quote:Saxon, the form of the statement is incidental. Likely may be subjective, but only in the sense that one person might define a specific range of probabilities as likely than another person would, whereas a movies "goodness" is inherently undefinable. Change "is likely" to "has a large body of scientific evidence in its support."
Alright, so my understanding of a factual statement was faulty. I still don't see the practical application of the separation of opinion from factual statement.
Alan says, "Evolution is likely." That is a factual statement (as defined above). It is therefore his opinion that the statement is true. How should this separation of opinion from factual statement affect my conversation with him?
Posts: 4534 | Registered: Jan 2003
| IP: Logged |
posted
Actually, if we replace "is likely" with "has a large body of scientific evidence in its support," then it's hardly even worth discussing, as it's not even disputable. I mean, one may dispute that the scientific evidence has any value or may dispute its interpretation, but I think most people would be hard pressed to argue that it doesn't exist.
What if we change it to Alan saying "All life evolved from single-celled organisms"? That seems to qualify as a factual statement. And Alan's opinion, then, is that the statement is true. How should that affect my discussion with him?
Posts: 4534 | Registered: Jan 2003
| IP: Logged |
quote:Alan says, "Evolution is likely." That is a factual statement (as defined above). It is therefore his opinion that the statement is true. How should this separation of opinion from factual statement affect my conversation with him?
Because it's not useful seeking to determine the truth of a non-factual statement* - it's a meaningless endeavor. So one must first determine if the subject of disagreement is a factual statement or not.
My point isn't distinguishing the opinion that a factual statement is true from the factual statement, although I think there's value in doing so. Rather, it's in distinguishing factual statements from opinions in general. The opinion about a factual statement was an interesting example of the broader concept that many times when people think they are discussing opinions they are actually disputing the truth value of factual statements.
Dagonee *Factual statement is used here in the same way I used it in the first post.
posted
I'm relatively new (registered here about a week ago). But I would think you would have read some of my posts on the Speed of Light/10000 years thread (starting on page 2).
Posts: 142 | Registered: Apr 2005
| IP: Logged |
In the process of explaining my last post to my wife, I was able to simplify things a bit; since I think more logically/mathematically I realize I tend to be more abstract than I have to be sometimes. My point is that objective truthhood/falsity of statements or propositions determines its status as a "fact" and this is based on a comprehensive (perhaps arbitrary, if you wish) assignment of truth values to propositions. Humans cannot think this way. We think logically. (Well, illogically sometimes!) The point is that formalized logic was developed to reflect the way humans reason. We start with certain assumptions, and we make conclusions by reasoning on those assumptions. The things we think are true are all results of that process. Therefore, they do not correspond (and, based on theories in logic, cannot ever correspond completely and consistently) to a comprehensive assignment of truth values to sentences. So we can state our "opinions," which are the results of this system, and our opinions may even contain thoughts about what this object truth is, but we cannot ever equate the results of our reasoning with that objective truth. Our opinions will then be facts depending on whether they correspond to objective truth, but if anyone tries to evaluate any given opinion, their opinion of whether it is true or not will also be an opinion.
The other thing is that I think any written or spoken sentence that seems not to correspond to something capable of having objective truth value ("The movie is good"), in reality, to whoever wrote or spoke such a sentence, carries behind it much more semantic meaning, which consists of perhaps one or more internal propositions (such as what "good" means in this case, what makes a movie "good", things about this movie that are relevent to evaluating it as "good", etc). That's why I chose to look behind the statement and evaluate the propositions behind it.
Posts: 142 | Registered: Apr 2005
| IP: Logged |
C: The set of all statements that can be assigned a truth value under G. F: The set of all statements that are assigned the truth value "true" under G. All members of F are members of C.
U maintains the same definition as the complement of C, but of course it's base definition is altered by the change to C. The undefined terms are now statement, opinion, and G (which contains the definition of true).
Under this new system, whether or not objective truth exists or not depends on whether or not C is an empty set and whether or not U is an empty set. If C is empty, then there is no objective truth. If U is empty, then there is no subjective truth. If both are non-empty, then both subjective and objective truth exists.
The categorization of a statement into C or U will then be a necessary first step in seeking to determine its truth.
I'm still digesting "statement" and "proposition." I think moving from the former to the latter removes part of the subject I'm interested in here, so I need to think on it more.
Glenn, does this help integrate the thoughts you expressed on the last page and the idea I'm trying to get at here?
quote: Let us posit that there exists a objectively real theory G (consisting of atoms and interpretation) that is capable of interpreting certain propositions.
This is my take on this:
Depending on your definition of "interpret," you could say that "reality" interprets atoms as being "true." Any atom not interpreted by reality is, by default, "False." (or non-existent. Reminds me of Spock "anything that is real exists")
From this can we make the jump to: "G exists, and G is complete"? Or am I assuming too much about reality?
Posts: 3735 | Registered: Mar 2002
| IP: Logged |
posted
Ok, I remember now: "Nothing that is unreal exists."
I don't think it's logically the same, but use the other one, because it works better in my previous post.
Posts: 3735 | Registered: Mar 2002
| IP: Logged |
I'm trying to sort out your sets. I can work with a few at a time, but it takes time to absorb them all.
quote: My intent is that "There is a God" is a member of C.
Yes, we agree on that.
quote: Let us posit that there exists a objectively real theory G (consisting of atoms and interpretation) that is capable of interpreting certain propositions. As a Christian, I believe that G is capable of assigning an interpretation (true or false) to ANY proposition.
Based on what I said above, G (as reality) does interpret every proposition. G (as God) introduces something that is assumed prior to the assumption of reality. (Oh, geez, this is going to open a whole other can of worms).
Ok, first: If we define reality as God, then God exists. But if we assume God is reality (The assumption of God must be prior to the assumption of reality), then (I think) God is a superset of reality, and thus isn't necessarily interpreted by it. (or can only be partially interpreted by it)
Posts: 3735 | Registered: Mar 2002
| IP: Logged |
posted
When I use the G concept, I'm strictly using it as an evaluator of statements. This means it can parse a statement and assign truth values where possible. The crux, I guess, is whether or not "Sideways is a good movie" is something that can be assigned a truth value by G. And here it's important to maintain the distinction between "Sideways is a good movie" and "Sideways is a good movie to me."
So my use of G above does not require God (although, of course, my personal concept of the real G is based on my belief in God).
Whether or not all statements can be assigned a truth value by G is an important question about the nature of the universe, I think. All my musings in the first post were based on an apparantly deep, underlying assumption that not all statements can be assigned a truth value by G.
quote: The crux, I guess, is whether or not "Sideways is a good movie" is something that can be assigned a truth value by G. And here it's important to maintain the distinction between "Sideways is a good movie" and "Sideways is a good movie to me."
So an opinion in this case is true if it fulfills a personal rubric. Does that work?
Posts: 3735 | Registered: Mar 2002
| IP: Logged |
posted
I think so. But that can't depend on whether the person thinks it's a personal rubric. If G can evaluate the truth of any statement, "statement X can be evaluated by G" has to be a statement that can be evaluated by G.
posted
It's possible for a three year old to evaluate whether they like a movie or not, but a three year old isn't even going to consider whether they have a personal rubric. And I think that most of the time adults don't bother to consider whether they have a personal rubric either.
"I know what I like" isn't exactly metacognitive. It's usually just a cop out. (often a perfectly justified cop out, but a cop out nonetheless)
In other words I don't think you even have to be aware of the process of evaluating according to a rubric in order to have an opinion.
You might break it down into formal opinion, where you know you are comparing it to a personal rubric, and informal opinion, where you don't know or don't care.
Posts: 3735 | Registered: Mar 2002
| IP: Logged |
posted
If G exists and is complete, it would have to necessarily contain comprehensive information about everyone who has ever existed, including their complete personal rubrics at any point in time during their lives and how they would take anything to mean, whether those people knew it themselves or not.
So just because a person does not know that they have certain views does not preclude G from having an interpretation on things that relate to them.
Furthermore, just because a person isn't aware that they have a reasoning system that results in a proposition, does not mean that the system does not exist.
Posts: 142 | Registered: Apr 2005
| IP: Logged |
quote:If G exists and is complete, it would have to necessarily contain comprehensive information about everyone who has ever existed, including their complete personal rubrics at any point in time during their lives and how they would take anything to mean, whether those people knew it themselves or not.
Yes, and this would allow someone to judge a CofO statement (a factual statement about an opinion). But this leaves out one level of analysis.
If "Sideways is a good movie" (a member of U) is a personal rubric, then G cannot evaluate the truth of that statement. But, it can evaluate the truth of the statement, "Dagonee believes that Sideways is a good movie." (a member of CofU)
posted
The problem is, you cannot seperate the statement "Sideways is a good movie" from the context - i.e., who said that statement, to what audience, was it part of a discussion, what was said before, what does the word "good" mean in that context, etc. That is why I choose to deal with propositions instead, because the implicit propositions that correspond to that statement ALONG WITH the context of that statement can together be interpreted under G as true or false. At least, that is my take - again, because I believe that G is complete. If you did not believe G is complete then it may very well be that that is subjective and G does not interpret any of the propositions related to that statement.
Note that this blurs the line between you stating (statement X:) "Sideways is a good movie" and me stating (statement Y:) "Dagonee thinks Sideways is a good movie" in an imaginary conversation. Both of these statements correspond to both propositions and contexts that can be interpreted in G and can be true or false, so they both are potentially "facts". Both of these statements can be opinions as well, because according to a third person observer of our conversation T's axioms, which includes what T thinks the word "good" means in the current discussion, T may agree or disagree with either statement. T may think (as a result of T) that X is either true or false, and T may think Y is true or false (for instance, he could believe you were lying when you said that). Later in our conversation, T may realize we are using the word "good" (or maybe the word "movie") in a different sence than he had thought, and therefore now change his opinion on one or potentially both statements. However this would not contradict with the fact that he previously would have vocally said something that he now seems to be saying the opposite of; what changed was his internal representation of the sentence (the context) and so we only see the vocal portion of that change. He has not changed his axioms, but he is asserting a different thing than before. The point is that his two assertions are still logically equivalent because his context with his statement amounted to the same idea both times, but we only see the statement portion of that.
Still, there IS a difference between statement X and statement Y, in that in a certain sense they are related but statement Y has more context to it than statement X. The context of statement X involves your personal definition of "good" and "movie", what makes a "good movie", knowledge of the movie Sideways with relation to how it can be good, and innumerable assumptions about language and reality - all of which you held at the time you stated this (since it was your statement). I think that given a complete understanding of this context, there is an objective truth or falsity to the statement+context (which is best described by the propositions that underly the statement+context). Therefore, if someone had internal axioms that were consistent and completely aligned with G, then they would always come to the same conclusion about the statement that G would. Furthermore, any two people with the same axioms, if they had the same context about the statement, would also come to the same conclusion about the statement, because they would both be evaluating the same set of propositions that underly the statement+context from the same axioms.
Now with Y, Y contains a context about X that is specific to what Dagonee thought the context of X was at the time that he made statement X, and also context about what a person is, who Dagonee is, what does it mean for a person to think something, etc. which is specific to ME at the time I made statement Y. So in other words, Y has a more specific, but larger, context than X.
The reason statement X seems more subjective and opinion oriented than statement Y is that statement X is completely based on your personal assumptions about words and topics that are not semi-universally held. But if you incorporate your context with the statement, then you get to what you really meant. However, the truth value of statement Y is in most people's reasoning more based upon assumptions that are more universally held (those assumptions which relate to you actually having said that and believing that the movie is good). Yet that is at its deepest level, equally subjective until you include the contexts described above, at which point it then can be evaluated by G or any person's own axioms.
The lesson, I think, is that when people make statements, the more explicit they are about the contexts, the more "factual" they seem.
Posts: 142 | Registered: Apr 2005
| IP: Logged |
Printer-friendly view of this topic
![[Wave]](graemlins/wave.gif)
