posted
not to derail this thread, but weren't the Hutaree arrested for something they planned (or claimed they were planning) to do?
Posts: 467 | Registered: Nov 2005
| IP: Logged |
posted
No, they were arrested for doing the planning. Planning certain sorts of events is illegal. They were arrested for committing a crime in the present.
Posts: 15770 | Registered: Dec 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
i am aware of the illegal nature of planning destructive events. It just seems that the current discussion about reasonable doubt, punishment and deservedness there might be some interesting discussion about whether the Hutaree should be prosecuted/punished. Are they beyond a reasonable doubt a proven threat to society in that they must be punished?
It just seems like an interesting and current event that can be discussed versus the fictional (and in the future) event like in Minority Report.
Posts: 467 | Registered: Nov 2005
| IP: Logged |
posted
"Of course there are other factors influencing. But the crime having been committed is necessary factor. If it's not there, no amount of other factors will be enough."
That's fine. It just was not clear until a couple posts ago that this is what you meant.
At this point, it just appears that you are arguing that deservedness is a necessary condition (and sufficient?) + the other thing might be a nice effect. Which is what I was arguing for from the beginning. Well, that is, if you also think deservedness is a sufficient condition. Do you?
Fugu, when I say entailed simpliciter, I always (and I mean always) mean necessarily entailed. If I mean something different, then I will say something such as "conceptually entailed" or something of that sort, as entailed has necessary embedded in it whenever it is used in logical argumentation. As such, necessary entailment is redundant.
"It might in some instances. It doesn't in this case." Well, I don't really see why this case is exceptional, but I don't think it matters anymore, if we agree on the first point. But what about the neuroscience example I provided? Is that also exceptional?
Posts: 2705 | Registered: Sep 2006
| IP: Logged |
posted
I don't know why you're using the term 'deservedness'. The conditions I think are necessary are the ones I've said at least once already: that a crime be committed, and that it be proven beyond a reasonable doubt etc. etc. that a certain person did commit that specific crime. Only when those two conditions have been met can we start talking about the individual being a danger to society in terms of separating that person from society.
What you were initially arguing is that, somehow, including 'protect society from the criminal' into our criminal justice system actually meant that we could also just determine, before a crime was actually committed, that someone is a danger and lock them up too. Or at least that's how it read to me-I can't speak for everyone, but you really seem to be making this unnecessarily complicated.
As for the neuroscience example, since it relies on incredibly accurate, currently impossible degrees of certainty in terms of reading the mind of an individual, I'd certainly say it's exceptional. But even if such science existed, under current law we still couldn't just imprison them out of the blue-though perhaps that might happen in terms of medical care, which is a different ball of wax.
Posts: 17164 | Registered: Jun 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
The second paragraph you wrote comes from the confusion of what we meant by reason, as fugu pointed out earlier and I asked that you would explain at that point what you meant by it (I think I did? Too lazy to check back). When I mean reason to do something, I mean sufficient reason, as I do not think that something can be a reason to do something unless it follows that one has reason to do it. This is rather than this nice benefit. That is to say, if they are going to be locked up already because they deserve to be locked up, why do we need to justify it by saying they are a danger to society?
And the reason I talk of deservedness is that this is the term that is usually used when discussing the topic. It covers having done the action, having had the intent to do it, knowingly doing it, etc. It is highly preferable, I believe, to use this term over them having been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that they did it, because someone can still deserve the punishment without having been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have done it. That is to say, they could have *actually* done it, but been clever about it. I would not want to say that person no longer deserves to be punished because he was so clever. This type of procedural justice is problematic for that reason.
On the neuroscience, I am concerned with the ethical ramifications, not the legal ones, as the law--in my mind--ought to follow from the ethics.
Posts: 2705 | Registered: Sep 2006
| IP: Logged |
What if someone who hasn't broken any laws is carrying a terrible plague and needs to be locked up to prevent it from spreading? Is that sort of 'consequentialist' imprisonment always ethically wrong?
Posts: 4600 | Registered: Mar 2000
| IP: Logged |
posted
A straight Kantian would have to say yes. There is a way around it for a Kantian, though.
a) Ask him to stay quarantined. Inform him of his great danger he is posing. he either b) Accepts and goes under quarantine or c) Refuses and runs about if 'c' then he is knowingly and intentionally causing harm to other, or he is irrational and thus not an agent with rights anyway. So then we may force quarantine.
Posts: 2705 | Registered: Sep 2006
| IP: Logged |
posted
What if there's no way to communicate with him before infringing on his rights? Suppose he's listening to loud headphones and he's on his way out of town. The only way to stop him is to shoot out his tires and cause an accident, or something like that.
Posts: 4600 | Registered: Mar 2000
| IP: Logged |
posted
I would say that we lock dangerous people up to protect society but that, first, a person must have done something (commit a crime) to relinquish some of his or her civil rights. The goal is protecting society but a greater goal is freedom so "deserving it" would be a necessary but not sufficient condition.
In the case of the innocent person with a disease, locking them up is not ethical but, possibly, letting them spread the disease would be even less ethical.
Posts: 11187 | Registered: Sep 2005
| IP: Logged |
posted
What he said. Kant would say no go. I don't know what I'd say; I'd have to think about it for a good long while.
Posts: 2705 | Registered: Sep 2006
| IP: Logged |
posted
Well, I'd say the obvious right answer is to lock the guy up, if that's the only way to save thousands of lives. We could even tool the example so that he only has to be imprisoned for a short while, making it doubly obvious.
If, according to Kantian ethics, that's not the obvious right answer, I don't see how Kant's ethics has any chance of being correct.
Posts: 4600 | Registered: Mar 2000
| IP: Logged |
posted
When we lock this guy up, presumably we are locking him up in a nice place, with good food, access to amusement (cable, internet, books, phone, whatever). That is substantially different then tossing the poor, sick guy in a tiny cage with nothing to do all day.
Posts: 2223 | Registered: Mar 2008
| IP: Logged |
quote:What he said. Kant would say no go. I don't know what I'd say; I'd have to think about it for a good long while.
If it's a question of a grave risk to the lives of many versus quarantining one individual up - possibly for a limited time, no less - what is there really to think about? The choice is in your hands in this situation, so the question really becomes 'Which is more important?' The lives of many or the civil rights - of an individual?
If you chose to respect the individual's civil rights, I'm sure you'd have your family be the first in line to go to a movie with the guy, of course?
Posts: 17164 | Registered: Jun 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
It's not that simple. I take rights seriously (for those who get the joke, teehee).
Also, regarding your strawman, there is a difference between not actively preventing something and encouraging the action.
Posts: 2705 | Registered: Sep 2006
| IP: Logged |
How is it my strawman - or even a strawman at all, really - for me to reference a hypothetical situation someone else brought up and was being discussed seriously - by you, no less - well before I posted? This coming from the guy who brought Minority Report into things.
Anyway, as for taking rights seriously...what about the right to not catch a fatal illness and then die from it when it could have been prevented? Do we not have that right? How do we not have that right, but we do have a right not to be quarantined?
quote:Also, regarding your strawman, there is a difference between not actively preventing something and encouraging the action.
Sure there is. In this case, that difference is that the people who die aren't close to you. Or would you not quarantine the carrier, and then take you and your family and head for the hills? Then you would have the right not to get sick and die, and your family would, but not all the other poor slobs who come into contact with the person you wouldn't quarantine just to keep a clean conscience.
(If you can't tell, the strawman remark was pretty damn irritating).
Posts: 17164 | Registered: Jun 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
The strawman is, once again, that my comment about not actively doing something to prevent it is utterly different from actively encouraging it.
Posts: 2705 | Registered: Sep 2006
| IP: Logged |
Well, I suppose your conscience might be clear at the end if you didn't quarantine, but lots of people would be dead...so long as you didn't violate the carrier's rights, though, that's the most important thing.
Civil rights aren't a suicide pact. They are not, nor should they be, absolutely inviolate. If someone is a carrier of a deadly, highly contagious illness and plans to continue living his life in close proximity to other human beings, exposing who knows how many to the serious risk of death...the choice over whether or not to quarantine that individual, whether they have been given the opportunity to choose that for themselves, is extremely simple.
Or, you tell me - without descending into ethics-class jargon, if possible? - why it isn't? 'I take rights seriously' is hardly persuasive. Seriously is not an accurate word to describe such a high esteem for these rights. 'Fanatic' is really more complete.
Posts: 17164 | Registered: Jun 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
You have to understand, Rakeesh -- the historical Kant thought it was wrong to lie to a murderer about where his intended victim was hiding.
Makes it hard to understand why anybody ever thought he was onto something with his ethics. Probably because his work in metaphysics and epistemology was so brilliant.
Posts: 4600 | Registered: Mar 2000
| IP: Logged |
posted
I wonder if even someone as brilliant as Kant could present a strong defense for that style of belief. So far, though, I've never heard one. Not even in the ballpark.
Posts: 17164 | Registered: Jun 2001
| IP: Logged |
quote:Because this does not entail that any crimes are committed.
*cough* does not necessarily entail. There are numerous moral systems where this would entail, for all situations that can arise in reality.
If we're trying to be precise, let us actually be precise.
I'm shocked. If we are going to bring "morality" into the picture, lets be intellectually honest. I'm opposed to abortion on a moral basis but I don't believe abortion providers should be charged with murder. Abortion is legal.
By your standard, criminal charges can be brought against anyone who deviates from those in power.
Posts: 1495 | Registered: Mar 2009
| IP: Logged |
quote:While valid criticisms of the Groundwork are to be addressed, Kant dismisses many criticisms that he finds unhelpful. He suggests that many of the defects that reviewers have found in his arguments are in fact only in their brains, which are too lazy to grasp his ethical system as a whole. As to those who accuse him of writing incomprehensible jargon, he challenges them to find more suitable language for his ideas or to prove that they are really meaningless. He reassures the reader that the second Critique will be more accessible than the first.
Is this a fair statement to make in your opinion, Jon? I do have to wonder at an outlook which insists on the laziness of others as a reason for their disagreement.
Anyway:
quote:Kant's position is that moral goodness, which consists in following the rule of the categorical imperative, is more basic to ethics than good consequences, and that it is the right motivations--an obligation to duty-- which is criterial for defining a person as good.
What good are right motivations if they don't lead to good consequences? For example, telling a murderer where his victim can be found so as not to lie, or permitting a carrier of a highly contagious, deadly illness freedom of movement so as to avoid quarantining him against his will. I think if you asked the people who died as a direct result of those decisions, they'd say something like, "To hell with 'right motivation'! My family is dead!"
Reading the whole article carefully twice now, I simply don't see anything that leads me even to consider that an individual ought decide to let the carrier go free, or tell the murderer where to find his victim. Maybe I'm just lazy, or perhaps I think my responsibility stretches further than what I directly decide to do and carry out.
Posts: 17164 | Registered: Jun 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
Are you suggesting we profile in the airports? The words of the bullies are the same as the words of an Imam. In fact, the words of the Imam lead to even more deaths.
Inspiration is inspiration. This girl was inspired to kill herself. What about religious leaders that preach words that inspire their flock to kill themselves in the name of Jihad? Are you sure you want to start prosecuting people who inspire suicide? Of course, you'll ignore the homicidal suicices. She killed herself some kill themselves to take out others. The Imam at the mosque has more blood on his hands than the bullies in a school.
Posts: 1495 | Registered: Mar 2009
| IP: Logged |
posted
What in the hell are you talking about? I think perhaps one idea in five in this post of yours just now was actually relevant to the discussion at hand, and even that idea was nutty.
Posts: 17164 | Registered: Jun 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
I do wonder why your question matters with regards to criticisms of the groundwork. The question is moreso concerning whether the second critique is valid, not the groundwork. And yes, Kant's writing is... hard.
Regarding your second point, I was unclear. I did not mean that the wikipedia article is the good read. Rather, I meant that the book itself was and provides his justification, which is a very brilliant.
That having been said, I disagree with him. My point is simply that he does provide a fantastic argument for his point because you inquired whether he could provide a strong defense. Yes, and it is there in that book.
ETA: Rereading what was said again concerning his accusations of laziness: I do not think this should be held against Kant at all. He was a genius and was, like many other geniuses, bothered that other people had trouble understanding him.
ETA2: Kant distinguishes between good actions and right actions. They are distinct. A good action is one with the proper motivations. A right action is one in which the proper action is done.
Posts: 2705 | Registered: Sep 2006
| IP: Logged |
posted
I don't mind hard reading. In fact, if done well I enjoy it. I am suspicious, though, of writing done hard just for its own sake-and suggesting people who disagree are just too lazy to understand does make me skeptical.
Anyway, my list is pretty long right now as is. What is your defense, then?
Posts: 17164 | Registered: Jun 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
My defense of Kant? I don't have one. I disagree with him. I just don't think that it is offhandedly wrong. If you want me to try to provide a full defense of Kant as Kant might put it, that would be incredibly long (edit: and I would do a piss poor job of it). If you want me to provide a shallow one, that will be incredibly bad and full of holes that may easily be picked.
As for my view on the matter, I have said already that I am unsure, and am very very hesitant to take some particular answer as obviously the case. Heck, I'm not even sure there is a fact of the matter.
Posts: 2705 | Registered: Sep 2006
| IP: Logged |
posted
Meh, I happen to think that if Kant or Wittgenstein want to yell at people and throw a hissy fit because they aren't understood, let them. They've done enough. The fact that they yell at people doesn't degrade the quality of their work. In fact, nothing they do independent of the work itself matters at all.
Posts: 2705 | Registered: Sep 2006
| IP: Logged |
posted
I meant your defense of, in this case, considering letting the carrier go unquarantined, not of Kant.
Posts: 17164 | Registered: Jun 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
Uhh... I don't understand that sentence. Can you clarify?
Edit: Oh, it's too early. I understand what you mean now. Well, the same that I said of Kant's account would apply to mine. That having been said, it is grounded in the idea that if a right is really a right, then it is inviolable. If it is violable, then it was not a right in the first place. As well, I am not concerned about the consequences as much as you are, but rather the ethics of the action itself, which gives me a completely different view on the matter.
As for an actual defense, to do that in any reasonable way, I would first have to teach you a few metaethical theories, explain the good sides and bad sides, and explain why perhaps some constructivist amalgam is most suitable--or, alternatively, nothing is correct and thus it makes it impossible to say with certainty that any action is that which is right or good; or at the very least, actions that are not clear cases (if there is such a thing). Sorry to be somewhat dismissive, but it's kind of like going up to someone and saying, "Hey, can you explain physics to me." Ethics is a well developed field, and really can't be summarized in any efficacious manner in a forum post. Or a book for that matter.
quote:As for an actual defense, to do that in any reasonable way, I would first have to teach you a few metaethical theories, explain the good sides and bad sides, and explain why perhaps some constructivist amalgam is most suitable--or, alternatively, nothing is correct and thus it makes it impossible to say with certainty that any action is that which is right or good; or at the very least, actions that are not clear cases (if there is such a thing).
What's the epistemic method supposed to be here? Not reflective equilibrium -- that would require that you take considered judgements about particular cases as basic evidence. Clearly you're not doing that in response to the plague carrier case, where the answer is obvious (as we've tried to point out).
Many ethicists would say that by doing metaethics first and letting it dictate your judgements about particular cases, you're putting the cart before the horse. We're looking for a theory that explains a bunch of moral truths we largely already know.
Besides, there are a lot of constructivist views available that don't entail Kantian normative ethics. Sharon Street's view, for example.
P.S. You don't need to teach me any background. I learned it from Michael Smith in grad school at Princeton.
Posts: 4600 | Registered: Mar 2000
| IP: Logged |
posted
"Dude, you are SUCH an ohmigosh-this-is-so-COOL! college student. Save these posts. In 5 or 10 years, you'll find them amusing." Based on the fact that I'll be applying to phd programs soon, thus making a major life commitment, based on the fact that I think that the work is all that matters, I do not think I will suddenly up and switch a few years down the line. But it's possible.
"That's perhaps not how I'd describe it, but... "
There's a difference between well developed and close to finding an answer.
"What's the epistemic method supposed to be here?"
Right now, I'm not specifically concerned with the moral epistemology of it. If we really want one, how about moral contrastivism? That seems to be as good as any other for this situation. e.g., not killing rather than killing.
"Many ethicists would say that by doing metaethics first and letting it dictate your judgements about particular cases, you're putting the cart before the horse. We're looking for a theory that explains a bunch of moral truths we largely already know."
Many metaethicists would say that ethicists are just speaking meaninglessly unless they have a foundation upon which to ground their ethics, and that grounding the metaethics in what ethical truths we thinks we know (based on what? intuition?) begs the question in favor of those ethical decisions.
"Besides, there are a lot of constructivist views available that don't entail Kantian normative ethics. Sharon Street's view, for example."
I was just giving Kant earlier as a token example of someone who is not a consequentialist, if I recall. That I said a constructivist account might be best doesn't mean that I think Kant's account may be best--if there is a best. I just happen to think that if any moral system is going to work, it is going to be some form of constructivism because I sure as hell don't believe in ethical objects or that intuitions are grounding. No thank you, Mr. Audi.
"P.S. You don't need to teach me any background. I learned it from Michael Smith in grad school at Princeton."
I was responding to Rakeesh, not you.
Edit: And yes, I still agree that Kantian ethics is obviously wrong. It doesn't mean that some deontological theory isn't preferable over some consequentialist theory--or, as said earlier, an amalgam. Because for me, many (all?) consequentialist theories give rise to situations that I take as obviously wrong.
Edit2: Once again, too early and too little sleep. I just glanced over your post again, actually noticing the reflective equilibrium part as more than a blip in my mind. Metaethics has priority over ethics.
quote:Originally posted by JonHecht: That having been said, it is grounded in the idea that if a right is really a right, then it is inviolable. If it is violable, then it was not a right in the first place. As well, I am not concerned about the consequences as much as you are, but rather the ethics of the action itself, which gives me a completely different view on the matter.
Well I'm not sure that any definition of "rights" comes without some inherent legal/moral/ethical guidelines. Rights always have parameters with which they are no longer owed or are to be observed. Also i cant see how you can focus on the ethics of an action and not be concerned with the consequences of the action, that's like saying you're concerned with the structural stability and integrity of a bridge but not with whether it can withstand a gust of wind or actually have people drive on it.
Posts: 467 | Registered: Nov 2005
| IP: Logged |
quote:Oh, it's too early. I understand what you mean now. Well, the same that I said of Kant's account would apply to mine. That having been said, it is grounded in the idea that if a right is really a right, then it is inviolable. If it is violable, then it was not a right in the first place. As well, I am not concerned about the consequences as much as you are, but rather the ethics of the action itself, which gives me a completely different view on the matter.
It's my personal outlook to be skeptical of anything involving human beings that is absolute. They can serve some good purposes as guidelines, but never in my experience as something that must always (that word again) be taken literally.
Why wouldn't you be as concerned with the consequences as I am in this hypothetical? You're the one making a decision that leads to results. And it's not even a decision like 'Everyone must wear seatbelts' or something. Your detachment might be credible in such a case. No, here the consequences - contagious death - are suffered by other people just by going about their daily lives and encountered the carrier you let go because of his 'inviolate' right (if you did decide to let him go).
I suppose the real question is do you have an obligation to stop major suffering and death if you can? How much is that responsibility mitigated, if at all, by other considerations such as personal risk, cost of taking action, and the potential of violating someone else's rights? An elaborate philosophical construct is not, it seems to me, required to examine such a question.
quote: As for an actual defense, to do that in any reasonable way, I would first have to teach you a few metaethical theories, explain the good sides and bad sides, and explain why perhaps some constructivist amalgam is most suitable--or, alternatively, nothing is correct and thus it makes it impossible to say with certainty that any action is that which is right or good; or at the very least, actions that are not clear cases (if there is such a thing). Sorry to be somewhat dismissive, but it's kind of like going up to someone and saying, "Hey, can you explain physics to me." Ethics is a well developed field, and really can't be summarized in any efficacious manner in a forum post. Or a book for that matter.
'Somewhat'? If you can't explain it persuasively, you could simply say you don't want to talk about it right now.
Posts: 17164 | Registered: Jun 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
OK. I don't want to do it right now. There is no way I would have any chance of convincing you of anything unless you have studied the topic enough to be willing to not rely solely on your gut feeling about the topic. Hell, I'm not even sure studying the topic would make a difference, as it seems to me that most people just base their ethical systems on what their gut feelings are anyway in some shallow attempt to justify their pretheoretical beliefs. Honestly, I am kind of tired of talking about ethics at this point. All it is now is "I think it's obviously x" "I don't think it is obviously x". Since when does the skeptical (or perhaps simply fallibilistic here) standpoint get so much sh*t. I think I'm in an epistemically solid position. Meh.
"Why wouldn't you be as concerned with the consequences as I am in this hypothetical?"
I already explained some reasons why one might not be concerned with consequences. Ethics confuses the hell out of me, and I don't think it's simple. I don't trust my intuitions about such matters, so even if I have the intuition that the consequences matter here, I am hesitant to say so. I really don't know what framework is best, though, as noted earlier, I suspect some form of constructivism is preferable. I just know that I don't like many, possibly all, forms of consequentialism due to some possibly distasteful results, and thus am suspicious of making a judgment based on the consequences.
Maybe I'm just a bloody emotivist. I don't know. Ethics is weird.
Edit: The only thing I really do have strong feelings about is that metaethics takes priority over ethics. What the conclusion will be... I don't know. Trying to adduce a metaethics from "clear cases" of right ethical judgments presupposes that there are clear cases. I don't know that this is the case.
Posts: 2705 | Registered: Sep 2006
| IP: Logged |
posted
Yes, well, if you think I'm relying solely on my 'gut feeling', then your perception isn't actually very clear at all.
Posts: 17164 | Registered: Jun 2001
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by JonHecht: Trying to adduce a metaethics from "clear cases" of right ethical judgments presupposes that there are clear cases. I don't know that this is the case.
posted
Oh. It's a gut feeling. There's a reason I find all this so confusing. The feeling is, in my mind, effectively worthless. There might be good reasons for why it is the case that metaethics has priority, but there are also good ones for the other way around. Those that destineer noted, for example.
Posts: 2705 | Registered: Sep 2006
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by JonHecht: "Dude, you are SUCH an ohmigosh-this-is-so-COOL! college student. Save these posts. In 5 or 10 years, you'll find them amusing." Based on the fact that I'll be applying to phd programs soon, thus making a major life commitment, based on the fact that I think that the work is all that matters, I do not think I will suddenly up and switch a few years down the line. But it's possible.
WHOOSH!
Way to miss my point.
Posts: 32919 | Registered: Mar 2003
| IP: Logged |
(First of all, good luck with your grad school plans. It can be a super-cool experience.)
quote:I just know that I don't like many, possibly all, forms of consequentialism due to some possibly distasteful results, and thus am suspicious of making a judgment based on the consequences.
What do you have in mind? Over-demandingness? Trolley problems? Williams's Jim and the Indians example? I suspect that the distasteful results you're talking about are judgements about clear cases! In effect, Rakeesh and I are saying the same thing about Kantian retributivism, the view you endorsed before. It leads to a distasteful-looking result.
quote:The only thing I really do have strong feelings about is that metaethics takes priority over ethics. What the conclusion will be... I don't know. Trying to adduce a metaethics from "clear cases" of right ethical judgments presupposes that there are clear cases. I don't know that this is the case.
I sympathise, in that a large number of applied ethicists want to disregard metaethics entirely, which seems misguided to me. But the idea that there might be no clear cases also seems odd. The Holocaust is a clear case.
I think that in the end both metaethics and applied/normative ethics matter to each other's domains, and neither is "prior" to the other in any important sense. Knowledge of what's right in a particular case can be evidence for metaethics, and knowledge of metaethical truths can be evidence about what's right.
Posts: 4600 | Registered: Mar 2000
| IP: Logged |
posted
I am certainly sympathetic to the view that there are clear cases, but I am still suspicious of them as anything more than emotivism or some like thing. I definitely think that the holocaust was wrong, but clearly many of the Nazis didn't. If it was so obviously wrong and manifestly so, then why wouldn't they have done something? Once again, I don't know. I am just more and more suspicious of ethical claims as definite. Something may seem like a clear case, but is it really? I am not denying clear cases. I just don't know. To clarify, I do not mean that a metaethical system should disregard normative ethics completely. It can certainly be informed by normative ethics, but if the metaethical system is sound but leads to some results that are against a supposedly clear normative instance, perhaps the normative intuition is just wrong and we should not take this as a defect in the theory. Looking back, I realize that when I said that metaethics has priority, this is different from what I am saying now, but what I am saying now is more in line with my view.
The horrible part about all this is that I am sympathetic to particularism.
And thanks for the link.
Posts: 2705 | Registered: Sep 2006
| IP: Logged |
posted
without personal ethics, meta-ethics are worthless. Depending on your personal beliefs the answer to "what is good", one of the fundamental questions of meta-ethics, can vary.
Personal ethics can be culturally based, experienced based, or theoretically based, just to name a few.
If you let that guy go, I'd probably shoot you both in order to stop him, and live with the consequences.
Outside of books and college, very few things are absolutes.
Posts: 15082 | Registered: Jul 2001
| IP: Logged |
quote:I am certainly sympathetic to the view that there are clear cases, but I am still suspicious of them as anything more than emotivism or some like thing. I definitely think that the holocaust was wrong, but clearly many of the Nazis didn't. If it was so obviously wrong and manifestly so, then why wouldn't they have done something?
Maybe, as you suggest, it's not so obvious. Or maybe they knew it was wrong and just didn't care.
Or, maybe the premise that there exists a flawless/objective moral framework is wrong.
Posts: 1945 | Registered: Jul 2005
| IP: Logged |
Printer-friendly view of this topic
![[Roll Eyes]](rolleyes.gif)
![[Wink]](wink.gif)
![[Smile]](smile.gif)
If you can't explain it persuasively, you could simply say you don't want to talk about it right now.
