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France's lower house of parliament approved a bill on Thursday making it a crime to deny Armenians suffered genocide at the hands of Ottoman Turks...

The legislation calls for a one-year prison term and 45,000 euro ($56,570) fine for anyone denying the 1915 genocide -- the same sanction as for denying the Nazi genocide of Jews.

"Does a genocide committed in World War One have less value than a genocide committed in World War Two? Obviously not," Philippe Pomezec, a parliamentarian with the ruling Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), said during the debate.

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Pamuk recently went on trial for insulting "Turkishness" after telling a Swiss newspaper nobody in Turkey dared mention the Armenian massacres. The court eventually dropped charges.

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Posts: 26071 | Registered: Oct 2003  |  IP: Logged | 

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If you believe in the value of free speech then these, including the law banning denial of Nazi genocide, are horrible laws.

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Posts: 10177 | Registered: Apr 2001  |  IP: Logged | 

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Originally posted by Dan_raven:
Besides, what happens if we discover that, while the genocide was planned, the GSM (Giant Spaghetti Monster) gathered up all the Armenians and took them away to a far nicer, better irrigated, and much cooler and hip planet? Then would the law be one that demands we lie?

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OSC's objections to homosexuals appears, from his writing, to come in large part from beliefs that are demonstrably false and constitute forcing others to live according to his religion.

I don't know that this is adequately compared to banning people saying things that are false or making it illegal to be a neo-Nazi. While the structure of these situations are very similar, the underlying factors are very different.

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Part of OSC's perspective is that openly tolerating certain sexual activity will cause problems. I'm not sure what basis you have for assigning validity to one view of what will lead to bad results and invalidity to another.

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OSC's objections to homosexuals appears, from his writing, to come in large part from beliefs that are demonstrably false and constitute forcing others to live according to his religion.

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The decision of whether or not some group or behavior is undesirable should rest on as objective an expectation of harm as possible. The anti-gay crowd has consistently failed to reach this standard and their arguments have often turned out to be intellectually and/or ethically deficient.

Even assuming that they have demonstrated some solid points as to why it should be okay to throw gay people in prison, I don't think anyone except those from the furthest extreme is going to say that the case against gays is anything even approaching that against neo-Nazis. Though perhaps you disagree Dag, as you apparently don't see a difference between these laws.

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We're not talking making it being illegal to be a neo-Nazi, we're talking about it being illegal to say certain things that neo-Nazis say - whether the speaker is a neo-Nazi or not.

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On a different note, it is possible to make a judgement that certain types of people should not be welcomed in your society. Germany, for example, really doesn't want Neo-Nazis hanging around and uses their laws to enforce this.

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One big difference between this law and an anti-threat or anti-"FIRE"-in-crowded-theater law is that this law bans a particular viewpoint. The others ban particular effects of speech. That represents a significant jump in the manner in which speech is affected.

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I am.

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I don't think anyone except those from the furthest extreme is going to say that the case against gays is anything even approaching that against neo-Nazis. Though perhaps you disagree Dag, as you apparently don't see a difference between these laws.

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That's not really true though. The "Fire!" example is based not on the effects of the speech, but rather the probable effects of the speech. This wasn't passed by a bunch of psychics who knew what the effect would always be. You can make an argument that the ban on Holocaust denying et al. is at least partially focused on the probable effects of this speech.

I think such an argument would be incomplete and I agree that it's on a different level, but still the argument exists.

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I'm hard-pressed to see the difference in these laws and the homosexuality laws as OSC advocates them.

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Originally posted by Dagonee:
One big difference between this law and an anti-threat or anti-"FIRE"-in-crowded-theater law is that this law bans a particular viewpoint. The others ban particular effects of speech. That represents a significant jump in the manner in which speech is affected.

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Posts: 407 | Registered: Mar 2006  |  IP: Logged | 

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Originally posted by MrSquicky:
If this:

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I'm hard-pressed to see the difference in these laws and the homosexuality laws as OSC advocates them.

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wasn't about the neo-Nazi laws and instead was only about the speech thing, then let me clear it up for you. OSC advocates using the law against a certain group of people because of the very fact that they belong to a certain group in order to assert that these people don't belong in our society. The speech laws are aimed at excluding a certain viewpoint, judged to be false, from being actively represented as true and is not about a passive group of people.

This difference is to me excedingly clear, such that I didn't see how you could not instead be talking about the laws I had just mentioned that were set up for the same purpose as OSC had with homosexuals. If that wasn't what you were talking about, I don't see how bringing up what OSC makes sense, but what I said is no longer necessarily a logical extension of your statements.

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Your explanation is accurate from an explicit legal standpoint, but not necessarily from a more generalized one. It is entirely possible to make a law based on what one perceives as the likely effects of something without codifying these effects into the determination of that crime, especially when the effects we're talking about are as potentially widespread and nebulous as would be in the case of denying the Holocaust or this genocide.

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But it's a different kind of argument entirely - "the class of actions described by X might lead to Y, therefore the class of actions described by X are now criminal" rather than "specific acts that have a likelihood of causing a specific instance of Y are now criminal."

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This is not because I think that they are obviously wrong, but because I very much don't trust the government to decide what sort of speech should or should not be protected.

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Exactly. It's this threshold that is crossed by the French law and not by the "FIRE" law.

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In America, it's illegal to make false statements about a person or company that a reasonable person might believe, and if so might cause the person or company in question harm.

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In America, it's illegal to make false statements about a person or company that a reasonable person might believe, and if so might cause the person or company in question harm.

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Okay.

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Originally posted by Dagonee:
What factors would you use to decide if such a law is good or bad?

Some I can think of:

1.) Whether the banned statement is true.
2.) Who is harmed by the statement.
3.) How important is it to make the banned statement (which could be analyzed in dozens or hundreds of ways).

If the overall goal of making undesireables unwelcome in society is acceptable, then none of these factors are necessarily dispositive.

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Canada, like the United States, has a constitutional guarantee of free expression. Our Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees freedom of expression, subject to such reasonable limits as are "demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society". In other words, we have free speech, but the state can limit it in reasonable ways. This may be contrasted with the absolute language of the First Amendment of the United States Bill of Rights, which states: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." The words of the Canadian guarantee acknowledge the state's right to limit free speech; the words of the American guarantee forbid the state from doing so.

Of course, we all know that the American Supreme Court has not interpreted the First Amendment literally. American rights, however absolutely stated in the Bill of Rights, are in fact subject to limits imposed by the Courts as they struggle to balance conflicting rights and situate them in a practical working framework. Free speech is no exception. In 1952, Justice Hugo Black, who insisted on reading the First Amendment literally, voted to strike down a states' group libel law, stating that the First Amendment "absolutely forbids such laws without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or 'whereases'." (Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952)). But he was in dissent and his view has not prevailed.. It was Mark Twain who said of the United States, only partly in jest, "It is by the goodness of God that in our country we have those three unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and the prudence never to practice either of them."

This said, the explicit recognition that, in a democratic society, limits may be imposed on fundamental freedoms means that free speech is more narrowly conceived in Canada than in the United States, as is evidenced by our respective positions on pornography, hate speech and defamation. While the American right of free speech admits of some limits in the name of reason or practical necessity, the fact remains that what would be counted as a reasonable limit on speech in Canada would often amount to an unreasonable limit in the United States.

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To take another example, it is easier to sue for libel in Canada than it is in the United States. Application of the First Amendment's guarantee of press freedom led in this country to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (376 US 254 (1964)) which permits newspapers to publish false rumours and make false statements about people with impunity so long as they do not do so intentionally or recklessly. A few years ago, the Supreme Court of Canada in Hill v. Church of Scientology expressly declined to adopt the Sullivan approach. As a result, in Canada, newspapers print unverified material at peril of being sued for libel. The Supreme Court considered the argument that a Sullivan approach was required to prevent "chilling" the free dissemination of information essential for the working of democracy. It concluded that any chilling effect flowing from strong libel laws is outweighed by the importance of protecting people's reputations against false and slanderous statements. Canadian law accepts that the goal of getting at the truth may be served by free exchange in the marketplace of ideas. But it also accepts that false words can do great damage to individuals and groups, damage that cannot always be repaired by debate and discussion.

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Section 319(2) is the section most of the public would be familiar with when hate propaganda is mentioned in the media. This section states that "everyone who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of an indictable offence or an offence punishable on summary conviction." Section 319(3) sets out the defences which provide that no person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2):

(a) if he establishes that the statements communicated were true;

(b) if, in good faith, he expressed or attempted to establish by argument an opinion on a religious subject;

(c) if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds he believed them to be true; or

(d) if, in good faith, he intended to point out, for the purpose of removal, matters producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an identifiable group in Canada.

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Section 319(2) cases are few. One of the reasons for this is that the allegations under section 319(2) rarely meet the high standard of proof that is required by the legal definitions and evidential requirements established in Regina v. Keegstra. In that seminal judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada had to balance the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ right to freedom of expression under section 2 against section 1’s reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The Keegstra case went through several levels of court on the original charges and took several years for appeals on sentence.

The facts, briefly, are that James Keegstra was a high school teacher in Eckville, Alberta. From the 1970s to his dismissal in 1982, he attributed evil qualities to Jews. He described Jewish people as "treacherous, sadistic, money-loving, power hungry, and child killers." Keegstra taught that Jewish people seek to destroy Christianity and are responsible for depressions, anarchy, chaos, wars and revolutions. He claimed the Jews "created the Holocaust to gain sympathy" and, in contrast to open and honest Christians,were said to be deceptive, secretive and inherently evil.

Particularly egregious was the fact that his students were expected to reproduce his teachings on exams, and if they failed to do so, their marks suffered. Ironically, he later defended his actions by arguing that freedom of expression was a charter right in a democracy.

He was convicted at Superior Court, but his Charter argument was accepted in the Alberta Court of Appeal. The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

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Section 319(2) of the Code constitutes a reasonable limit upon freedom of expression. Parliament's objective of preventing the harm caused by hate propaganda is of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutional freedom. Parliament has recognized the substantial harm that can flow from hate propaganda and, in trying to prevent the pain suffered by target group members and to reduce racial, ethnic and religious tension and perhaps even violence in Canada, has decided to suppress the wilful promotion of hatred against identifiable groups. Parliament's objective is supported not only by the work of numerous study groups, but also by our collective historical knowledge of the potentially catastrophic effects of the promotion of hatred. Additionally, the international commitment to eradicate hate propaganda and Canada's commitment to the values of equality and multiculturalism in ss. 15 and 27 of the Charter strongly buttress the importance of this objective.

Section 319(2) of the Code is an acceptably proportional response to Parliament's valid objective. There is obviously a rational connection between the criminal prohibition of hate propaganda and the objective of protecting target group members and of fostering harmonious social relations in a community dedicated to equality and multiculturalism. Section 319(2) serves to illustrate to the public the severe reprobation with which society holds messages of hate directed towards racial and religious groups. It makes that kind of expression less attractive and hence decreases acceptance of its content. Section 319(2) is also a means by which the values beneficial to a free and democratic society in particular, the value of equality and the worth and dignity of each human person can be publicized.

Section 319(2) of the Code does not unduly impair freedom of expression. This section does not suffer from overbreadth or vagueness; rather, the terms of the offence indicate that s. 319(2) possesses definitional limits which act as safeguards to ensure that it will capture only expressive activity which is openly hostile to Parliament's objective, and will thus attack only the harm at which the prohibition is targeted. The word "wilfully" imports into the offence a stringent standard of mens rea which significantly restricts the reach of s. 319(2) by necessitating the proof of either an intent to promote hatred or knowledge of the substantial certainty of such a consequence. The word "hatred" further reduces the scope of the prohibition. This word, in the context of s. 319(2), must be construed as encompassing only the most severe and deeply felt form of opprobrium. Further, the exclusion of private communications from the scope of s. 319(2), the need for the promotion of hatred to focus upon an identifiable group and the presence of the s. 319(3) defences, which clarify the scope of s. 319(2), all support the view that the impugned section creates a narrowly confined offence. Section 319(2) is not an excessive impairment of freedom of expression merely because the defence of truth in s. 319(3)(a) does not cover negligent or innocent error as to the truthfulness of a statement. Whether or not a statement is susceptible to classification as true or false, such error should not excuse an accused who has wilfully used a statement in order to promote hatred against an identifiable group. Finally, while other non-criminal modes of combatting hate propaganda exist, it is eminently reasonable to utilize more than one type of legislative tool in working to prevent the spread of racist expression and its resultant harm. To send out a strong message of condemnation, both reinforcing the values underlying s. 319(2) and deterring the few individuals who would harm target group members and the larger community by communicating hate propaganda, will occasionally require use of the criminal law.

The effects of s. 319(2) are not of such a deleterious nature as to outweigh any advantage gleaned from the limitation of s. 2(b). The expressive activity at which s. 319(2) is aimed constitutes a special category, a category only tenuously connected with the values underlying the guarantee of freedom of expression. Hate propaganda contributes little to the aspirations of Canadians or Canada in either the quest for truth, the promotion of individual self development or the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy where the participation of all individuals is accepted and encouraged. Moreover, the narrowly drawn terms of s. 319(2) and its defences prevent the prohibition of expression lying outside of this narrow category. Consequently, the suppression of hate propaganda represents an impairment of the individual's freedom of expression which is not of a most serious nature.

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Posts: 10886 | Registered: Feb 2000  |  IP: Logged | 

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(How would Frenchmen react if Turkey passed a law stating that any proclaiming that Joan of Arc was other than an insane child, they will be fined)

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Posts: 21182 | Registered: Sep 2004  |  IP: Logged | 

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We can prove that Armenians were masaccred and that the Turks who raped, tortured, killed, and otherwise harmed them intended to commit genocide.

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