quote:Originally posted by scifibum: Can you clarify "meaningful" here? Because if free will is merely probabilistically determined instead of absolutely determined, I fail to see how that makes it more meaningful. And if there's an alternative to a) absolute determinism, b) probabilistic determinism, and c) lack of prior cause, then I am missing it.
Meaningful in the sense that there really is a choice, that the future differs depending on the outcome, and that the process of deciding is somewhat, though not entirely, what it appears to be in our experience. So, there really is a chance I will punch that guy in the nose, and there really is a chance that I will laugh if off. And the future is different either way. And although the process of deciding is conducted within material constraints, it is a genuine experience with the exact outcome somewhat unpredictable.
I think it is undeniable that some aspects of our experience could be characterized as illusory. We know, for instance, what we 'see' at any given time is a representation constructed by our brain but that 'illusion' (if you will) is materially determined. Unlike the Cylons, we cannot wholly chose what to see. There is a materially determined relationship between our representations and reality. What we see is not exactly what is 'out there' but it is nonetheless real.
quote:It depends on the mechanism of choice, and whether it is sensitive to quantum-scale events. But it seems like a possibility.
If events generally can only be probabilistically determined this would seem to apply to all events, even the ones in our head.
Quantun events net reality. We don't know exactly how, but it is reality on a quantum scale. The fields in every atom of your body are governed by QM. I don't think it is necessary for my argument but Penrose did suggest a theory of consciousness based on quantum computation.
quote:Can't possibly? What do you mean by that?
I mean that if a given event has a number of potential contributing determinants, any one of those could only be attributed with a probability that they will, indeed, influence the final outcome. And that event will, in fact, only be determined by a subset of the potential contibutors and that subset could only have been predicted probilistically.
Or, I am just not smart enough to consider all the things I should consider when making any particular decision. Thus, I occassionally lose at chess. And the circumstances in which I will lose, are not entirely predictable. There is a probibility of making a mistake and severe limitations on the predictability of exactly when that mistake will occur.
quote:Don't you mean incapable of making the "correct" decision every time? That doesn't seem like it has anything to do with the underlying mechanisms of our choices.
I think it speaks directly to the nature of the mechanism of choice and whether inputs could be wholly determinant if the mechanism occassionally and unpredictably misfunctions. Moreover, it lends credance to the notion that an event could have been determined in a different way than how it was determined.
Further, if the nature of the mechanism is fundamentally serial (linear) then it limits which of the complex of parallel potential determinants could be processed in order to cause an event. There is an attention bottleneck. You can't have two patterns of neuronal activity simultaneously overlapping. So I knew that my opponent likes to castle, but I forgot to consider that. It was possible that I would have remembered and impossible to prefectly predict if, or when, I would forget. Macaques have much the same problem.
quote:I agree that our choices are highly meaningful, but I don't tie this meaning to an interpretation of quantum mechanics or the nature of time...
I think we still disagree on what "meaning" means.
quote:Originally posted by orlox: I think when you invoke the word 'fate' you seem to be referring to another question entirely, specifically to what happens after you die. If you are talking about fate in this world then I would contend that you can, and do, know something about what will happen but you can't know it perfectly. Our sense of free will arises from the dynamic relationship we have with the universe. Our actions appear to result in differing eventuation. Our 'fate' differs if we choose to ignore stop signs or pay close attention. Or if we choose to build or destroy. Our circumstances here on this world, at least to some degree, are made by us.
If you are enjoying the journey of life, I contend that it not serendipitous happenstance or the scribblings of a supernatural script. We ride on the back of a hard fought history. And our decisions help build, or impede, the circumstances in this world for future generations. There are futures we could choose that are not full of windfalls or happy surprises or anything we would associate with enjoyment. How much and in what ways we are determined is important. And we can determine how much and in what ways we are determined.
By "fate" I meant fate in this lifetime. How my life will turn out. As to whether or not we know, I contend that we can make certain predictions. I'm reasonably certain not to end up the dictator of a third world country. However, the fact that I can make predictions is, to my mind, an argument against free will. If I knew all the circumstances that affect my life, then I could know for certain how my life will turn out, including what choices I will make when specific situations arise. Clearly if I walk in front of a car, my life will be different than if I don't. However, the question is not whether there will be a difference, but whether or not I can choose to walk in front of a car. You say, "of course you can," but I haven't done it. My past experience and my beliefs about my future prevent me from walking in front of a car. So, is my choice really a choice, or is it determined by my past?
Either way, I enjoy my life. Either way, I must act as though I have free will, because I can do no other. Even something like tossing a coin to make a decision seems to be a choice I make (I chose to toss the coin) so belief in free will will have no apparent affect on my life.
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quote:Here is a twenty minute Radiolab segment that runs through eternal block time, MWI, free will and post hoc rationalization with Brian Greene, Michio Kaku, Lisa Randall and VS Ramachandran.
If you liked that and want to listen to the entire broadcast you can listen or download here.Posts: 8741 | Registered: Apr 2001
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It is possible to enjoy life believing that the sun spins around the earth. There is not much apparent difference. But the truth is important nonetheless.
Free will is important for moral and legal implications and our understanding of the truth about how our brain operates is important in ways that we can probably no more comprehend than Copernicus's contemporaries could anticipate what we would do with the knowledge he offered.
There is a difference between free will and not free will and the difference is important, to the species if not to a particular individual. And since we can know, since it is not an intractable problem, we should know.
I think there is determinism in our choices. You need cars to step out in front of one. But that doesn't mean that your experience of choice is an illusion. Setting a decision on a coin flip is determined in many ways. The idea of flipping a coin, the existence of coins to flip, that coins are two-option disks rather than cubes, etc. But the results of that flip are only probabilistically determined, it is not certain.
Similarly, you conduct decision making in ways that are material, determined by language, brain structure etc. But that process doesn't have just one outcome. The process is just as real as the determinative factors that go into it.
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quote:Originally posted by orlox: I think there is determinism in our choices. You need cars to step out in front of one. But that doesn't mean that your experience of choice is an illusion. Setting a decision on a coin flip is determined in many ways. The idea of flipping a coin, the existence of coins to flip, that coins are two-option disks rather than cubes, etc. But the results of that flip are only probabilistically determined, it is not certain.
Similarly, you conduct decision making in ways that are material, determined by language, brain structure etc. But that process doesn't have just one outcome. The process is just as real as the determinative factors that go into it.
Not sure I agree. Certainly one can flip a coin and have the result be either heads or tails. However, the question that I'm asking is: given the precise conditions of the coin, the agent doing the flipping, and the total environment of the flip, is it possible for the coin to land on either side? I don't think so. I think that if the total conditions were known, then the result could be calculated. When we say the outcome of a coin toss is 50-50, we are merely expressing ignorance as to the total conditions. If we knew all the conditions, there would (I believe) be no chance at all.
Similarly, if the total conditions of my circumstance and existence at the moment of choice are known, then I believe it is possible to know (not guess with accuracy) what my choice will be. Hence, free will is an illusion brought about by our incomplete knowledge. We can make no choice other than the one we make, but we can't tell beforehand which of two choices is the one we are going to make.
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I'm sure we don't agree. Even if we know all that can be known, there is still uncertainty. The search for local hidden variables is, as I have argued, extremely hopeful at best and likely to result in a theory that still admits probability limitations such as MWI.
Coin flips are quite predictable if you know all the initial conditions but not with absolute certainty. The universe just doesn't seem to work that way.
Laplace's demon either cannot be or will have to settle for probability. Hence, the universe is not determined in such a way that free will must be illusion.
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Hm, I haven't studied LaPlace's Demon extensively, but it seems to me to be a simplistic and outdated statement of my thoughts on the matter. When the theory was originated, atoms were believed to be the smallest division of matter. Energy was thought to be only a characteristic of matter, and not it's own entity. I would expand the statement and leave it open: the theoretical demon would need to know also the entire quantum state of every atom, sub atomic particle, energy photon, anti-matter particle (of any size) etc.
As to the thermogoddammic objection, yes, the second law indicates that a single state of the universe is unique and not recreatable (is that a word?) in full. However, that does not mean that a single state of the universe allows two or more states to derive from it. Entropy cannot currently be analysed, but that doesn't mean it is not analysable (another questionable word). And even still we can calculate the increase in entropy even if we aren't entirely clear on what entropy is. So it seems that there is no theoretical objection to "knowing the complete state of the universe".
Now, on the other hand, it is entirely possible that "knowing the complete state of the universe" is a logical impossibility. Certainly it isn't possible for you or me right now and it may never become possible. But my contention is not that you or I or any person may someday be able to predict with absolute certainty the actions of people, merely that a prediction of that nature seems to be theoretically possible and that possibility indicates that free will is as much of an illusion as standing still.
Either way, the illusion or fact of free will remains. I believe it is pointless to talk about not having free will until and unless something practical can come of it. Orlox stated earlier that there is a difference between free will and not free will. I do not argue, said difference does exist if free will does. He (she? Orlox) also stated that the difference is important to the species if not the individual. Here I disagree. I believe that perception is more important than reality, because we operate on our perception of reality, not reality itself (that's another discussion). If we perceive ourselves as having free will (which we do) then that perception has an affect on us. If we perceive ourselves as not having free will, that perception would affect us. We cannot easily change the reality. We appear to be able to change the perception.
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There are some things that we simply cannot calculate because of the sheer amount of processing power required. A coin flip is probably simple enough that if we know the initial conditions (location, velocity, angular velocity of the coin; atmospheric temperature and pressure; the geometry, elasticity, adhesiveness, etc. of the landing surface; the gravitational field) then we can calculate the outcome to a very high degree of accuracy. As you note, orlox, we can never have absolute certainty: there's always the possibility that the coin will spontaneously tunnel to somewhere in South America.
However, try the same thing with human behavior and all of a sudden there is too much data involved to make any meaningful prediction. But just because we can't calculate something doesn't mean that it isn't determined.
On the one hand, it all comes down to whether there are local hidden variables (and honestly, spooky action at a distance doesn't really bother me that much). If there are true quantum probabilities involved, then of course the future is not fully determined by the present state of the universe. That's tautology territory. I actually really like the MWI in this case.
On the other hand, as Eric pointed out, most expressions of probability are in fact very highly (I hesitate to say absolutely) determined, to a much higher degree than 50:50 (for a coin toss), 1 in 6 (for rolling a die), or 1 in 25,000,000 (jackpot on a lottery ticket). I'll go out on a limb and say that quantum probabilities have no bearing whatsoever on what we call free will. I'd say that free will is a very useful fiction, like love and anger, like your bank balance, like your mother-in-law. All these things have very little meaning if you're looking at the universe on the scale of quantum events.
[Edit: I posted before I saw the previous post. I agree with the last paragraph.]
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quote:Originally posted by orlox: The search for local hidden variables is, as I have argued, extremely hopeful at best and likely to result in a theory that still admits probability limitations such as MWI.
What about Bohm's quantum theory? That's an example of a deterministic form of QM with nonlocal hidden variables.
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Mike, my point is that right now with our current understanding of quantum (and newtonian) behavior, it seems that the hypothetical coin could spontaneously tunnel to South America, but if we had complete knowledge and understanding, the tunneling which appears spontaneous actually has a cause. Quantum theory is only our current best understanding of the sub-atomic universe. It's not necessarily gospel truth.
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My understanding is that for some theories tunneling to South America has a cause, and for some it is a truly random occurrence. I also understand that in the current theories in the former category there are also bizarre effects that look like instantaneous communication. I could be wrong about this: IANAQP.
I think our basic viewpoints on this are very similar.
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