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The purpose of this paper is to study and analyze the balance of power dynamic of the period of Chinese history known as the ‘Era of the Warring States’, a period of Chinese history spanning from 475 BC to the unification of China under the Ch’in dynasty in 221 BC. This period of Chinese history saw the development of several nation-states who conducted diplomacy, intrigue, war and peace with each other. The nations who participated in this period of history were Ch’i, Ch’u, Ch’in, Yen, Han, Wei, and Chao. The period was also known for the birth and rise to prominence of the ‘Hundred Schools of Thought’ where philosophers, sages and schools therein flourished and itinerant scholars wandered the Middle Kingdom offering advice from statecraft to war. The theory of this paper is that this period of Chinese history possessed a balance of power dynamic, and that it was most similar to Kaplan’s balance of power rules which could be paraphrased as follows: firstly, the only relevant actors are nation-states; secondly, security is their primary goal; thirdly, weaponry is non-nuclear (which is a given, considering the time frame); thirdly, each state seeks a margin of security higher than its current capabilities; fourthly, there are at least five major powers (there are in fact seven keeping the same ratio); and finally, each state, even if they are a ‘great power’ within the system, will need allies to achieve its goals to explain the willingness to preserve some states as possible future allies. Thus, the system in practice for the Warring States is the closest approximation to the eighteenth century balance of power system.
While it is perfectly acceptable to discuss why the era in question best approximates the eighteenth century balance of power system, it would be wrong to ignore the ways in which this period does not conform to balance of power theory. The first and most obvious difference is that, historically, the Ch’in defeated all of its rivals in 221 BC, forming the Ch’in dynasty of the first Chinese Empire. This means that the system broke down and not only led to war, but ended the system with the transition to total Hegemony by one state absorbing all the others. The second difference is the lack of ‘small’ states, as China was divided then into seven powerful kingdoms with Han and Wei being the smallest kingdoms, and yet were considered diplomatic equals to the remaining five. This is in contrast to the Spring and Autumn period (722-481 BC) which started with over 170 feudal entities who would eventually be destroyed and absorbed until only the seven remained. The Warring States period however differs itself from the European model of the balance of power on a more fundamental basis because of the intellectual and philosophical foundations of Chinese thought, Confucianism and Legalism.
While one could interpret Chinese philosophers of the period as being worried about the balance of power between states, in practice their focus was on the concept of righteousness, for, to paraphrase Confucius, “a wicked King who covets his neighbor’s lands must be opposed!” Confucius would have argued that by being wicked, a King is doomed to failure and should, if in the wrong, “fear the puniest opponents”. Confucius deplored unprovoked aggression but also believed that, if in the right, he “would go against thousands and tens of thousands”, setting the stage for the definitions of a ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ war; additionally, Confucius was a strong advocate of military readiness. All of this fits in with the conceptualization of balance of power theory as we know it. With the evidence for deterrence presented in the story of him encouraging the Duke of Lu to take with him a strong military escort to a friendly peace conference to ensure it stayed friendly, this influenced the notion in Chinese thought that one should always negotiate from a position of strength.
Later another philosopher known as Mo Tzu (Master Mo), the founder of Mohism, also contributed to this theory with his focus on righteousness of people and kings. He attacked the idea of aggressive war, feeling that there was some hypocrisy in the way citizens killing citizens was considered wrong, and yet when a state attacked another it was considered righteous. However, he also advocated that states should maintain a well-prepared and alert military as the best insurance against attack. Furthermore, he pioneered some of the more modern elements of complex diplomacy by not only negotiating with Kings to cease their attacks on weaker states, but also sent his armed followers to the weaker state to help prepare their defenses. He convinced the Duke of Ch’u to call off his attack by arguing, to paraphrase, that “it does not make sense for a rich man who doesn’t need or want luxuries to steal the rags and the broken down cart of the poor. If not, how does it make sense for him to steal the much poorer land from his smaller neighbor?”
Lao Tzu, the founder of Taoism, is another important figure to discuss. Taoism, or “The Way”, was a very influential philosophy espousing that for every political action, a reaction would inevitably follow: “Those who stand and clamor for justice will be visited upon later by an even greater injustice.” Taoists supposed that all moral codes and all excesses were unnatural, and that all things were divided into yin and yang. A sovereign, according toTaoists, should not be labeled noble or mean, for he is the only possible sovereign at the time and shouldn’t chase at virtues and favorable repute by following conventions of right and wrong. Soon the gap between Taoism and Legalism would be bridged and the foundational values of the balance of power resolved.
The period of the Warring States began when the feudal state of Tsin split into Han, Wei and Chao, and was marked by the scramble for supremacy between the seven great states, including Ch’i, Ch’u, Ch’in, and Yen. Military technology had advanced and now armies were all armed with finger trigger crossbows, people were living according to written laws, iron made its debut and the warring states began hiring professional generals to lead their armies. It was an anarchic system with each state struggling for hegemony against all the others, and where Europe was characterized by leading statesmen crafting diplomatic and political policy, China was characterized by the itinerant scholars known as the “Wandering Persuaders”, who were men with an acute understanding of “international affairs”, as well as masters of devious argument and diplomatic finesse. Most notable among these in their efforts to craft and mold the balance of power to their whims were Su Ch’in and Chiang I, who worked in opposition to further the goals of their respective states. Here we see one of the most clear examples of balance of power politics in action, for the state of Ch’in was the strongest of the warring states, had fully embraced a centralized bureaucratic police state, and possessed iron weapons and a large well-trained military, making it ‘only a matter of time before Ch’in would triumph over its rivals’.
With Ch’in’s strength self-evident, the balance of power system that had worked in effect for 200 years to equalize the gains and losses of the warring states was put to its test: in a flurry of diplomatic activity in an effort between two ideologically opposed coalitions, those who felt an alliance of six states was needed to check and contain Ch’in were known as the “vertical” alliance, and those who felt resistance was futile and sought appeasement and reconciliation for survival were known as the “horizontal” league. In this crucial time Su Ch’in first went to Yen and convinced him that Yen was at peace only because Chao stood in the way of Ch’in as a buffer and should thus befriend Chao to contain Ch’in. Convinced of this truth, Su was sent as an envoy of Yen to Chao to negotiate on Yen’s behalf and convinced Chao that 6 armies would be strong enough to overcome Ch’in in a vertical alliance. Su would then leave to Han as an envoy of Chao, accusing the King of Han of cringing in the face of Ch’in in appeasement, which would only result in them giving away more cities and land year by year until nothing remained. In Ch’i, Su argued that Ch’i should not stand aside. It was strong and distant from Ch’in and yet it bowed its head to the aggressor - Why? If Ch’i entered the fray then the smaller states bordering Ch’in could resist the bully. But if Ch’in overran them, Ch’i would find itself exposed. To the King of Ch’u, Su pointed out that if Ch’u accepts the supremacy of Ch’in then all others must submit, but that there can be no room for both Ch’in and Ch’u and that Ch’u has always been Ch’in’s greatest enemy. This stratagem was countered when Su Ch’in was assassinated by rivals, allowing Chiang I on Ch’in’s behalf to drive wedges between the members of the Vertical Alliance, first by a royal marriage between Yen and Ch’in, and then pretended to befriend Ch’u while forcing Ch’i to surrender concessions. Forcing Ch’i to reconcile with Ch’in under the assumption it would be flanked by Ch’u, Ch’u was isolated. Ch’in then reconciled with Ch’u again to isolate Ch’i to gain additional concessions. Chao was convinced the Vertical Alliance was a dead letter that forced Chao to capitulate, eventually allowing Ch’in to invade and absorb the four smaller states in succession, finishing by defeating Ch’u and overrunning Ch’i, forging the six states into a single empire led and dominated by Ch’in.
Thus we have our system for the 200 years it lasted. Ch’in, by being too strong, provoked the other states into an alliance to contain Ch’in’s appetite, and prior to that the strong states that attempted to gobble the weak would be countered by coalitions who felt it was unjust. The relatively smaller powers of the warring states period would either seek appeasement or alliances with stronger neighbors. Confucian principles were of paramount importance in diplomacy, as Confucius had observed the words of Kuan Chung: “If you would be master you must put your sincerity above all else … if you continue to occupy the territory of Lu no one will ever trust you, but if you return it then all men will trust your honesty.” For 200 years reputation and the concept of righteousness dominated policy; if a war was perceived as unjust then it was opposed, if it was just then it was perceived as punishing the wicked for their transgressions against the Will of Heaven. Where the differences further diverge between the European and Chinese systems is that of goals; while of course the Chinese states were motivated to maintain their relative ranking, they were, in each turn, motivated to become hegemon of the system and scrambled to become such, including the smaller states who wasted no opportunity to grow when it seemed just and unopposed by the larger states. This worked as an equilibrium uninterrupted from the Spring and Autumn to the end of the Warring States as the system went from 170 entities to seven, and then to one when it collapsed through opportunism and stratagem.

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The topic of the paper is to be an analysis of a (any) selected region within a (any) given period (usually 50 to 100 years), except Europe of the eighteenth and twentieth century, to examine the extent to which the behavior of the member states can be characterized by balance of power theories. The students should draw on the hypotheses outlined in the Simulation Report Outline available on the website. The paper length is not to exceed 1,500 words, not including footnotes/endnotes and bibliography. The precise method of citation is up to the student, but should be consistent throughout the paper. The student must make use of at least two books and two academic periodicals (not journal) sources for their research.
Indicate:
• Region and period of time considered. Here you would give a brief overview of the time period by providing some factual details of the region and the nature of relationships between countries.
• Analysis
The first two are basically the theory behind your argument. Is there a BoP situation, why, which one, why is it that one, etc.?
o Can the region be characterized by a balance of power dynamic of relations? If so, which kind?
o What balance of power hypotheses appear to be active in the case under examination? This is where you use the simulation report hypotheses, which I have also included below.
The second part looks at where the theory isn’t applicable and how it was influenced by heads of state, as opposed to simply being an automatic response.
o Where do inter‐state relations seem not to behave according to the balance of power? This speaks for itself but if you have specific questions about this part please e‐mail me.
o Were there any skillful statesmen/stateswomen that played on the balance of power? This speaks for itself but if you have specific questions about this part please e‐mail me.
Considering you only have 1500 words to work with, you do not have enough room to delve into great detail. With an introduction and conclusion of approximately 150‐200 words each, you are left with 1100, or so, words to write the body of the essay.
Hypotheses
1. Large states provoke counter‐balancing coalitions of smaller states.
2. Small states isolated from the possibility of allies will bandwagon with larger states.
3. The reputation of states matter for the maintenance of alliances.
4. The reputation of states is damaged by the failure to keep promises.
5. Once most of the states in the system are at war, the remaining states join ongoing conflicts in order to profit (as jackal bandwagoners).
6. Large states are motivated to maintain their relative ranking, whereas small states are motivated by insecurity (The Melian Debate: The strong do what they can and the weak do what they must).
7. Large states are better able to maintain the peace than are smaller states.
8. There is in fact a balance of power equilibrium/a.

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Originally posted by Blayne Bradley:
Also question, am I academically liable to get into any academic trouble/problems if someone takes my above essay and hands it in as their own (plagarising my work) am "I" liable to get into trouble for this when its clear I'm not posting it for distribution but for discussion and criticism?

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Originally posted by Blayne Bradley:
"elf-reference in a shorter paper is generally not considered a no-no."

I've lost substantial marks with particularily hardassed teachers, it depends on the teacher.

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Originally posted by Orincoro:
I've written dozens and dozens of essays in that word range, each with a coherent thesis. I'm telling you what I think can work, not asking for excuses about why you didn't do it. Do what you want- I'm not your dad.

You say you would need 5,000 words to really "get into" an analysis, but what I'm saying is that this paper contains *no* analysis at all. At best you attempt some historical interpolation, but I have no idea how much of that you are getting from your source readings. The flow of the essay strongly suggests that everything written in it is paraphrased or cribbed from your reading. Certainly that isn't a good thing for an essay to be, but it's also not a great thing for an essay even to *appear* to be- stylistically, or in content.

And you're over the limit by nearly 25%, which tells me you have sacrificed concise and clear direction for volume. As much as I know very well that you want to show the things you know, I advise very strongly that you stay closely within working limits and take the steps necessary to do so, by editing your work more thoughtfully, or by narrowing the focus of your work. Again, excuses are not necessary. I'm giving a piece of advise since you posted your essay here in order to receive it.

Who edited the paper, by the way? The syntax has improved, but the sentence flow is still clunky overall. I'm guessing you had someone correct it for errors, but not punch it up for style?

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De ppose o' this linun is ter study and analyze de balance o' power dynamic o' de period o' chinese 'istory known as de ‘era o' de warr'n states’, a period o' chinese 'istory spann'n from 475 bc ter de unification o' china under de ch’in dynasty in 221 bc. this period o' chinese 'istory saw de development o' several nation-states oo conducted diplomacy, intrigue, war and peace wi' each uvver.

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Th' purpose ay thes pepper is tae study an' analyze th' balance ay power dynamic ay th' period ay chinese history knoon as th' ‘era ay th' warrin' states’, a period ay chinese history spannin' frae 475 bc tae th' unification ay china under th' ch’in dynasty in 221 bc. thes period ay chinese history saw th' development ay several nation-states fa conducted diplomacy, intrigue, war an' peace wi' each other.

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Th' purpose ay thes pepper is tae study an' analyze th' balance ay power dynamic ay th' period ay chinese history knoon as th' ‘era ay th' warrin' states’, a period ay chinese history spannin' frae 475 bc tae th' unification ay china under th' ch’in dynasty in 221 bc. thes period ay chinese history saw th' development ay several nation-states fa conducted diplomacy, intrigue, war an' peace wi' each other. th' nations fa participated in thes period ay history waur ch’i, ch’u, ch’in, yen, han, wei, an' chao. th' period was also knoon fur th' birth an' rise tae prominence ay th' ‘hundred schools ay thooght’ whaur philosophers, sages an' schools therein floorished an' itinerant scholars wandered th' middle kingdom offerin' advice frae statecraft tae war. th' theory ay thes pepper is 'at thes period ay chinese history possessed a balance ay power dynamic, an' 'at it was most similar tae kaplan’s balance ay power rules which coods be paraphrased as follows: firstly, th' only relevant actors ur nation-states; secondly, security is their primary goal; thirdly, weaponry is non-nuclear (which is a given, considerin' th' time frame); thirdly, each state seeks a margin ay security higher than its current capabilities; foorthly, thaur ur at leest fife majur powers (thaur ur in fact seven keepin' th' sam ratio); an' finally, each state, e'en if they ur a ‘great power’ within th' system, will need allies tae achieve its goals tae explain th' willingness tae preserve some states as possible future allies. thus, th' system in practice fur th' warrin' states is th' closest approximation tae th' eighteenth century balance ay power system. while it is perfectly acceptable tae discuss wa th' era in question best approximates th' eighteenth century balance ay power system, it woods be wrang tae ignair th' ways in which thes period disnae conf'rm tae balance ay power theory. th' first an' most obvioos difference is 'at, historically, th' ch’in defeated aw ay its rivals in 221 bc, formin' th' ch’in dynasty ay th' first chinese empire. thes means 'at th' system broke doon an' nae only led tae war, but ended th' system wi' th' transition tae total hegemony by a body state absorbin' aw th' others. th' second difference is th' lack ay ‘small’ states, as china was divided 'en intae seven powerful kingdoms wi' han an' wei bein' th' smallest kingdoms, an' yit waur considered diplomatic equals tae th' remainin' fife. thes is in contrest tae th' sprin' an' autumn period (722-481 bc) which started wi' ower 170 feudal entities fa woods eventually be destroyed an' absorbed until only th' seven remained. th' warrin' states period however differs itself frae th' european model ay th' balance ay power oan a mair fundamental basis coz ay th' intellectual an' philosophical foondations ay chinese thooght, confucianism an' legalism. while a body coods interprit chinese philosophers ay th' period as bein' woriat abit th' balance ay power atween states, in practice their focus was oan th' concept ay righteoosness, fur, tae paraphrase confucius, “a stoat kin' fa covets his neighbor’s lands main be opposed!” confucius woods hae argued 'at by bein' stoat, a kin' is doomed tae failure an' shoods, if in th' wrang, “fear th' puniest opponents”. confucius deplored unprovoked aggression but also believed 'at, if in th' reit, he “woods gang against thoosands an' tens ay thoosands”, settin' th' stage fur th' definitions ay a ‘just’ an' ‘unjust’ war; additionally, confucius was a strang advocate ay military readiness. aw ay thes fits in wi' th' conceptualization ay balance ay power theory as we ken it. wi' th' evidence fur deterrence presented in th' story ay heem encooragin' th' duke ay lu tae tak' wi' heem a strang military escort tae a coothie peace conference tae ensure it biddin coothie, thes influenced th' notion in chinese thooght 'at a body shoods aye negotiate frae a position ay loch. later anither philosopher knoon as mo tzu (master mo), th' foonder ay mohism, also contributed tae thes theory wi' his focus oan righteoosness ay fowk an' kings. he attacked th' idea ay aggressife war, feelin' 'at thaur was some hypocrisy in th' way citizens killin' citizens was considered wrang, an' yit when a state attacked anither it was considered righteoos. however, he also advocated 'at states shoods maintain a well-prepared an' alert military as th' best insurance against lat at. furthermair, he pioneered some ay th' mair modern elements ay complex diplomacy by nae only negotiatin' wi' kings tae cease their attacks oan weaker states, but also sent his armed followers tae th' weaker state tae help prepaur their defenses. he convinced th' duke ay ch’u tae caa aff his lat at by arguin', tae paraphrase, 'at “it disnae make sense fur a rich cheil fa doesn’t need ur want luxuries tae ned th' rags an' th' broken doon cart ay th' puir. if nae, hoo diz it make sense fur heem tae ned th' much poorer lain frae his smaller neighbur?” lao tzu, th' foonder ay taoism, is anither important figure tae discuss. taoism, ur “the way”, was a huir uv a influential philosophy espoosin' 'at fur every political action, a reaction woods inevitably follow: “those fa stain an' clamur fur justice will be visited upon later by an e'en greater injustice.” taoists supposed 'at aw moral codes an' aw excesses waur unnatural, an' 'at aw things waur divided intae yin an' yang. a sovereign, accordin' totaoists, shoods nae be labeled noble ur pure techt, fur he is th' only possible sovereign at th' time an' shooldn’t chase at virtues an' favorable repute by followin' conventions ay reit an' wrang. suin th' gap atween taoism an' legalism woods be bridged an' th' foondational values ay th' balance ay power resolved. the period ay th' warrin' states began when th' feudal state ay tsin split intae han, wei an' chao, an' was marked by th' scramble fur supremacy atween th' seven stoatin states, includin' ch’i, ch’u, ch’in, an' yen. military technology hud advanced an' noo armies waur aw armed wi' finger trigger crossbows, fowk waur livin' accordin' tae written laws, iron gart its debut an' th' warrin' states began hirin' professional generals tae leid their armies. it was an anarchic system wi' each state strugglin' fur hegemony against aw th' others, an' whaur europe was characterized by leadin' statesmen craftin' diplomatic an' political policy, china was characterized by th' itinerant scholars knoon as th' “wanderin' persuaders”, fa waur men wi' an acute understandin' ay “international affairs”, an aw as masters ay devioos argument an' diplomatic finesse. most notable amang these in their efforts tae craft an' mauld th' balance ay power tae their whims waur su ch’in an' chiang Ah, fa worked in opposition tae further th' goals ay their respectife states. haur we see a body ay th' most clear examples ay balance ay power politics in action, fur th' state ay ch’in was th' strongest ay th' warrin' states, hud fully embraced a centralized bureaucratic polis state, an' possessed iron weapons an' a large well-trained military, makin' it ‘only a matter ay time afair ch’in woods triumph ower its rivals’. with ch’in’s loch self-evident, th' balance ay power system 'at hud worked in effect fur 200 years tae equalize th' gains an' losses ay th' warrin' states was pit tae its test: in a flurry ay diplomatic activity in an effort atween tois ideologically opposed coalitions, those fa felt an alliance ay a scuttle states was needed tae check an' contain ch’in waur knoon as th' “vertical” alliance, an' those fa felt resistance was futile an' sooght appeasement an' reconciliation fur survival waur knoon as th' “horizontal” league. in thes crucial time su ch’in first went tae yen an' convinced heem 'at yen was at peace only coz chao stuid in th' way ay ch’in as a buffer an' shoods thus befriend chao tae contain ch’in. convinced ay thes truth, su was sent as an envoy ay yen tae chao tae negotiate oan yen’s behalf an' convinced chao 'at sex armies woods be strang enaw tae overcome ch’in in a vertical alliance. su woods 'en lae tae han as an envoy ay chao, accusin' th' kin' ay han ay cringin' in th' coopon ay ch’in in appeasement, which woods only result in them givin' awa' mair cities an' lain year by year until naethin' remained. in ch’i, su argued 'at ch’i shoods nae stain aside. it was strang an' distant frae ch’in an' yit it bowed its heed tae th' aggressur - wa? if ch’i entered th' fray 'en th' smaller states borderin' ch’in coods resist th' bully. but if ch’in overran them, ch’i woods fin' itself exposed. tae th' kin' ay ch’u, su pointed it 'at if ch’u accepts th' supremacy ay ch’in 'en aw others main submit, but 'at thaur can be nae room fur baith ch’in an' ch’u an' 'at ch’u has aye bin ch’in’s greatest enemy. thes stratagem was coontered when su ch’in was assassinated by rivals, allowin' chiang Ah oan ch’in’s behalf tae drife wedges atween th' members ay th' vertical alliance, first by a royal marriage atween yen an' ch’in, an' 'en pretended tae befriend ch’u while forcin' ch’i tae surrender concessions. forcin' ch’i tae reconcile wi' ch’in under th' assumption it woods be flanked by ch’u, ch’u was isolated. ch’in 'en reconciled wi' ch’u again tae isolate ch’i tae gain additional concessions. chao was convinced th' vertical alliance was a deid letter 'at forced chao tae capitulate, eventually allowin' ch’in tae invade an' absorb th' fower smaller states in succession, finishin' by defeatin' ch’u an' overrunnin' ch’i, forgin' th' a scuttle states intae a single empire led an' dominated by ch’in. thus we hae uir system fur th' 200 years it lasted. ch’in, by bein' tay strang, provoked th' other states intae an alliance tae contain ch’in’s appetite, an' priur tae 'at th' strang states 'at attempted tae gobble th' weak woods be coontered by coalitions fa felt it was unjoost. th' relatively smaller powers ay th' warrin' states period woods either seek appeasement ur alliances wi' stronger neighbors. confucian principles waur ay paramoont importance in diplomacy, as confucius hud observed th' words ay kuan chung: “if ye woods be master ye main pit yer sincerity abune aw else … if ye continue tae occupy th' territory ay lu nae a body will ever troost ye, but if ye return it 'en aw men will troost yer honesty.” fur 200 years reputation an' th' concept ay righteoosness dominated policy; if a war was perceived as unjoost 'en it was opposed, if it was jist 'en it was perceived as punishin' th' stoat fur their transgressions against th' will ay heaven. whaur th' differences further diverge atween th' european an' chinese systems is 'at ay goals; while ay coorse th' chinese states waur motivated tae maintain their relatife rankin', they waur, in each turn, motivated tae become hegemon ay th' system an' scrambled tae become sic', includin' th' smaller states fa wasted nae opportunity tae graw when it seemed jist an' unopposed by th' larger states. thes worked as an equilibrium uninterrupted frae th' sprin' an' autumn tae th' end ay th' warrin' states as th' system went frae 170 entities tae seven, an' 'en tae a body when it collapsed ben opportunism an' stratagem.

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