Topic: China: Fragile Superpower by Susan L. Shirk
Blayne Bradley
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A fascinating phenomenal book that allowed me to get fully up to date with Chinese internal, domestic, and external politics. My third 'omg' moment came when the author mentioned her participation with the Commitee of Concerned Asian Scholars that visited China in 1971, which blew my mind! As the very first book I read about China was "China! Inside the People's Republic" and I was like "I know you!" this was an awesome moment of recognition for me as not only was it the first detailed book on the People's Republic I ever read, but was probably THE book to get me interested IN China and to study it seriously and casted aside all of the usual 14 year old preconceptions (at the time) I might have had.
So here we are full circle with Susan written a new fascinating book on China and me here once again to read it this time essentially the modern "upgrading" of the previous 1970's mindset I gotten from "China! ITPR" to a new 21st century mindset that I had been busy formulating the last few years.
So here we have it, a book that provided me with ample information to allow me to structure a new modern paradigm on international relations and power politics as focused on China and China's Peaceful Rise.
So onto the book then, the books premise is that the greatest danger to the international world order is not China per se but China's domestic vulnerability to nationalistic whiplash, that China's government Central Control over China while on the outside appears solid and entrenched is really in a manner of speaking under siege and that China's leaders are constantly balancing external foreign politics factors with nationalistic public opinion, arguing that should such factors get out of control the Central Government in Beijing could collapse causing widespread regional instability and worldwide economic backlash, that China's government has in some ways backed itself in a corner where if certain things happen say an officially independent Taiwan the government will be forced to react with violence and act tough for fear of upsetting its people who would revolt and topple the government like the previous 1911 revolution against the Qing.
Susan L. Shirk talks about many facets of China's government, talking about the growing commanding prescence of the military in political concerns as the newer generation of leaders are nolonger of the Long March generation that had fought alongside them, to the Control Coalition the Propoganda Department and the Ministry of Internal Security which are absolutely required for the government to retain control and how a combination of them holding the most die hard conservative wing of the party has caused by their own independant streak their own share of problems by jumping the gun and sensationalizing international disputes forcing a "tough" reaction from China that otherwise could have been handled quietly and lowkey with room for compromise.
With Communist ideology losing its significance in cementing Party control over the population they turned insted to nationalism to confer legitimacy, nationalism coupled with the nessasity for Order to allow development of the economy that provides jobs and wealth to China. This leads to the quandary where China MUST maintain its good relations with the United States to prevent a economic backlash that could disrupt their economic growth, growth that must remain at around 9 to 10% increases each year ensure that millions of new jobs are created to meet demand for said jobs otherwise they risk widespread unrest. The other problem is that by stoking nationalism in its people they are forced to react to minor slights that had been blown out of proportion or risk looking weak to foreign influence which could undermine the government and risk it being toppled.
This is especially noticible with Japan whom public setiment turned violently against as a means of political participation by the people to let off steam as they can't protest as openly against the United States, China needs to normalize relations with Japan to slow down US-Japanese military cooperation and to gain further investment from Japanese investment and open up Japanese markets for Chinese exports but normalizing relations is extremely difficult with public opinion for negative vs Japan.
So China has been forced to for the last little while to suppress news stories on issues that may prove to be contentious and instead handles them in a low key matters where Chinese diplomats can be more flexible and willing to give concessions whereas if it was more public they would be unable to do so without angering public opinion.
In the back of my head the old proverb keeps knocking "a country where the people are afraid of its people is a dictatorship, a country where the government is afraid of its people is a democracy." Technically this should mean that China is very much so a "closeted" democracy considering how paranoid the government is of upsetting public opinion going to significant steps to avert domestic crisis.
Susan L. Shirk goes on to talk about how politics from the US side is doing its own fair share of things to harm US-Sino relations and to cause tensions alongside with things the US has done right during both the Clinton and Bush administrations. For example to stop insisting on them to "democratize" faster, even pro-democracy groups within China are resentful of what they see as foreign interfearance in China's domestic affairs and is extremely counter productive. Secondly to stop remiliterizing Japan, any gain the US makes in regional security by shunting regional responsibility onto China is offset by the increased tensions and risks we gain from China and S. Korea who are NOT happy with a militerized Japan.
Furthermore the US must stop politicalizing trade issues, if you keep claiming national security and resorting to dirty tricks to keep China out of economic deals where they ARE playing by the rules you give the message that even when China plays by the rules you will do whatever it takes to keep them down thus giving the message they there's no point to acting responsibly.
The US goals should be to see China not as an enemy or a rival but as a possible strategic ally and efforts should be made to share responsibility with them and encourage them to join multinational forums to gain a stake in the current international system. As such the US should provide respect to China and its leaders, they crave respect they NEED respect, respect by the US allows them to claim diplomatic points to bring home to domestic approval and gives them "a stronger sense of responsibility for maintaining world order." Furthermore that "inviting them [China] into the G8 would and thus further into the global establishment would strengthen domest support for China to be acting responsibly rather then emotionally".
And possibly number 1 point is "Don't overreact to China's economic rise" that the US still has many advantages that China currently doesn't have and that by using China as a "sputnik" instead of a scapegoat the US can maintain its edge by using China as an oppurtunity to gets its own house in order rather them blaming and punishing China.
"Unfortunately, Cold War fears and protectionist instincts are clouding Americans' economic reason. Our overreactions, which are read by the Chinese public and its leaders as an expression of our hostile intentions toward China, could turn China from an economic rival into an all-out enemy... By politicizing normal commercial dealings and turning them into matters of national security we tell China's leaders and citizens that even when they follow the rules, we will fight dirty to block their economic rise and preserve our own dominance. This message not only inflames Chinese public reactions but also robs China's leaders any incentive to act responsibly..."
Its a great book that not only takes a blunt approach to China's politics and tears away the political "Black Box" of China's government but also gives a comprehensive overview of China's challenges and their pov juxtoposed with what US's interests are and how the US could go about to encourage the continuation of peace and regional stability by encouraging China rather then restraining it.
I'll keep an eye out for it.
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Blayne Bradley
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quote:Squeeze China too much, she argues, and you'll get World War III. But, historically, China has been a far more fragmented society than either Germany or Japan. Faced with a grave threat to their nation's survival from the Japanese invasion that began in the '30s, what did China's elite do? They barely battled the Japanese and continued their civil war.
This is incorrect, while the nationalists didn't do anything about Japan right away eventually they did agree to concentrate on Japan after one of his marshals took CKS hostage. Essentially the argument backfires here as in actuality Japanese invasion stoked Chinese nationalism to cast aside the ideological questions of the Chinese civil war and focus on crushing the foreign invader.
Also just because it was politically divided then doesn't mean it is now, now any perceived threat from foreigners today could enrage the nationalistic public.
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The argument that he is countering is the idea that China will start an offensive war, ala Germany or Japan. The fact that when pushed to the brink under a brutal invasion, one Chinese faction managed to blackmail a different Chinese faction into a half-hearted defence is not much of a counter to his point. Especially since the two sides still ended up sporadically attacking each other and jockeying for position.
I don't really buy that political divisions have shrunk all that much in the last few decades either.
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Blayne Bradley
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quote:Originally posted by Mucus: Huh?
The argument that he is countering is the idea that China will start an offensive war, ala Germany or Japan. The fact that when pushed to the brink under a brutal invasion, one Chinese faction managed to blackmail a different Chinese faction into a half-hearted defence is not much of a counter to his point. Especially since the two sides still ended up sporadically attacking each other and jockeying for position.
I don't really buy that political divisions have shrunk all that much in the last few decades either.
The end result is that for a time anyways they put aside differences and fought the common enemy because the very idea of letting the Japanese seemingly without a fight occupy parts of China was so infuriating it allowed his own officers to rebel.
And it wasn't One faction blackmailing another it was one of Chiang Kai Sheks own Marshals who arrested Chiang.
Also remember that the nationalists nolonger occupy the mainland so that political divisions nolonger exists as a restraining bolt.
The argument Susan makes is that because of the Party fueling nationalistic feelings as a replacement for Communist ideology public unrest will force the Central Government to react to certain hotbutton incidents with force in order to avoid political suicide, or retaliate with certain forceful actions that will result in escalating tensions which is why both sides need to work to defuse these situations before they occur.
The attempt to use 'political divisions' as a reason why China wouldn't feel compelled to react in an international incident is the complete opposite of what the evidence points to, because people are poor they are angry, because people are dissatisfied they are angry, etc so they have their anger funneled at foreigners to whip up nationalistic support to the point that BECAUSE OF THIS the leadership will be when this backfires and an incident happens where backing down or giving concessions would seem like a sign of weakness HAVE TO counter with angry rhetoric and gunboat diplomacy to maintain public approval.
John Pomfret's thoughts in that paragraph don't make sense in context is what I am trying to say and are completely at odds with both history and the logical conclusion of that thought.
To repeat Susans argument is not that China will "inevitably" "start" a war only that its possible conflict might break out should tensions escalate and both sides should work to diffuse these and that by understanding China's internal politics the US can avoid making mistakes that may lead to war.
John Pomfret's paragraph the one I quoted doesn't make sense.
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