules of war just to survive, because they believe that they are inherently better people than the other guy and, therefore, are justified in bending their own morality temporarily to keep their superior morality in existence. It's the same reason you don't see wars decided by single combat, or why sci-fi stories about planets that now resolve their differences through ritual robot sports are ludicrous (although I suppose that sort of thing MIGHT become possible if both sides were aware that the other side would annihilate them in the event of a real victory.)
Of course there's exceptions to every rule. In specific regards to Rome and Carthage, Rome's "bending" of morality wasn't temporary, it took root and never let go. Granted it changed over time, especially with the advent of Imperial rule, but senatorial Roman morality evaporated during the Punic Wars. It was replaced by greed and racism.
And as far as single combat goes, before hoplite warfare was developed, the Greeks fought primarily using single combat.
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quote:Any war with real stakes is going to see the loser break the rules of war just to survive, because they believe that they are inherently better people than the other guy and, therefore, are justified in bending their own morality temporarily to keep their superior morality in existence.
Hmm. It's something to think about.
I don't see how the American people would tolerate a military that insisted on proudly torturing our enemies as a means of obtaining victory. I think our soldiers, in the main, would rebel if such a tactic were implemented.
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quote:I don't see how the American people would tolerate a military that insisted on proudly torturing our enemies as a means of obtaining victory.
Neither do I. And it's hard to imagine a situation in which that would become a necessary condition for victory for us. But if it were, and if victory were necessary, I don't doubt in a heartbeat that our leaders would -- and arguably should -- advocate doing it.
Morality slips when two conditions are met: victory is required, and immorality increases the chance of victory. In most wars of real scope -- in all wars I can think of, in fact -- both of those become true at some point.
Posts: 37449 | Registered: May 1999
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quote:Any war with real stakes is going to see the loser break the rules of war just to survive,
Well, that depends on how you define 'real'. The colonisation of the Americas was surely a genuinely big deal; yet France did not make the 7 Years' an all-out, total struggle. They fought by the rules of dynastic warfare, and lost their colonies. (Conversely, the conflict between Catholic and Protestant looks a bit silly now, at any rate it's not something we would kill for. But the Thirty Years' was about as nasty a war as you'll find before the twentieth century.) When Prussia invaded Silesia, was that small change? It was a rich, industrialised province, and Austria could surely have destroyed Prussia if its resources had been completely mobilised. Again, though, limited war prevailed. There again, did it really matter whether France was a monarchy or a highly unstable republic, as it would surely have remained in the absence of foreign intervention in 1792? That developed into a total war that lasted twenty years and ground several nations into dust.
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quote:They fought by the rules of dynastic warfare, and lost their colonies. (Conversely, the conflict between Catholic and Protestant looks a bit silly now, at any rate it's not something we would kill for.
Consider: when France fought the Seven Years' War, they were fighting for new land, not the defense of France. The Thirty Years' War was all about the future of the homeland, and had considerably higher stakes.
In general, an invader is less willing to commit to total war than a defender, precisely because the invader has less to lose by submitting. The reason people feared the Mongols so much is that they reversed this.
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I do not see how the Austrian, Swedish, French, or Spanish homelands were threatened in the the TYW; it was the Prussians who were on the offensive (in Europe) in the 7YW, yet it was they who committed the more fully. I do not think your thesis fits the facts. Moreover, while it's true that the French homeland was not under threat, that didn't have to be true. The English hadn't yet given up their ancient claim to the French throne; they could in principle have pushed for a change of dynasty, given a sufficiently complete victory. You should note that English troops did operate with considerable success in the Rhinelands; I do not think it totally inconceivable that they could have taken Paris. Not likely, by any means, but if they won really, really big in some battle, it could happen. It's not as though Ancien Regime France could very well call out the levee en masse to defend them! But the English operated by the rules of dynastic warfare too, and did not commit to the complete warfare that might have brought their enemies down for good. It takes acceptance of limtied gains as well as acceptance of limited losses to keep a war small.
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