quote:That would be "strong evidence". Do you have any of it?
You seem to be limiting "strong evidence" in ways that I am not. So, I don't think I have what you are terming strong evidence.
Okay, so what do you term "strong evidence"?
Why don't you present that, and then everyone can decide if what you think is strong really is strong.
quote:You aren't going to find much clear evidence for the existence of something subjective and nonphysical if you limit what counts as evidence solely to objective, physical scientific evidence.
Are you backtracking away from "strong" to "clear"? If so, you should admit that up front, rather than doing it on the sly, hoping no one will notice that you wrote "strong" before.
quote:For instance, I have no idea about the state of Phineas Gage's soul - I have no idea how I'd measure it, since I am not him.
But what does your "strong evidence" tell you? What good is it if it tells you nothing about actual cases?
quote:I do have what I explained on page 1 of this thread - my own internal observations that I experience things, and that there is a "self" experiencing them.
So your "strong evidence" is your own subjective experience? Sorry, but the strong evidence of reality testing shows us we could drastically alter your sense of self with mere chemicals that act on the brain.
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"Strong evidence" is any information a person has that allows that person to judge a given conclusion much more likely to be true than alternative conclusions.
Yes, my strong evidence is my own subjective experience, as I explained before. Yes, you could drastically alter my sense of self with chemicals, but that doesn't in any way suggest I don't have a self or that I don't have a soul. You could give me chemicals that would drastically alter my sense of what happened yesterday too, but that doesn't mean yesterday didn't exist.
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quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: "Strong evidence" is any information a person has that allows that person to judge a given conclusion much more likely to be true than alternative conclusions.
My point is, you used the term "strong" to communicate a certain degree of certainty to others. Do you honestly think that your personal subjective evidence is "strong" in the eyes of other people?
quote:Yes, you could drastically alter my sense of self with chemicals, but that doesn't in any way suggest I don't have a self or that I don't have a soul.
But having a "sense of self" isn't strong evidence that you have a soul either. Your perceptions and sensations are highly malleable, remember?
quote:You could give me chemicals that would drastically alter my sense of what happened yesterday too, but that doesn't mean yesterday didn't exist.
So you would consider your misbelief "strong evidence" that yesterday didn't happen, correct?
In which case, why do you consider your subjective impressions "strong evidence" of anything?
And given that everyone else knows how unreliable subjective feelings are, why would you describe them as "strong evidence" to others? Why should they consider your subjective feelings "strong evidence" of anything?
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quote:Do you honestly think that your personal subjective evidence is "strong" in the eyes of other people?
No, I think my personal subjective evidence is "strong" in the sense of telling *me* what is actually true. If it is not convincing in the eyes of other people, that does not make it weaker evidence. If Superman tells Lois Lane that he is really Clark Kent, that is strong evidence to Lois Lane that Superman is Clark Kent, even if nobody else believes it and even if if everybody else thinks Superman never told Lois Lane such a thing. Evidence doesn't need to be communicable to others to be convincing to you.
Nobody else can experience my consciousness, so what I experience is not going to be that convincing to others, unless they take me on my word. However, I don't believe I am unique in this way. I suspect that if you and others examine yourselves, you will see the same thing that I do - that you too experience existence. I can't know that for sure, since I can't see into your consciousness, but I don't believe I'm the only person in the world who has actual experiences. So, if you want to be convinced by what I'm arguing, I'm relying on you to look into your own experiences and see if what I'm saying is true. Otherwise my evidence is only going to be "strong" to me.
And yes, it is possible that someone put certain chemicals in my brain to confuse me and make me think things that aren't true. It is also possible that I hallucinated during science class, and all the scientific facts I believe in are made up. It is possible that I live in The Matrix, and all of reality is a fiction. It is possible I'm just crazy. All of the above things are possible, but I consider them extremely unlikely. That's why I say I have "strong evidence" instead of "absolute 100% proof".
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quote:Do you honestly think that your personal subjective evidence is "strong" in the eyes of other people?
No, I think my personal subjective evidence is "strong" in the sense of telling *me* what is actually true.
Ah, so you are a relativist? There's stuff that's true for you, and stuff that's true for other people, and there's no common ground between everyone's truths?
If you had said "I strongly believe this to be true based on my own subjective and not always trustworthy perceptions", that would have been honest and clearly gotten across what you meant.
But calling your own private and admittably unreliable feelings "evidence", and "strong evidence" at that, is an abuse of the term. The same way that saying that since "faith" properly describes the conclusion that the sun will rise tomorrow proves that non-religious people have "faith" is an abuse of the term.
It's a logical fallacy, and worse yet, a dishonesty, to use words knowing that you mean something completely different from what other people mean by them.
And that's exactly what you do when you try and pass off your own admittedly unreliable feelings and perceptions as "strong evidence" of the existance of anything (other than your perceptions and feelings).
quote:Evidence doesn't need to be communicable to others to be convincing to you.
If you are convinced of something, and you can't convince anyone else that you are right, it's far more likely that they are right, and you are wrong. You, frankly, are just not that magically special, that you know the truth that others can't perceive. Most likely, if they can't perceive it, it's because it's not there.
quote:I suspect that if you and others examine yourselves, you will see the same thing that I do - that you too experience existence. I can't know that for sure, since I can't see into your consciousness, but I don't believe I'm the only person in the world who has actual experiences.
Yes, as a function of my working brain. Even slightly alter my brain, and all my preceptions and sensations, thoughts, memories, feelings, behaviors, change.
None of this is "strong evidence" that any of that is distinct from my brain. In fact, its quite the opposite.
quote:Otherwise my evidence is only going to be "strong" to me.
Explain again the "strong evidence" you have that your mind, or soul, or whatever, is distinct from your brain? I don't believe I've seen that. In fact, I have what you'd call "strong evidence" that you haven't presented any thing in that line yet.
quote:It is also possible that I hallucinated during science class, and all the scientific facts I believe in are made up.
But there is also real evidence that all of those facts are true. Not your "strong because I feel it", but "strong because empirical testing could falsify them, but the empirical data supports their accuracy".
Can you really not see the difference? Everyone else does.
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quote:If you are convinced of something, and you can't convince anyone else that you are right, it's far more likely that they are right, and you are wrong.
How many people who believed they have a soul have you been able to convince they don't?
quote:Explain again the "strong evidence" you have that your mind, or soul, or whatever, is distinct from your brain?
I can see its true by observation, in the same way you know the music produced by a radio is a distinct thing from the radio itself. The soul and brain seems to have very different properties; the soul is an indivisible subjective mental thing that has nonphysical experiences, whereas the brain is an objective physical thing that can be broken down into parts.
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Urgh. Tresopax, the way you are using the word 'evidence' has no relation to the definition of evidence. You could say you had a 'suspicion,' 'belief,' or 'conviction' in possession of a soul. You do not have any evidence.
And no, handing us an English to Tresopax translation is bypassing the issue entirely. This is the worst way to ply a semantic argument or any type of argument. It's redefining words entirely in order to float an argument on rhetoric.
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By evidence I mean what you and most average people mean by evidence. I'm not talking about a "suspicion" or "belief" or "conviction" I have. I'm talking about proof - repeatable, consistent proof that I believe both you and I are equally capable of observing. I'm talking about definition #1 provided by dictionary.com:
–noun 1. that which tends to prove or disprove something; ground for belief; proof.
That is exactly what I mean when I say I have evidence of the soul.
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I accept that you have evidence that you have an experience of self; but you have zero evidence that this is separate from your brain, and considerable evidence that it isn't. If your sense of self were not separate from the brain, how would you know? You havent felt both alternatives and therefore have no means of judging between them by plain sense information.
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quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: By evidence I mean what you and most average people mean by evidence. I'm not talking about a "suspicion" or "belief" or "conviction" I have. I'm talking about proof - repeatable, consistent proof that I believe both you and I are equally capable of observing. I'm talking about definition #1 provided by dictionary.com:
–noun 1. that which tends to prove or disprove something; ground for belief; proof.
No you aren't. Your subjective feelings don't prove anything. They are terrible grounds for believing things, as your yourself admitted, since your brain can be manipulated into sensing and feeling all kinds of false things.
Your feelings are proof of your feelings, and absolutely nothing more.
But if you wish to prove me wrong, it would be simple.
Present the "strong evidence" that your soul is distinct from your brain. You said you have it.
Present it, and everyone will judge if you were equivocating or lying when you said your "evidence" was "strong".
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quote:Experience itself isn't physical by nature, in a way similar to how I know that the number seven is not made of clay. That's just not what it is.
As noted, there is no direct way of telling physical experience from non-physical; whichever theory is correct, nobody has ever experienced the other kind. It follows that there is simply no way to distinguish between them based on sense information alone. How do you distinguish between red and humfinor, based only on the output of your optical nerve?
Edit: I skipped a step there; humfinor is the colour that looks exactly like red unless you have the gene humf13, in which case it looks like red except for being different in a way that's just as easy to explain as the difference between red and blue. The gene is now extinct in humans. Lest anyone think this is a purely theoretical question, I remind you of the distinction between grass green and fence green, which we had a discussion about here a while ago. I can't find it now, but apparently some people distinguish two kinds of green due to having extra colour receptors in their eyes. Tres's assertion is equivalent to saying that he can tell the difference between grass and fence green, having only experienced one kind of green all his life. No you can't.
[ November 02, 2009, 01:47 PM: Message edited by: King of Men ]
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quote:I accept that you have evidence that you have an experience of self; but you have zero evidence that this is separate from your brain, and considerable evidence that it isn't.
I agree that I don't have a lot of evidence that the soul is ever separate from the brain, outside religious sources.
quote:Your feelings are proof of your feelings, and absolutely nothing more.
Exactly - my feelings are proof of MY feelings, which demonstrates that there is a "me" that is experiencing those feelings.
quote:Present the "strong evidence" that your soul is distinct from your brain. You said you have it.
As I said, the "self" that experiences my feelings and thoughts seems to have radically different properties from the brain, meaning it a distinct thing. This is just a very basic part of the direct observation I make, and which you can make. You recognize this distinction yourself when you say things like "subjective feelings don't prove anything". The brain is an objective, physical things which is capable of serving as evidence in the same way any physical object could. The fact that you distinguish my feelings as subjective and incapable of being proof in the same way shows that you are treating them as a thing distinct from the brain and with different properties.
quote:As noted, there is no direct way of telling physical experience from non-physical; whichever theory is correct, nobody has ever experienced the other kind. It follows that there is simply no way to distinguish between them based on sense information alone. How do you distinguish between red and humfinor, based only on the output of your optical nerve?
How would a person who has the humf13 gene prove to a person without that gene that humfinor looks different from red? It's not a theory that he proves. Rather, it's a direct observation. He can see without doubt that the experience of humfinor is fundamentally different for him than the experience of red. That is evidence enough for himself. But to prove it to someone else, he needs to rely on the other person being able to experience it for themselves.
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quote:Your feelings are proof of your feelings, and absolutely nothing more.
Exactly - my feelings are proof of MY feelings, which demonstrates that there is a "me" that is experiencing those feelings.
I'm sorry, but putting a word in all caps isn't evidence, strong or otherwise.
Where was the "me" of Phineas Gage after his accident?
quote:As I said, the "self" that experiences my feelings and thoughts seems to have radically different properties from the brain, meaning it a distinct thing.
The properties of your feelings are that they are the product of chemical and physical processes in your brain. How does this make them distinct from that brain?
If your beliefs are "strong evidence" of things, and you already admitted that your brain can be manipulated into believing all kinds of false things. Which makes it not strong evidence.
So furnish the strong evidence, please.
quote:The brain is an objective, physical things which is capable of serving as evidence in the same way any physical object could. The fact that you distinguish my feelings as subjective and incapable of being proof in the same way shows that you are treating them as a thing distinct from the brain and with different properties.
Just because the brain is a physical object doesn't make it "strong evidence" of anything you wish.
And the properties I am ascribing to your feelings is that they are chemical and physical processes of your brain. And I really have strong evidence that this is the case, as your feelings can be changed with chemical and physical changes to your brain.
quote:How would a person who has the humf13 gene prove to a person without that gene that humfinor looks different from red?
You can't possibly think that it really is impossible to demonstrate to a color-blind person that red and green really are different colors.
quote:He can see without doubt that the experience of humfinor is fundamentally different for him than the experience of red. That is evidence enough for himself.
You honestly think this? That color blind people figure "Well, red and green look the same to me, that's 'strong evidence' that they are"?
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quote:How would a person who has the humf13 gene prove to a person without that gene that humfinor looks different from red? It's not a theory that he proves. Rather, it's a direct observation. He can see without doubt that the experience of humfinor is fundamentally different for him than the experience of red. That is evidence enough for himself. But to prove it to someone else, he needs to rely on the other person being able to experience it for themselves.
Make cards coloured red and humfinor. Offer them to the humfinor-blind person to shuffle. Sort them into red and humfinor, and let the humfinor-blind person observe that you can do this consistently.
Figure out what is the actual property that makes something humfinor rather than red - say it's the polarisation of the reflected light - and make a machine that can reliably tell the difference.
Really, now, this is not difficult.
quote:As I said, the "self" that experiences my feelings and thoughts seems to have radically different properties from the brain, meaning it a distinct thing.
You mean, other than being damaged exactly as the brain is damaged?
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I've explained the strong evidence I have, and I don't want this to be just me repeating myself over and over. I cannot "furnish" the evidence because the internal experiences of my mind can't be taken out and thrown on the table for you to see. So, if you are interested in finding out whether your should agree with me, you have to look into your own mind and see if you see what I see. Judge for yourself, and either agree or disagree.
quote:You can't possibly think that it really is impossible to demonstrate to a color-blind person that red and green really are different colors.
This depends on how trusting the color-blind person is willing to be when other people tell him that red and green look different to them. If he insisted that no, red and green are the same identical experience, what proof could you furnish that they are different experiences for you? You could get a bunch of people and show how each of them can distinguish "green" objects from "red" objects, and that would prove that people can somehow distinguish between the two. But if he was stubborn and still insisted that the two colors produce an identical visual experience and therefore are the same color, then you are stuck.
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Well yes, you can't argue with a nitwit. That doesn't mean you should make nitwittery the basis of your ontology. Of course it's possible to insist that, no, your sense impressions are the only evidence you'll accept. Or you can, you know, stop being an idiot and actually look at the dang evidence.
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I think everyone's arguing against the wrong point here. Tres is basically saying "I think therefore I am," and is using a definition of "distinct" that isn't what most of the rest of the world uses. It's not a matter of she's wrong, it's a matter of "Okay, so what?"
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quote:Make cards coloured red and humfinor. Offer them to the humfinor-blind person to shuffle. Sort them into red and humfinor, and let the humfinor-blind person observe that you can do this consistently.
See above post. This tells you that the person can somehow distinguish humfinor from red, but not whether or not the experience looks different from red.
quote:You mean, other than being damaged exactly as the brain is damaged?
This isn't true. If there's internal bleeding in my brain, there isn't internal bleeding in my consciousness? I'm not even sure what it would mean to say there's internal bleeding in my consciousness.
Usually an injury to the brain causes some different effect to the mind. For instance, if you feel dizzy, that doesn't mean there's physical dizziness located somewhere in your brain. It means something physical happened in your brain that has triggered dizziness in your mind.
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quote:This tells you that the person can somehow distinguish humfinor from red, but not whether or not the experience looks different from red.
Absent gods help us. How else are you suggesting humfinor be distinguished from red, other than having a different sense impression?
quote:Usually an injury to the brain causes some different effect to the mind. For instance, if you feel dizzy, that doesn't mean there's physical dizziness located somewhere in your brain. It means something physical happened in your brain that has triggered dizziness in your mind.
*Feels overwhelming urge to slap some dang sense into Tres*
Dizziness is a movement of electrons and/or chemicals which is different from the usual movement, leading to a different set of nerve commands and feedbacks. This is exactly and precisely a "physical dizziness in the brain".
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quote:Tres is basically saying "I think therefore I am," and is using a definition of "distinct" that isn't what most of the rest of the world uses. It's not a matter of she's wrong, it's a matter of "Okay, so what?"
Firstly, I'm not a "she".
Secondly, "distinct" isn't my term; this is how the term is used in metaphysics. It is essentially "not identical to".
Thirdly, yes, I am saying "I think therefore I am" and then elaborating that I must be a thinking thing. Although its actually more like "I experience thought therefore I am", and thus I am an experiencing thing.
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quote:Well yes, you can't argue with a nitwit. That doesn't mean you should make nitwittery the basis of your ontology.
Yeah, but that's my trouble here. I'm being asked to provide a level of evidence equivalent to what the nitwit is demanding in that example. I can distinguish easily between mental and physical things, consistently. I just can't prove the difference exists to someone who's very intent on asserting there is no difference.
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"I can distinguish easily between mental and physical things, consistently."
You've offered absolutely no hint of how you are drawing the distinction, other than an assertion that you are experiencing things and attributing the fact of your ability to experience things to a soul that is distinct from your physical body.
It would be more valid to attribute the experience to your physical body, in the absence of something more that suggests separate entities, if you give any weight to Occam.
You should probably retract the claim that you have strong evidence for the soul, and instead say you choose to believe that your soul is what does the experiencing, despite the lack of any actual evidence.
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Actually, before the experiment can be designed, it is necessary to demonstrate it is meaningful. A color-blind person understands the difference between black and white; other differences of the same kind can be meaningful. But this is not the case for mental and physical. Suppose I prick your finger. Clearly there is a physical effect: There is a needle going into the skin, nerves are activated, chemicals flow in the brain, you say "Ouch". We have only your assertion that there is something else, which you decide to label "mental". If you cannot produce it in the absence of the physical effects, why assert that it is there? The physical stuff within your brain is the experience.
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Your "strong evidence" would convince you that yesterday never happened, if we manipulated your brain to think that. You already admitted that.
Are you honestly saying that when you use the term "stong evidence" you
1) mean "some observation with only a tangential connection to physical reality, that is very unreliable at telling us what the physical world really is like"
and
2)honestly expect other people to understand that you mean that when you use the term "strong evidence"
Because it's not honest to use the term to refer to your subjective feelings unless you hold both of the above clauses true.
quote:and I don't want this to be just me repeating myself over and over.
You could just admit that when you said "strong evidence" you were exagerating for effect. Admit that you used the world "evidence" because it makes it sound like there is objective, physical, undenably real support for your belief (becuase that's what evidence means), but that this isn't the case.
quote:So, if you are interested in finding out whether your should agree with me, you have to look into your own mind and see if you see what I see. Judge for yourself, and either agree or disagree.
But you haven't told me what to look for! All you've done is capitalize the word MY and said "See, that proves I have a soul distinct from my body".
You can't even list a single known property of this soul, so how will I know what it looks like?
quote:
quote:You can't possibly think that it really is impossible to demonstrate to a color-blind person that red and green really are different colors.
This depends on how trusting the color-blind person is willing to be when other people tell him that red and green look different to them.
Good grief, your attempt to defend your ludicrous argument is leading you to look very stupid.
A color blind person could do a biological experiment, and see that in people with wild-type color cones, each cone reacts differently to colors of light that they can't distinguish between.
quote:If he insisted that no, red and green are the same identical experience, what proof could you furnish that they are different experiences for you?
Experimental data showing that in organisms with wild-type cones, the eyes and brain distinguish between both colors.
Were you expecting this to be a hard question to answer?
Words have meanings. Evidence itself has meaning, it's not just a fancier term to slap on to your favoraite irrational beliefs.
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quote:Ok, design the experiment that lets you distinguish between mental and physical.
We'll do the same experiment you set up for the person who can see humfinor. Start with a bunch of cards. On each card, write something I am familiar with, including objects and experiences. They can be things like "neuron" or "cerebellum" or "the experience of smelling apple pie" or "pain", and then shuffle the cards. Give them to me and I'll sort them into mental and physical. If you want, you can probably offer them to almost any other random person and they'll be able to sort them just the same as I do.
quote:You've offered absolutely no hint of how you are drawing the distinction, other than an assertion that you are experiencing things and attributing the fact of your ability to experience things to a soul that is distinct from your physical body.
Here's one way to draw the distinction: If it is objective, and multiple people can observe it fully, then it is physical. If it is subjective, and only the person experiencing it can observe it fully, then it is mental.
quote:If you cannot produce it in the absence of the physical effects, why assert that it is there?
Again, the same reason I assert there's such a thing as "computer software" that is distinct from the hardware, even though I cannot produce it without any hardware. It's still there, even if not independent from the hardware.
quote:My bad. At some point you posted something that I somehow made the wrong connection from.
quote:Are you honestly saying that when you use the term "stong evidence" you
1) mean "some observation with only a tangential connection to physical reality, that is very unreliable at telling us what the physical world really is like"
and
2)honestly expect other people to understand that you mean that when you use the term "strong evidence"
Yes, after I explained it, as I have.
quote:
quote:If he insisted that no, red and green are the same identical experience, what proof could you furnish that they are different experiences for you?
Experimental data showing that in organisms with wild-type cones, the eyes and brain distinguish between both colors.
This tells you about brains, not experiences. To an average person, this would be convincing, since most people accept a correlation of brains and experiences. But to someone very intent on not accepting that they are different colors, in the approach you are taking to my evidence, that would not be enough.
quote:Again, the same reason I assert there's such a thing as "computer software" that is distinct from the hardware, even though I cannot produce it without any hardware. It's still there, even if not independent from the hardware.
No! Software consists only, and exactly, of patterns of electrons! Here you don't even have the thin excuse of qualia; I defy you to assert that Vista has any dang qualia.
Let's try it from another angle. I take it we can agree that a computer does not have a soul, in any sense of that word. Nonetheless we can certainly program a computer to say "ouch" and hit you when you prod it with a needle. The causality here is perfectly straightforward; needle->electrons->cascades of voltages through transistors->robot arm slaps you. No sense of self involved. Yes?
Now do the same thing with a human. Again the causality is perfectly straightforward: Needle->nerves->cascades of electrons and chemicals->arm slaps you. Now if there's a soul, I see only a few options for it:
* It is an illusion, "what an algorithm feels like from the inside". * It is only an observer; the causal chain linking needle to slap does not involve the sense of self, and is deterministic. * It is a decisionmaker, and there is a step somewhere in between needle and slap which involves a non-electron pushing an electron; this asserts that, within human brains, momentum is not conserved.
I assert the first; I don't think you have distinguished between options two and three yet. However, in the second case, you must explain why the soul always makes the same decision as the deterministic brain. And for the third case, are you seriously asserting the non-conservation of momentum? If so, please stand up and say so loudly.
[ November 03, 2009, 06:48 PM: Message edited by: King of Men ]
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quote:Here's one way to draw the distinction: If it is objective, and multiple people can observe it fully, then it is physical. If it is subjective, and only the person experiencing it can observe it fully, then it is mental.
You're shifting the terms of the discussion again! I wasn't asking for a distinction between 'physical' and 'mental'! Are you now saying that mentation proves the soul? You're just rephrasing the same bare assertion as if it demonstrates anything about your reasoning.
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quote:We'll do the same experiment you set up for the person who can see humfinor. Start with a bunch of cards. On each card, write something I am familiar with, including objects and experiences. They can be things like "neuron" or "cerebellum" or "the experience of smelling apple pie" or "pain", and then shuffle the cards.
Your inability to distinguish the symbol from the referent does not make an argument. You might as well assert that, because you can divide the list "run", "rock", "ball", "throw" and "table" into two classes, there really exists a platonic Noun and Verb.
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quote:Software consists only, and exactly, of patterns of electrons!
Perhaps, but it is still distinct from hardware, even while dependent on that hardware. That's the point: Something can be distinct without being independent of another thing.
quote:Now do the same thing with a human. Again the causality is perfectly straightforward: Needle->nerves->cascades of electrons and chemicals->arm slaps you. Now if there's a soul, I see only a few options for it:
* It is an illusion, "what an algorithm feels like from the inside". * It is only an observer; the causal chain linking needle to slap does not involve the sense of self, and is deterministic. * It is a decisionmaker, and there is a step somewhere in between needle and slap which involves a non-electron pushing an electron; this asserts that, within human brains, momentum is not conserved.
I assert the first;
The first option contradicts itself. It requires the existence of an "inside". If there was no soul, there would be no "inside" and thus nothing to experience the illusion.
You could create a robot version of me that claimed it had an "inside" when in reality it did not, and it would talk just like I'm talking - but it would not actually be experiencing an illusion because it has no actual self to experience it.
quote:You're shifting the terms of the discussion again! I wasn't asking for a distinction between 'physical' and 'mental'!
The following quote from you was not asking for a distinction between physical and mental?
"'I can distinguish easily between mental and physical things, consistently.'
You've offered absolutely no hint of how you are drawing the distinction,"Posts: 8120 | Registered: Jul 2000
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quote:Originally posted by King of Men: Let's try it from another angle. I take it we can agree that a computer does not have a soul, in any sense of that word. Nonetheless we can certainly program a computer to say "ouch" and hit you when you prod it with a needle. The causality here is perfectly straightforward; needle->electrons->cascades of voltages through transistors->robot arm slaps you. No sense of self involved. Yes?
Now do the same thing with a human. Again the causality is perfectly straightforward: Needle->nerves->cascades of electrons and chemicals->arm slaps you. Now if there's a soul, I see only a few options for it:
* It is an illusion, "what an algorithm feels like from the inside". * It is only an observer; the causal chain linking needle to slap does not involve the sense of self, and is deterministic. * It is a decisionmaker, and there is a step somewhere in between needle and slap which involves a non-electron pushing an electron; this asserts that, within human brains, momentum is not conserved.
I assert the first; I don't think you have distinguished between options two and three yet. However, in the second case, you must explain why the soul always makes the same decision as the deterministic brain. And for the third case, are you seriously asserting the non-conservation of momentum? If so, please stand up and say so loudly.
If I'm reading that right... I'll take door #3, Monty.
I think the soul may work though, not by pushing an electron, but by cutting it off from it's path or diverting it along a different one - if that makes any sense.
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Same thing as far as conservation of momentum goes. Well then, your theory makes a testable prediction, to wit, "momentum is not conserved in human brains". This contradicts all known physics; the burden of proof is very much on your side. Go set up the experiment, and shut up until you have the evidence.
quote:The first option contradicts itself. It requires the existence of an "inside". If there was no soul, there would be no "inside" and thus nothing to experience the illusion.
I rephrase: The non-physicality is an illusion. What evidence do you have that a physical system cannot feel? None. Also, you did not say which of the other two options you liked better, nor offer a fourth.
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A physical system *can* feel, in the sense that physical systems can seemingly be somehow linked to a soul, which in turn can experience feelings. But the feeling itself, and the entity experiencing the feeling, cannot be physical because their properties contradict what it means to be physical. What do you think it means to say something is "physical" or "material"?
As for which of the other two options I like better - I really don't have much evidence either way. You are essentially asking whether the soul reflects the brain or whether the brain reflects the soul, and I don't have the knowledge or the ability to study that. Neuroscientists may one day be able to see for certain whether the conservation of energy holds true everywhere within the brain, but I am not aware of any such study at the moment. Given that you told Godric to shut up until he has evidence, I don't think you want me to take up a position on this point until I have stronger evidence.
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Honestly, Tres, your entire argument seems to boil down to "I postulate that the soul does things that the body can't do, and I experience those things, QED."
(Oh, btw, sorry for making a mistake about what I was asking. My bad.)
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That's the heart of my premise, more or less. The conclusion is "Therefore the soul exists."
I have no argument for the premise that I experience things. It's just an observation - a piece of data. If you don't experience things, or you don't observe that you experience things in the way I'm talking about, you won't be convinced by my argument.
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quote:But the feeling itself, and the entity experiencing the feeling, cannot be physical because their properties contradict what it means to be physical. What do you think it means to say something is "physical" or "material"?
The question is rather, what do you think it means to be non-material? The feeling, and the entity, both consist of patterns in the brain. They are made of electrons. If you move the electrons around, the feeling changes; move them enough, and the entity goes away. That's physics.
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Not any more circular than "I see things and seeing things requires an eye from which to see, therefore my eye exists."
quote:The question is rather, what do you think it means to be non-material? The feeling, and the entity, both consist of patterns in the brain. They are made of electrons. If you move the electrons around, the feeling changes; move them enough, and the entity goes away. That's physics.
Not being made of electrons is one element of being non-material, at least. The feelings I observe myself having, and the self having those feelings are not the sort of thing that can be constructed out of electrons. No infinitely large diagram of electrons in a given pattern will tell you what it is to experience something if you haven't experienced it yourself. And you can't observe a set of electrons in my brain and know for sure whether I truly have a "self" that is experiencing things or whether I am just acting like I do.
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Tres: that's a fascinating example, considering it doesn't require an eye to see anything. The brain is perfectly capable of coming up with images (especially if subject to stimulation) all on its own, and we're already approaching the point of being able to induce particular images.
So, if you think the arguments are similarly well-supported, then you've just undermined your soul argument.
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quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: But the feeling itself, and the entity experiencing the feeling, cannot be physical because their properties contradict what it means to be physical.
I'm not a particularly strong materialist, but this doesn't make sense at all. There is no particular reason that those things cannot be physical. Here is one possible explanation:
Physically, the feeling is an electrochemical cascade that passes through nerves. The experience is an electrochemical cascade within the brain of the entity, one that that forms particular patterns. If these patterns are similar to ones that have happened to this brain in the past, another electrochemical cascade within the brain associates the current experience with the past experience.
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quote:Originally posted by Tresopax: The feelings I observe myself having, and the self having those feelings are not the sort of thing that can be constructed out of electrons. No infinitely large diagram of electrons in a given pattern will tell you what it is to experience something if you haven't experienced it yourself. And you can't observe a set of electrons in my brain and know for sure whether I truly have a "self" that is experiencing things or whether I am just acting like I do.
I have three questions: why not, why not, and why not?
You're asserting these things as axiomatic, not demonstrating them with logic or evidence as you claim to be doing. I think that's why you attract so much argument every time you start talking about this stuff.
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quote:The feelings I observe myself having, and the self having those feelings are not the sort of thing that can be constructed out of electrons.
Sez you! I can move electrons around in a particular pattern in your brain and make you experience anything you choose.
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quote:The brain is perfectly capable of coming up with images (especially if subject to stimulation) all on its own, and we're already approaching the point of being able to induce particular images.
We're already at that point. It's just that the images are of very low fidelity at the moment.
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quote:I can move electrons around in a particular pattern in your brain and make you experience anything you choose.
No, you can't. We don't know how to do this and we're not sure if we ever will. That's just a belief you hold without confirming evidence. That your ideology says that is will be the case doesn't magically make it so or based in any sort of real world science.
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quote:We don't know how to do this and we're not sure if we ever will.
We have done things, though, like identify particular neuron(s) that, when stimulated, make a given individual taste cake or forget Bill Clinton's name. It's doubtful that a perfect map of anyone's brain is going to be possible in our lifetimes, because of the way brains grow, but it turns out that sensations and memories behave pretty predictably once you know where they are for a given person.
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quote:I can move electrons around in a particular pattern in your brain and make you experience anything you choose.
No, you can't. We don't know how to do this and we're not sure if we ever will. That's just a belief you hold without confirming evidence. That your ideology says that is will be the case doesn't magically make it so or based in any sort of real world science.
Well - fair enough, I overstated the case of what we can do with current technology. But see Tom's post above.
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Absent gods help us. How else are you suggesting humfinor be distinguished from red, other than having a different sense impression? ![[Wink]](wink.gif)
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At some point you posted something that I somehow made the wrong connection from.
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