quote:Not true. When someone feels disquiet, that can be scientifically analyzed.
I don't accept this. I guess you're trying to say that if we had the determination to, you think it would be possible to read our biology to a degree that we would know what someone is thinking. I don't think that's true.
We can detect certain emotional states, but we don't know what they mean to the person experiencing them. I think there is more to mental life than emotion.
Posts: 11017 | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged |
quote:I guess you're trying to say that if we had the determination to, you think it would be possible to read our biology to a degree that we would know what someone is thinking. I don't think that's true.
Well, while I DO think that we'll eventually be able to read people's minds with technology, what I means specifically is that we can scan minds accurately enough now to know when you're in an emotional state like "disquiet." And we can even administer some drugs with enough accuracy to end or provoke certain emotional states -- in enough of a natural-seeming way that the patient will invent intellectual justifications for those states.
Posts: 37449 | Registered: May 1999
| IP: Logged |
posted
We can scan minds to know when someone is in an emotional state like "disquiet", but we can't scan minds to learn what "disquiet" as an experience feels like to that person.
Posts: 8120 | Registered: Jul 2000
| IP: Logged |
posted
Hm. Every time I see this thread at the top of the page, I expect someone to dobie it with an advertisement to win a Free Wii!
It's only by the most supreme efforts of self-control that I contain myself to only talking about making the dobie rather than actually going ahead and doing it.
Posts: 1099 | Registered: Apr 2005
| IP: Logged |
posted
Your self-control is to be commended. Your method of satisfying the urge by posting in the thread in question about the dobie that I'd like to be making is how I usually manage it too.
Posts: 16059 | Registered: Aug 2000
| IP: Logged |
posted
Polygraph examinations are still woefully inadequate - as evidenced by how man "confessed" killers have been exonerated by DNA. And they only work because they are calibrated. The polygraph devices do not "know" anything. They are calibrated based on someone lying or not lying, and the results are interpreted by a human being.
Posts: 11017 | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by BandoCommando: Hm. Every time I see this thread at the top of the page, I expect someone to dobie it with an advertisement to win a Free Wii!
It's only by the most supreme efforts of self-control that I contain myself to only talking about making the dobie rather than actually going ahead and doing it.
I could mention that you've as good as dobied it anyway, but I won't. Posts: 5957 | Registered: Oct 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
Pooka, you claimed that it is impossible to determine what someone is thinking. Pointing to current technological inadequacies does not do much to support such a strong claim.
Posts: 1327 | Registered: Aug 2007
| IP: Logged |
posted
Nor do I think polygraph tests speak much to determining things like "what someone is thinking."
Posts: 37449 | Registered: May 1999
| IP: Logged |
posted
Where is a theoretical physicist when you need one?
Let's begin with the difference between a wind up world and one that features free will. The difference is that the wind up world has only one possible future and free will requires an open future. And that difference is within our abilities to examine scientifically, so it is not an intractable problem.
Next, we should specify between absolute determinism and probabilistic determinism which offers the same difference. Absolute determinism nets one possible future while probabilistic determinism nets an open future which is variously constrained.
Claims that science has moved toward absolute determinism are plain wrong. First off, if there was broad consensus there wouldn't be much of a conversation here. Widespread and fundamental disagreements are a good indicator that we have yet to reach any sort of conclusion. But if we were to examine trends, I think it would be very difficult to maintain that we are trending toward absolute determinism. Just the opposite. Uncertainty a la Heisenberg presents an unavoidable challenge to absolute determinism and sets folks like Tom to espousing theories that can account for uncertainty through yet-to-be-discovered hidden variables. A very hopeful position.
And it is a position that smashes head on into Bell's Theorem:
quote:No physical theory of local hidden variables can ever reproduce all of the predictions of quantum mechanics.
There are deterministic theories that account for quantum mechanics (QM) but, as per Bell's Theorem, they forsake local realism in order to accomplish their task. And these theories have some prominent features which I know Tom well enough to be confident that they will make him squirm. Such is the case for the Bohm interpretation, for instance, which boasts a 'pilot wave' that can never be observed.
The best hope for absolute determinism would seem to be the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of QM. But in this particular world of high irony, the MWI still allows that any particular frame of reference is probabilistically determined within the absolutely determined multiverse. So the one future is every possible future.
There are many flavors of MWI, of course, some that don't conceive of the block multiverse implied by relativity. But they all feature branching of some description. Indeed, treating the measurement problem as any other interaction is one of the most elegant features. So decisions made do alter future of that frame of reference. Doing an experiment in one way nets a different world than if the experiment had been done a different way.
[I should mention that MWI doesn't necessarily violate localism but rather a subset of local realism: counterfactual definiteness.]
Of course free will is a somewhat different argument. It can still be argued that free will is a post hoc rationalization etc. Probabilistic determinism doesn't prove free will. But it does set a different context in which to have this discussion. For instance, when we model the mind, we will likely have to include functional mistakes. I make them all the time. If that model nets the same result 99 times of 100, Tom's current conceptualization of 'true free will' gives it to the 1 of 100 dysfunction. Under probabilistic determinism, the example says nothing at all about free will.
And again, we still haven't really defined free will. Idealized free will, something without prior cause is non-material in my estimation and therein nonsensical. For me, it is not troubling that my choices rest on a materially determined foundation. I might as well be troubled that I need a brain to think.
But it is troubling if my choices are meaningless because that goes counter to my fundamental experience of the world. Free will is the only reality I can ever know. Perhaps the absolute determinists can help me here because I haven't seen my next objection discussed which is likely either a flaw in my thinking or unfamiliarity with better commentaries. But if my one future is set, if selection is illusory, then there really is no point to anything.
No point to my personal decisions obviously, but no point to anything. No point to any experiment since the results could never have been any other way and no applicability of that experiment to any other context. Natural selection is wrong because even nature cannot select meaningfully: it could never have been any other way. Ultimately, it seems absolute determinism results in nihilism.
In more theoretical terms, how does one do science if any particular observable cannot be meaningfully considered as at least quasi-discrete from its context? And, to the point, how can something be considered as quasi-discrete in relativistic block time? In the mega-causal chain of absolute determinism its all just a big blob of 'that's the way it is' stretching back to the ultimate cause: the big bang - for which we are offered no prior cause. It seems both meaningless and useless to me.
quote:But it is troubling if my choices are meaningless because that goes counter to my fundamental experience of the world. Free will is the only reality I can ever know. Perhaps the absolute determinists can help me here because I haven't seen my next objection discussed which is likely either a flaw in my thinking or unfamiliarity with better commentaries. But if my one future is set, if selection is illusory, then there really is no point to anything.
No point to my personal decisions obviously, but no point to anything. No point to any experiment since the results could never have been any other way and no applicability of that experiment to any other context. Natural selection is wrong because even nature cannot select meaningfully: it could never have been any other way. Ultimately, it seems absolute determinism results in nihilism.
I'm pretty sure I'm not an absolute determinist - I'd lean more toward what you called probabalistic determinism - but I'd like to respond to this.
Even if every thought and choice you make is inevitable, you still have the conscious experience of them. That's where the meaning lies. This would not be annihilated. Subjectively, qualitatively, nothing is different just because it was inevitable. (Although your beliefs/thoughts about the meaning or significance of events could certainly color your subjective experience.)
I'm having trouble understanding your questions about science and experimentation in that context - I don't see how absolute determinism would hamper these efforts. Just because an experiment can only have one outcome doesn't mean that you don't learn something from doing it. And discrete principles would still be evident from experimental results, and we could still do some reasoning about them to see if they will fit other contexts. So, basically, I don't get what you mean.
Posts: 4287 | Registered: Mar 2005
| IP: Logged |
posted
If the future is already set, then causation is just as illusory as free will. The ultimate cause for everything is that it has already happened in exactly that way. There is no sensible means to treat any event or entity as somehow discrete from the unchanging block of spacetime. How is it then sensible to talk of cause and effect or of something not being caused by any other thing? How is it sensible to say that any event was caused by any other event since no event is discrete? All declarative statements become mere descriptions. Science becomes history.
If every choice I make is inevitable, there is no means to differentiate a good choice from a bad choice. No way to assert that non-violence brings about a different future than violence. The future just is. Nothing I can decide will change it so there is no reason to prefer one decision over another.
Subjectively, qualitatively, everything is different if it is inevitable. My ability to help shape the future is what gives life meaning. Without distinguishing a future that I want from a future that I do not want, without the deep sense that the decisions I make differentiate between the two, life is not only meaningless, it is so contrary to my experience, to every experiment that I have ever conducted, that I may as well consider myself a brain in a vat. In other words, it seems to be a useless proposition.
Posts: 675 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
I don't think your conclusions follow from your premise, at all, so I'm not sure how else to respond.
Posts: 4287 | Registered: Mar 2005
| IP: Logged |
posted
I am perfectly willing to accept that may be so. As I said, this is my own take. However, it would be more helpful to be shown how my conclusions do not follow rather than just told. Posts: 675 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
quote:How is it sensible to say that any event was caused by any other event since no event is discrete?
I don't think there is any argument that no event is truly discrete. But for purposes of specific observations, individual causes can be treated as discrete.
A disorganized mind leads to a disorganized schedule leads to forgetting to brush ones teeth leads to build up of plaque leads to tooth decay. What is the cause of the tooth decay? Plaque, poor organization skills, or the big bang? All or any, depending on what causal relationships you are examining.
Why does it matter who your grandmother is, if you've got hundreds of generations before her?
quote:If every choice I make is inevitable, there is no means to differentiate a good choice from a bad choice. No way to assert that non-violence brings about a different future than violence. The future just is. Nothing I can decide will change it so there is no reason to prefer one decision over another.
An argument to consequences isn't an argument for or against a deterministic universe. A deterministic universe may be personally unsatisfying and have disquieting ramifications, but that alone doesn't make it unlikely.
quote:My ability to help shape the future is what gives life meaning.
Or, possibly, your belief that you have the ability to do so produces the illusion of meaning necessary to allow the fiction that is "you" to continue functioning. That may be a form of selection in itself. Perhaps the only conscious beings that can survive in a deterministic universe are those who tend to not conceive of it as deterministic.
Posts: 3275 | Registered: May 2007
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by MattP: I don't think there is any argument that no event is truly discrete. But for purposes of specific observations, individual causes can be treated as discrete.
I think for any meaningful result, observables must be in fact, at least somewhat discrete. That is to say, differentiated from their context in some way that can be evaluated/measured. Not 'truly' discrete or arbitrarily treated as discrete but justifiably differentiated. So an electron is one thing and a positron is another.
And in making that differentiation we necessitate a negative. That is not an electron. This electron did not cause your tooth decay. I can't see how this can be anything but an arbitrary statement in non-MWI block time. In that block, this electron cannot be considered sufficiently discreet that I could meaningfully say that it did not cause your tooth decay. Except as an admittedly arbitrary selection of causal relationships. Again, that is not how I understand science.
quote:An argument to consequences isn't an argument for or against a deterministic universe. A deterministic universe may be personally unsatisfying and have disquieting ramifications, but that alone doesn't make it unlikely.
Very true. But stylistically my first paragraph referred to scifibum's last paragraph and that paragraph referred to his previous one talking about subjectivity and meaning rather than a direct argument for or against determinism.
quote:Or, possibly, your belief that you have the ability to do so produces the illusion of meaning necessary to allow the fiction that is "you" to continue functioning. That may be a form of selection in itself. Perhaps the only conscious beings that can survive in a deterministic universe are those who tend to not conceive of it as deterministic.
I would be happy to discuss the post hoc rationalization stuff at some point. But for now, I will confine my comments to non-MWI absolute determinism.
I don't see how nature can meaningfully select any more than free willed conscious entities can. The problem with free will selection is not due to the scope or power of the selecting entity but rather with the structure of spacetime itself: The future already exists. Everything has already been decided. Natural selection can not describe an open ended process in which things could have been different. Thus, it is another more or less arbitrary illusion that we use to pretend there is meaning to the world around us. It makes no sense to talk of reasons why some survive and some do not as if it could ever have been altered. Reasons also are just illusion. What is, is what always has been, and always will be. And it makes no sense how any being's conceiving of the universe makes him more or less likely to survive since his fate was already decided before he was born and cannot be altered by anything he thinks or does.
If I smash my head into that wall, then I have always smashed my head into that wall. If I do not, then I never did. There is no way to pull science out of that philosophical Catch-22 except as an arbitrary illusion. [edit: That is too broad, MWI can describe that situation meaningfully.] And if it were some religion making these claims it would have been derided and dispatched long ago.
quote:My ability to help shape the future is what gives life meaning.
Firstly, why is that the only thing that gives life meaning?
Secondly, isn't it possible that you can shape the future, yet the way you are going to shape it has been predetermined by how the past has shaped you?
Posts: 8120 | Registered: Jul 2000
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by orlox: If the future is already set, then causation is just as illusory as free will. The ultimate cause for everything is that it has already happened in exactly that way. There is no sensible means to treat any event or entity as somehow discrete from the unchanging block of spacetime. How is it then sensible to talk of cause and effect or of something not being caused by any other thing? How is it sensible to say that any event was caused by any other event since no event is discrete? All declarative statements become mere descriptions. Science becomes history.
True. "It is a poor effect that has but one cause." Of course, historians and scientists both often talk about "proximal cause" meaning the immediate event. The proximal cause of WWI was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The ultimate cause was, quite possibly, the Big Bang.
Posts: 354 | Registered: Jan 2006
| IP: Logged |
quote:My ability to help shape the future is what gives life meaning.
Firstly, why is that the only thing that gives life meaning?
Secondly, isn't it possible that you can shape the future, yet the way you are going to shape it has been predetermined by how the past has shaped you?
Firstly, I try to be cagier than to say the 'only' thing. Who can argue with puppy dogs and the eyes of our children? But I do think it is a predicate for meaning, especially for me, as you will note I specified.
But that is part of what I have been arguing: a closed future doesn't just make free will illusory, it makes science, experience, causation - meaning itself an illusion.
Secondly, I would want to specify whether you mean absolutely predetermined or probabilistically predetermined. And although I will admit that absolute determinism cannot yet be ruled out, I will insist that eventuation appears to be fundamentally probabilistic and absolute determinism will have to account for that. At the moment, the chain of causation breaks at quantum scales. Absolute determinism will have to show that it only appears to be broken and that hidden variables are at work. MWI does this but still nets an open, probabilistic future.
That we are materially determined by our past is not at issue, for me at least. The question is how does that happen? Do I materially select between materially determined options in an open ended material process as it appears? Or is it a rigged game?
Are we determined by our past or our future?
Posts: 675 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
But they can only read what is known from calibration indices, correct? And I doubt you can take what is known from other brains and apply it to different brains.
Posts: 11017 | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by Raventhief: True. "It is a poor effect that has but one cause." Of course, historians and scientists both often talk about "proximal cause" meaning the immediate event. The proximal cause of WWI was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The ultimate cause was, quite possibly, the Big Bang.
So what caused the big bang?
Posts: 675 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
quote:Firstly, why is that the only thing that gives life meaning?
If the future is already set then meaning is just another illusion. Nothing is as it appears to be. My experience of life is a sham and therein, meaningless. Much in the way that a rigged game is a waste of my time and ultimately meaningless.
quote:Secondly, isn't it possible that you can shape the future, yet the way you are going to shape it has been predetermined by how the past has shaped you?
It is possible if the future is open. If the future is set, then I am predetermined by the future and therefore any notion that I can shape it is void.
Posts: 675 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
Consider that your experience of your life is wholly subjective, regardless of whether the future is set or open. If your definition of "sham" is "not as I subjectively experience it" then your whole life is already a sham. Sorry.
Posts: 4287 | Registered: Mar 2005
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by orlox: If the future is already set then meaning is just another illusion. Nothing is as it appears to be. My experience of life is a sham and therein, meaningless. Much in the way that a rigged game is a waste of my time and ultimately meaningless.
I'd agree that meaning may be illusion, but just because the game is rigged, doesn't make the game pointless or not enjoyable. It's like reading a book. Nothing you do will affect the outcome of the book. Nothing the characters do will affect the outcome. The outcome is set. But the book is still enjoyable, often still has meaning of some sort. Life could be like that. You are reading the book of your life from the 1st person limited perspective of yourself. You don't know how long the book is and you don't have the option of flipping to the back, but the book has a definite length and a definite ending. You'll get there when you get there.
Posts: 354 | Registered: Jan 2006
| IP: Logged |
posted
It wouldn't be the first time that we have disagreed Tres.
But I suspect that much of our problem is in how we are conceptualizing time. I plucked this graphic from SEP to help us out.
I am only arguing that you can't change the shape of the future in the block universe. If you are conceiving of time in either of the two other conceptualizations, then our differences are minor. [Edit: better word]
If you are asserting that you can alter eternal block time then I am not really qualified to comment. [Edit: Except, of course, a MWI eternal block time which still couldn't be altered, apart from your frame of reference.]
Raventhief, I think your analogy is predicated on the assumption that "I" am immaterial in some way.
posted
How so? "I" is your perspective, just as it is mine. I am experiencing this life the way I do a book (with more detail and layers, of course) and I perceive my ability to choose the way the character in the book does. For all I can tell there is an author writing my story (a la Heinlein) or my story may be determined by the purely physical reality of myself and my surroundings. That doesn't change my perception.
In short, trapped in a book or not, I still experience my life from my point of view, and I can enjoy the illusion of choice in the same way I can enjoy reading a book.
Posts: 354 | Registered: Jan 2006
| IP: Logged |
posted
Analogies are always tricky. But from a strictly materialist POV you can't conceive of yourself as 'something' somehow reading a deterministic script. So in your analogy, "I" would more properly be thought of, not even as the script, but as the reading of it. Which brings up more messy questions and the analogy breaks down. You have a ghost in your machine.
In short, "I" am not my 'perspective' but the meaty process that constructs it. That "I" am determined by the meat and the process history/environment is one thing. That I am determined by the superimposition of an unknowable nature is... well, supernatural.
Maybe, the Heinlein scripting our reality is really just a brain in a vat in a higher reality etc.
Posts: 675 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
Ah yes, Cartesian philosophy as applied to free will. Always fun.
True, I have no absolute way of knowing I am not a brain in a vat. And true in a materialist universe, the me that is thinking my thoughts and observing through my POV must be strictly constructed from meat (of some kind). However, that doesn't automatically invalidate the point of my analogy.
Let's drop the analogy. My point in bringing up the analogy was this: whether or not my actions, my fate, and the world around me are predefined or not, there is no way for me to know what my fate is until I reach my end. I cannot perceive or conceive all of the factors that go into my decisions, so my decisions appear to be made on the basis of free will. That appearance may be true, or it may be false, but the appearance remains. The journey of my life is full of surprises and windfalls from my limited POV, and so, I enjoy the journey. The truth about its predetermination doesn't affect my perception and, therefore, my enjoyment.
Posts: 354 | Registered: Jan 2006
| IP: Logged |
quote:If you are asserting that you can alter eternal block time then I am not really qualified to comment. [Edit: Except, of course, a MWI eternal block time which still couldn't be altered, apart from your frame of reference.]
I am asserting that you could have altered the eternal block of time if you had chosen otherwise. You won't choose otherwise and thus you won't alter the block, since your choice is determined by your own nature and your wants - but that doesn't mean you could not have chose otherwise if you'd had different wants and desires. Free will isn't about actually altering the eternal block of time. It is about whether changing the part of the block that represents you in the present would have resulted in the rest of the block changing too.
Why wouldn't you be qualified to comment?
I don't think the "block model" is the best way to think about free will, though. Free will arises from existing within the universe, as a cause of future events. Taking the perspective of someone outside the time of the universe looking in tends to obscure the whole idea.
quote:But from a strictly materialist POV you can't conceive of yourself as 'something' somehow reading a deterministic script.
Some materialists do conceive of 'themself' as being equal to their body.
Posts: 8120 | Registered: Jul 2000
| IP: Logged |
posted
Let me try to put it this way... S = your self (your own state) P = the past state of the universe F = the future state of the universe -> = determines
Determinism says: P -> F Free will says: S -> F
Both are true if: P -> S -> F
Posts: 8120 | Registered: Jul 2000
| IP: Logged |
posted
That's actually a very elegant way of expressing that, Tres. I'm not entirely sure that the definition of "free will" in that post is really universally shared, but it's close enough for government philosophy.
Posts: 37449 | Registered: May 1999
| IP: Logged |
But they can only read what is known from calibration indices, correct? And I doubt you can take what is known from other brains and apply it to different brains.
I'm not quite sure what you mean by the first part, but it's still a vast step up from polygraph tests, which, as I said, aren't a very good example.
posted
Sorry I am so tardy in my response. I am still paying for my BSG marathon two weeks ago!
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: I am asserting that you could have altered the eternal block of time if you had chosen otherwise. You won't choose otherwise and thus you won't alter the block, since your choice is determined by your own nature and your wants - but that doesn't mean you could not have chose otherwise if you'd had different wants and desires.
I think we continue to talk past each other and that is due to continuing differences in conceptualizing the block universe where spacetime itself is considered static and eternal. Metaphysically, nothing could have ever been different because it is eternal and already 'out there'. So the past and the future are actual and unchanging. Your statement here seems to be a near perfect tautology. Choice is somehow available but unattainable. You seem to be adding metaphysical structure without a physical counterpart. Choice and change are not real features of the non-MWI block universe, they are only an illusion.
Simply put, do you think spacetime is dynamic or static?
quote:Free will isn't about actually altering the eternal block of time. It is about whether changing the part of the block that represents you in the present would have resulted in the rest of the block changing too.
Again, nothing ever changes in eternalism. So free will is metaphysically impossible in non-MWI eternal block time and the appearance of such, an illusion. Block time specifically avoids attributing a direction to time. By treating time as if it were another spacial dimension within a relativistic universe, we deny that any frame of reference is more real than any other. So the arrow of time that we perceive moving in one direction only is merely a product of our relative motion. There are frames of reference in the block universe in which events occur before causes leading to the assertion that it is all a set piece.
quote:Why wouldn't you be qualified to comment?
Within the logic of eternalism, nature is set and unchanging. If nature is unchanging, then changing it requires supernatural powers. Whether you actually have supernatural power or only claim to, either way, I am not qualified to comment.
It's a joke son!
quote:I don't think the "block model" is the best way to think about free will, though. Free will arises from existing within the universe, as a cause of future events. Taking the perspective of someone outside the time of the universe looking in tends to obscure the whole idea.
I guess I sort of agree with you here. But the block universe, if it is true, makes free will metaphysically impossible. So the first hurdle in a discussion about free will is whether the structure of spacetime itself allows for even the possibility.
I submit that if you conceive of the future as not already actual, then you do not accept the block universe as valid and we will have to find our disagreements elsewhere. It is possible, I suppose, to conceive of the block universe with 'holes' that would allow some local deviations from the block but that opens a Pandora's box which most scientist would find unsatisfactory. It is a very complicated argument though which can be found here. [edit to add: That argument, I believe, casts the most serious doubt on the block universe aside from QM. It is a bear though. ]
quote:
quote:But from a strictly materialist POV you can't conceive of yourself as 'something' somehow reading a deterministic script.
Some materialists do conceive of 'themself' as being equal to their body.
I am not exactly sure what you are trying to accomplish here. If it is just an offhand comment, that's fine. If it is supposed to be an objection then I have to point out that you had to physically strip out the sentence that specified that statement was within the logic of an analogy and ignore my next paragraph in which I declare that I am one of those materialists. Further, if someone were to conceive of themselves as being something other than their body, they are no longer materialists in any way that I can figure. Perhaps you can explain.
quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: Let me try to put it this way... S = your self (your own state) P = the past state of the universe F = the future state of the universe -> = determines
Determinism says: P -> F Free will says: S -> F
Both are true if: P -> S -> F
In the block universe, there is no preferred direction to time so:
P,F,S are determined.
If time does have a direction, and we live in the possibilist universe, your formula is valid with a slight correction for local realism:
P -> S -> F(S)
And in presentism:
P(S) -> S -> F(S)
Posts: 675 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
It is amusing how otherwise strict materialists can be convinced that they are somehow NOT their brain.
Soon et als and Libet have the same problem: Assuming that their results refer to free will.
Consider this thought experiment. Suppose that Soon or Libet hook me up to their machines but I decide that I will not follow their instructions and not press any button at all. Will the machine then demonstrate that I had no choice but to press?
In other words, there is a significant difference between how the brain functions for a given task (such as when to push a button or which button to push) and the assertion that we do not exercise choice.
Skepchick is having this discussion too but with far less sophistication than in this thread.
Raventhief, I will get you something as soon as I can. Maybe tonight or tomorrow.
Posts: 675 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
Then we will have agreed that we can tell the difference between a universe that is absolutely determined and one that at least allows the possibility of free will.
We would be an enlightened minority ready to discuss historical determinism and the neurological post hoc rationalization of Libet and Soon.
quote:Again, nothing ever changes in eternalism. So free will is metaphysically impossible in non-MWI eternal block time and the appearance of such, an illusion. Block time specifically avoids attributing a direction to time.
That is an interesting way of looking at time, but again I don't think it is an appropriate model for any discussion of free will. In particular, if there is no "direction" to time, then that seems to dissolve the entire notion of cause and effect - which in turn makes not only free will appear impossible, but also the laws of science which are based on the assumption that present causes lead to future effects. It may be possible to come up with some way of talking about cause and effect (as well as free will) within the sort of framework you are describing, but it would be very confusing and counterintuitive.
Instead, I'd propose we approach time in a more traditional way - at the very least assuming that time has a direction, and that things we do in the present influence the events of the future.
Posts: 8120 | Registered: Jul 2000
| IP: Logged |
posted
I would say that is a very good summation of what I have been trying to argue. So I agree. [edit to add: It is however, Einstein's conception of time, so it should not be taken lightly.]
I suspect that the definition of free will is creeping up on us now.
If free will is conceived in some idealized form as without prior cause, then I contend that it is immaterial and therefore nonsense.
If free will is conceived as making a meaningful choice between materially determined options, then I contend that we have plenty of it.
That the moment of choice be absolutely predetermined seems to go against the nature of a probabilistically determined universe and this Rube Goldberg machine of a brain we have.
Worse, our consciousness, being embedded in time and language is fundamentally linear and can't possibly be determined by all the things that should determine it.
We make mistakes. We act against our interests. Much of the time, we have no idea what we are doing. Because however you conceptualize time, you experience it Now. Now requires action. Best guess when you have to. Mostly, we stick to well worn conventions. We are fragmentary creatures, not even capable of absolute determinism.
But our decisions are meaningful. Meaningful as life or death.
Posts: 675 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by orlox: Then we will have agreed that we can tell the difference between a universe that is absolutely determined and one that at least allows the possibility of free will.
We would be an enlightened minority ready to discuss historical determinism and the neurological post hoc rationalization of Libet and Soon.
Ok, cool. I already agreed that I don't think the universe is absolutely determined - I accept that at the quantum scale we don't know whether particular results are determined or essentially random. (Can't speak for anyone else of course.) Not sure to what degree, but I think its possible that these probabilistic events can affect events at the macro level. And I think time has a direction, and that the future doesn't exist.
I'm not sure I understand the implications of this that you seem to see. Let me respond to a couple of your later paragraphs:
quote:If free will is conceived in some idealized form as without prior cause, then I contend that it is immaterial and therefore nonsense.
If free will is conceived as making a meaningful choice between materially determined options, then I contend that we have plenty of it.
Can you clarify "meaningful" here? Because if free will is merely probabilistically determined instead of absolutely determined, I fail to see how that makes it more meaningful. And if there's an alternative to a) absolute determinism, b) probabilistic determinism, and c) lack of prior cause, then I am missing it.
quote:That the moment of choice be absolutely predetermined seems to go against the nature of a probabilistically determined universe and this Rube Goldberg machine of a brain we have.
Not sure about that. It depends on the mechanism of choice, and whether it is sensitive to quantum-scale events. But it seems like a possibility.
quote:Worse, our consciousness, being embedded in time and language is fundamentally linear and can't possibly be determined by all the things that should determine it.
Can't possibly? What do you mean by that?
quote:We make mistakes. We act against our interests. Much of the time, we have no idea what we are doing. Because however you conceptualize time, you experience it Now. Now requires action. Best guess when you have to. Mostly, we stick to well worn conventions. We are fragmentary creatures, not even capable of absolute determinism.
Don't you mean incapable of making the "correct" decision every time? That doesn't seem like it has anything to do with the underlying mechanisms of our choices.
quote:But our decisions are meaningful. Meaningful as life or death.
I agree that our choices are highly meaningful, but I don't tie this meaning to an interpretation of quantum mechanics or the nature of time...
I think we still disagree on what "meaning" means. Posts: 4287 | Registered: Mar 2005
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by orlox: That the moment of choice be absolutely predetermined seems to go against the nature of a probabilistically determined universe and this Rube Goldberg machine of a brain we have.
Evolution does not favor the development of Rube Goldberg-ish structures.
Posts: 1327 | Registered: Aug 2007
| IP: Logged |
quote:Evolution does not favor the development of Rube Goldberg-ish structures.
This is not necessarily true. Evolution favors effective structures. It also favors latent variability. If a structure can maximize variability while remaining effective, it may be more successful than one that maximizes effectiveness without being variable.
Posts: 37449 | Registered: May 1999
| IP: Logged |
posted
Ok, I spoke too soon. I still don't think it's fair to classify the brain as a Rube Goldberg machine.
Posts: 1327 | Registered: Aug 2007
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by Raventhief: Let's drop the analogy. My point in bringing up the analogy was this: whether or not my actions, my fate, and the world around me are predefined or not, there is no way for me to know what my fate is until I reach my end. I cannot perceive or conceive all of the factors that go into my decisions, so my decisions appear to be made on the basis of free will. That appearance may be true, or it may be false, but the appearance remains. The journey of my life is full of surprises and windfalls from my limited POV, and so, I enjoy the journey. The truth about its predetermination doesn't affect my perception and, therefore, my enjoyment.
I think when you invoke the word 'fate' you seem to be referring to another question entirely, specifically to what happens after you die. If you are talking about fate in this world then I would contend that you can, and do, know something about what will happen but you can't know it perfectly. Our sense of free will arises from the dynamic relationship we have with the universe. Our actions appear to result in differing eventuation. Our 'fate' differs if we choose to ignore stop signs or pay close attention. Or if we choose to build or destroy. Our circumstances here on this world, at least to some degree, are made by us.
If you are enjoying the journey of life, I contend that it not serendipitous happenstance or the scribblings of a supernatural script. We ride on the back of a hard fought history. And our decisions help build, or impede, the circumstances in this world for future generations. There are futures we could choose that are not full of windfalls or happy surprises or anything we would associate with enjoyment. How much and in what ways we are determined is important. And we can determine how much and in what ways we are determined. Posts: 675 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
Printer-friendly view of this topic
![[Big Grin]](biggrin.gif)
![[Smile]](smile.gif)
